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Executive summary 
Background to the Study 
 
Discussions on the possibility to attribute liability to legal persons for 
committing offences are far from new. The Romans already had a clear position 
on this and were opposed to the idea that a persona could be anything else than a 
natural person. Even though this default position evolved and despite the 
consequent lenience towards accepting forms of liability (including criminal 
liability) of legal persons, the classical idea that legal persons could not be 
criminally punished prevailed. This resulted in the adagium societas non 
delinquere potest, nec puniri.  
Even though during the Middle Ages the concept remained somewhat 
controversial, the balance shifted in favour of accepting criminal liability of legal 
persons. However, this evolution was inhibited in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution. It was not until 1992 that the French Criminal Code officially 
reinstalled the criminal liability of legal persons. As to the former Soviet 
republics and Soviet satellite states, the State did not feel it necessary to install 
such criminal liability, considering that all undertakings were owned by the 
state and the autonomous powers of the managers was thus very limited. By 
contrast, the climate in the Anglo-Saxon countries provided incentives to 
recognize the legal persons’ criminal liability. 
As a result, in today’s European Union, the landscape is scattered. Although 
there is a clear tendency in favour of corporate criminal liability, it is not 
generally accepted. Because of the remaining diversity, it is important to identify 
the main commonalities and differences in order to correctly reflect these 
differences in cross-national policy initiatives. 
Liability of legal persons for offences is an issue which has been coming and 
going on the EU’s political agenda, but has never been subject of a full-fledged 
EU policy. Nowadays the issue is again becoming more and more prominent, 
and in this context the European Commission published a tender for a Study 
(European Commission, 2010), which was awarded to IRCP (Institute for 
International Research on Criminal Policy) and is conducted by the authors of this 
contribution. Considerable differences exist in the approach with respect to the 
liability of legal persons for offences, which is partially due to the fact that there 
are still significant remaining outstanding issues in theoretical debate. 
Opponents of criminal liability of legal persons argue that the latter does not 
have its proper mind and is therefore unable to have a criminal intent (societas 
delinquere non potest). Proponents however, regard legal persons as more than 
mere legal fictions: given their existence and their predominant position in our 
society they must be liable for the offences they commit (European Commission, 
2004).   
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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The study conducted for the European Commission aimed at gathering 
factual information on the legal framework that governed the liability of legal 
persons for offences in each of the 27 member states. To that end, the team drew 
up a questionnaire comprising of questions targeting solely the existing national 
liability approach. Based on the results of a preliminary desk-top study, the team 
divided the questionnaire into two main parts, preceded by some introductory 
questions. The first part dealt with the criminal liability of legal persons for 
offences, whereas the second part dealt with the administrative liability of legal 
persons for offences. Those two parts reflect the large majority of liability 
approaches in the member states though it showed from the preliminary 
analysis that also civil liability mechanisms were put in place in some member 
states.  
 
Diversity in the member states 
 
Despite a tendency towards the introduction of criminal liability of legal 
persons for offences, significant differences still exist in the approach developed 
in the member states. Differences in competent authorities were identified, 
differences based on the involvement of private or public legal persons, 
differences in attribution mechanisms, differences in the offences which can be 
brought in relation to liability of legal persons, and the sanctions which can be 
imposed on legal persons. Firstly, with respect to the differences related to the 
competent authorities involved, the analysis presented an overview of the choice 
for criminal, administrative and/or civil liability of legal persons. The mapping 
exercise lead to the conclusion that 5 member states have not introduced a form 
of criminal liability in their national law and 8 member states have not 
introduced a form of administrative liability in their national law. This diversity 
is also relevant in relation to the other diversities regarding liability of legal  
persons in that the varieties based on the involvement of private or public legal 
persons, differences in attribution mechanisms, differences in the offences which 
can be brought in relation to liability of legal persons, and the sanctions which 
can be imposed on legal persons. 
Secondly, with respect to the differences related to the type of persons 
involved, it must be noted that the concept of a legal person is sometimes used 
as an umbrella concept to include both natural and fictitious persons. For a 
proper analysis and comparison, it is important to clearly define a legal person 
as an entity (as opposed to a human being) recognized by the law as having 
legal personality, without excluding states and other public bodies and 
organizations from its scope. The latter nuance was added because the legal 
person concept is rarely limited to private legal persons. Nonetheless, awareness 
of the (rare) limitation is necessary, especially when examined in light of 
differences regarding criminal vs. administrative liability: in relation to criminal 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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liability of legal persons there tends to be more limits on liability of public legal 
persons than is the case for administrative liability of legal persons.  
Thirdly, with respect to the differences in attribution mechanisms, three 
theoretical schools were used as a basis to map the attribution techniques 
introduced in the member states. A distinction can be made between:  
− the vicarious liability/respondeat superior theory which opts for an almost civil 
law like attribution by stating that ‘any’ misconduct by the legal persons’ 
employees will lead to legal person responsibility; 
− the alter ego/identification model. stating that only managers and employees 
endowed with certain responsibilities may cause criminal liability for the 
legal person; 
− the aggregation model theory, aimed at identifying a collective responsibility of 
individuals within the legal person, rather than identifying an individual 
perpetrator, aggregation could therefore involve matching the conduct of one 
individual with the state of mind or culpability of another individual to 
achieve liability. 
A fourth model, the organisational model/self-identity-doctrine was also 
included. It is based on the assumption that legal persons have a mechanism for 
expressing their substance and self-identity, and can thus be held liable for 
crimes, without necessarily having to be linked to the behaviour of individuals.   
The identification model is the model used in the EU’s approximation 
instruments. Different elements of the several attribution models apply in many 
MS, but in relation to criminal liability, an overwhelming majority applies 
elements of both the vicarious liability and the identification model. Parallel 
prosecution of natural and legal persons is possible in a wide majority of the 
member states; whereas concurrent liability occurs in – on average – 55% of the 
member states. 
Fourthly, with respect to the differences in offences which can give rise to 
liability of legal persons, analysis revealed that only few member states have 
introduced an all inclusive liability for legal persons. Most member states have 
opted for an enumeration strategy selecting either families of offences or single 
offences for which a legal person can be held liable. 
Fifthly and finally, with respect to the differences in sanctions which can be 
imposed on legal persons, analysis revealed that the sanction arsenal is very 
divers, though some member states have not included separate sanctions in their 
legal system and/or included a conversion mechanism to convert inoperable 
sanction types to a financial sanction. 
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Recommendations for a coherent and consistent policy with respect 
to the liability of legal persons for offences 
 
With respect to approximation 
 
Since the introduction in the Amsterdam Treaty of the possibility to 
approximate the constituent elements of offences and sanctions, a significant 
number of approximating framework decisions and, since the Lisbon Treaty, 
directives, has been adopted. Examples can be found in relation to fraud and 
counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment, the fight against terrorism, 
trafficking in human beings, the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and 
residence within the EU, corruption in the private sector, the sexual exploitation 
of children and child pornography, illicit drug trafficking, and attacks against 
information systems.  
 
Recommendation 1 –  Continue general approach 
It is important to continue the general approach with respect to the 
introduction of provisions related to the liability of legal persons for offences 
included in approximation instruments. Considering the existence of structures 
such as accessories or instigators it should be kept as a baseline that legal 
persons can be involved in any type of offence. 
 
Recommendation 2 –  Complement non-EU instruments where necessary 
Though it is a good practice to take account of existing approximation efforts 
in non-EU instruments and refer to those instruments for the definition of the 
constituent elements of offences, it is important to thoroughly assess to what 
extent it is necessary to complement the provisions with respect to the liability of 
legal persons included in the concerned non-EU instrument. 
 
Recommendation 3 –  Avoid terminology with ‘criminal law’ connotation 
Especially because the EU has continuously accepted the diversity in the 
member states and has decided not to introduce the obligation to introduce a 
criminal liability for legal persons, the use of the term sanctions should have 
preferences over penalty which has a criminal law connotation. 
 
Recommendation 4 –  Reconsider the scope of a ‘legal person’ 
In the current EU policy with respect to the liability of legal persons for 
offences, public legal persons are not included in the scope. Considering that a 
lot of member states include one or more types of public legal persons within the 
scope of their national liability approach, the EU can consider extending its 
scope accordingly.  It is advised to delete the current limitation regarding the 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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scope of legal persons, usually phrased as “ […] States or other public bodies in the 
exercise of State authority and […] public international organizations”. 
 
Recommendation 5 –  Consider the introduction of ‘strict liability’ 
The introduction of a system of strict liability as is done in some member 
states can significantly reduce the burden of proof when prosecuting those 
offences. The introduction of this type of liability in the EU instrumentarium 
would entail that it is no longer necessary to prove the commitment of an 
offence by a specific natural person with the legal person.  
 
Recommendation 6 – Rephrase the currently suggested sanctions 
Some of the sanctions currently included in the list of suggestions can be 
better phrased. The recommendation can be made to rephrase the suggested 
‘exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid’ in a way to clearly 
encompass the exclusion from participation in a public tender procedure in its 
scope, especially since that suggestion is included in some other EU instruments. 
 
Recommendation 7 – Develop a standard set of suggested sanctions  
Though the suggested sanctions are to a large extent consistently included in 
all approximation instruments, there seems to be no tangible explanation why 
some are not included in a small number of approximation instruments. It is 
therefore recommended to develop a clear and transparent standard set of 
suggested sanctions for legal persons. 
 
Recommendation 8 – Complement standard set with additional sanctions 
Besides the standard set of suggested sanctions, additional (suggested) 
sanctions can be included reflecting the specificity of the offence. 
 
Recommendation 9 – Look into need for specific ‘legal person’-offences  
Based on the current formulation of the constituent elements of the offences, 
it is not always clear whether specific situations fall within its scope. Especially 
subcontracting constructions raise a lot of questions. It should therefore be 
looked into whether or not it is desirable to criminalise the situations linked to 
e.g. subcontracting and subsequently look into the necessity to either rephrase 
the constituent elements of the current offences or to develop a new set of  
specific ‘legal person’-offences. 
 
Recommendation 10 –  Increase follow-up of the implementation process 
Analysis has revealed that the implementation of the current set of 
approximation instruments is far from flawless. The implementation process in 
the member states should be followed more closely. In the event the current 
instruments need to be amended, the opportunity should be seized to introduce 
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directives the poor implementation of which can give rise to the start of an 
infringement procedure. 
 
With respect to mutual recognition 
 
Mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements would facilitate co-
operation between authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights. At 
the Tampere summit, the European Council therefore endorsed the principle of 
mutual recognition which, in its view, should become the cornerstone of judicial 
co-operation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. In order to 
implement the principle, a programme of measures was adopted in January 
2001. Because mutual recognition is now enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty as a 
basic principle for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, a consistent 
interpretation and application becomes all the more important. The programme 
of measures remains an interesting guideline, but more gaps can be identified 
and should be filled to ensure a consistent European criminal policy with respect 
to the application of the principle of mutual recognition. 
 
Recommendation 11 –  Extend mutual recognition instrumentarium 
The current instrumentarium regulating the mutual recognition of sentences 
and governing their cross-border execution is largely focused on the sanctions 
typically imposed against natural persons. A comprehensive and consistent 
policy with respect to the liability of legal persons would need to contain 
instruments regulating the mutual recognition of the sanctions typically 
imposed against legal persons.  
 
Recommendation 12 – Develop general approach with respect to refusal 
grounds related to the differences 
In the current instrumentarium, nor the differences in administrative vs. 
criminal liability, nor the differences based on the type of involved legal persons, 
nor the variety in attribution mechanisms, nor the differences in offences leading 
to liability of legal persons, nor the sanctions which can be imposed  are 
considered as eligible grounds to refuse execution of judicial decisions imposing 
a financial penalty or confiscation measure upon a legal person. The question 
arises whether that will become a general approach when extending the mutual 
recognition instrumentarium to encompass also cross-border execution of other 
sanctions. 
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With respect to the information exchange policy 
 
If the EU wants to ensure that convictions handed down against legal 
persons with respect to the offences it has identified in the approximation 
instruments have effect, it is important to ensure that such information 
effectively flows from one member state to another. Within the EU, taking 
account of prior convictions is an inherent part of the fight against crime. First, 
there is the taking account of previous convictions in the course of a new 
criminal proceeding which is regulated by a framework decision that introduces 
an obligation thereto. Second, there is the policy option to introduce the taking 
account of prior convictions in the context of disqualifications in the sense that 
convictions for certain offences must on the one hand automatically lead to 
disqualifications  and on the other hand be allowed to be used as a basis for 
disqualifications. The existing obligations and the future policy options warrant 
a critical assessment of the EU’s data exchange policy. 
 
Recommendation 13 – Introduce the obligation to keep records  
Analysis has revealed that not all member states keep (complete and 
comprehensive) records in relation to the liability of legal persons for offence. 
With a view to extending the information exchange with respect to the liability 
of legal persons for offences in the EU, the first step would be to introduce an 
obligation to keep records in order to be able to provide information upon 
request. 
 
Recommendation 14 – Introduce exchange and storage obligations 
Analogous to the exchange and storage obligations that have been 
introduced with respect to the criminal records of natural persons, similar 
exchange and storage obligations should be introduced with respect to the 
liability (criminal or other) of legal persons for offences. It would significantly 
facilitate the taking account of prior convictions in the course of criminal or non-
criminal procedures. 
 
With respect to the procedural safeguards policy 
 
For many years, the European Union, did not have any explicit jurisdiction as 
far as the human rights aspects of criminal proceedings were concerned. In 
December 2000, the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament 
jointly signed and solemnly proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union which covers the whole range of civil, political, economic 
and social rights of European citizens, by synthesizing the constitutional 
traditions and international obligations common to the member states, divided 
into six sections: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizen’s Rights and 
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Justice. Having increasingly gained importance the procedural safeguards policy 
has worked its way up to the top of the political agenda where the completion of 
the Road map on procedural safeguards can be found. 
 
Recommendation 15 –  Ensure equivalent protection outside criminal 
liability context 
Especially because the EU has continuously accepted the EU-wide diversity 
regarding the criminal vs. administrative liability of legal persons in the member 
states and has decided not to introduce the obligation to introduce a criminal 
liability for legal persons, it is important to complement that policy choice with a 
policy that ensures a procedural protection in relation to offences administrative 
and civil liability for offences that is equivalent to the procedural protection 
foreseen in the context of a criminal liability mechanism. 
 
 
Recommendation 16 –  Ensure equivalent protection for natural and legal 
persons 
The development of the policy line to enhance the level of protection 
provided by procedural safeguards in the EU, is mainly focused on the 
procedural safeguards natural persons need. It is important to look into the 
specificity of the situation in which a legal person finds itself and ensure 
equivalent protection for natural and legal persons. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Liability of legal persons for offences is an issue which has been coming and 
going on the EU’s political agenda, but which has so far not yet been the object 
of a clear and full-fledged EU policy. In the context of recent increasing 
importance of the subject – evidenced for example by the recent introduction of 
criminal liability of legal persons in some member states, the  European 
Commission published the tender for this Study,1 and awarded the contract to 
the IRCP (Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy). The main purpose 
of this Study is to, for the entirety of the European Union, map the variety 
between the member states in relation to both the very concept of liability of 
legal persons for offences, and its different manifestations. In addition thereto, 
the project team has formulated a set of recommendations providing their 
academic opinion on the implications those differences (should) have on EU 
policy making. 
Considerable differences exist regarding the very concept of a legal person 
on the one hand, and the concept of liability of legal persons for offences on the 
other. The introductory chapter contains a brief theoretical introduction of the 
main elements of the Study, as well as the methodological working method. The 
structure of this report is built starting from the realisation that when analysing 
the impact of the national diversity in attributing liability to legal persons, two 
separate yet undeniably linked interests are involved.  
First, from a member state perspective, concerns can be raised regarding the 
level of legal certainty in relation to the liability of legal persons throughout the 
Union. In its determination to contribute to increasing legal certainly in this 
field, the project team thoroughly analysed the variety on five different levels, 
namely differences in competent authorities, differences based on the 
involvement of private or public legal persons, differences in attribution 
mechanisms, differences in the offences which can be brought in relation to 
liability of legal persons, and the sanctions which can be imposed on legal 
persons. Given the existing variety criminal justice, administrative and civil 
liability, the reality in the member states is consistently analysed from 
particularly the first two perspectives. While doing so, care was taken to 
carefully preserve the scope of the Study: given that it concerns an analysis of 
the liability for offences, administrative liability regimes are only relevant in as far 
as they have any ties with offences touching upon the criminal justice sphere.  
Second, from an EU perspective it is important that the diversity is accepted 
only to the extent that it would not undermine the effectiveness of other policies, 
                                                             
1 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010), DG Justice, Invitation to tender, 
JLS/2010/JPEN/PR/0009/E4, “Study on the liability of legal persons for offences in the national 
legal systems of the Member States”.  
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especially given the increase in cross-border corporate crime, which has been 
facilitated amongst others by the removal of internal borders. The existing 
policies will be scanned in order to evaluate whether the identified diversity in 
liability of legal persons is adequately reflected: not only does Chapter 3 
scrutinize the EU’s own policy making relevant to the liability of legal persons, 
Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the member states’ experience and the EU 
instruments in relation to cross-border cooperation in criminal matters which are 
relevant to liability of legal persons.  
 
1.1 Concept of a legal person  
For the purposes of law the conception of “person” is a legal conception. In 
other words, the definition of what is a person is determined by what the law 
considers a person to be. As DEWEY suggests, given that the law determines 
what constitutes a person, a person might be used simply as a synonym for a 
right-and-duty-bearing unit.2 However, of course, obvious differences exist 
between what is known to be natural persons and the ‘rest-category’, which 
would then be called legal persons. Despite having been subject to debate in the 
past,3 currently, a natural person is any person which can be deemed human, 
that is to say a human being.  
The above notion of a natural person is not free from critique, because such 
terminology entails the risk of being interpreted in a way that only nature and 
not law confers the quality of a person. Therefore, it is sometimes suggested 
(and in some countries this is indeed the practice) to use the term ‘legal person’ 
as an umbrella term, to then distinguish two different sets of persons within that 
group, being natural persons vs. legal entities.  Consequently, the wordings 
‘legal person’ (or their literal translation) could be interpreted to mean any 
‘person’ which is recognized by law, meaning what is called legal persons in this 
Study plus natural persons. The project team dismisses this reasoning due to its 
inherent risk of confusion on the one hand and – more importantly – due to 
inconsistency with the existing European legislative framework. Indeed, when 
European (be it Council of Europe of EU) laws and regulations refer to what in 
this latter approach is called “a legal entity” the terminology “legal person” is 
used. Therefore, this Study examines “legal persons” in the sense of an entity 
recognized as such by law and thus represents a ‘subgroup’ of  the broad 
meaning given to a legal person in some member states (and outside the Union). 
It is advised to raise awareness of the different meanings in the member states 
                                                             
2 J. DEWEY, “The historic background of corporate legal personality”, Yale law Journal, April 
1926, 655-673. 
3 AUSTIN, J., CAMPBELL, R., AUSTIN, S. (eds.), Lectures on jurisprudence, or, The philosophy of 
positive law, 1911, London, J. Murray. 
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(all the more so considering the language differences) and to make a clear 
distinction between the national terminology and the terminology as used in 
cross-border context. It be noted that not only variations of “legal person” as 
opposed to “legal entity” occur: often, the terms used in national law are simply 
different words than the literal translation of legal person or entity. In France for 
example, the correct legal person as used in this Study “personne morale”. In yet 
other cases, native English speaking countries simply do not employ the term 
“legal person”, such as Ireland.  
For the definition of a “legal person”4 this Study departs from the first part of 
the definition offered in the Second Protocol to the PIF Convention:5 “a legal 
person shall mean any entity having such status under the applicable national law”. Not 
only is this the same definition as the one being used in the Council of Europe 
Convention on Corruption,6 it is also the definition used in the several EU 
instruments approximating rules in relation to criminal corporate liability. The 
definition entails that a person having the status of legal person under the 
national law, was recognised by law to be a legal person, as opposed to a natural 
person. Recognition by law refers to the concept of legal personality. After all, 
even though many differences occur, throughout the Union most member states 
use varieties of the definition of a legal person which is for example used in 
Portugal: “A legal person is an association of people or a special fund, established for 
social or collective purposes, which is recognized by law as having legal personality.”7 
Key concept is legal personality and whether or not such personality is 
attributed to the concerned person. Entities having legal personality are “certain 
groupings with the ability of being the holders of rights and obligations […] attributing 
to them the quality of subject of law” (free translation).8 It be noted that in some 
member states groupings without legal personality can still be held criminally 
liable;9 these will not be closely examined in this Study given that they do not 
fall within the scope of the definition of a legal person, the subject of this Study.  
As mentioned, the definition used by the project team to determine what 
qualifies as a legal person is based on the first part of the definition used in the 
majority used in the relevant European legislation. It was a conscious choice not 
to include the second part of that definition, namely the part excluding public 
legal persons: according to the relevant EU instruments, the following do not 
                                                             
4 As explained elsewhere, this contribution is limited to ‘private’ legal persons.  
5 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1997), “Act of 19 June 1997 drawing up the second 
protocol of the Convention on the protection the European Communities’ financial interests”, 
OJ C 221 of 19.7.1997, Art. 1(d).  
6 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1999), 27 January 1999, “Criminal law Convention on Corruption”, 
Strasbourg,  CETS 173, Art. 1(d). 
7 J.d.C. MENDES, Teoria Geral do Direito Civil, Vol. I., Lisboa, A.A.F.D.L., reeimpressão, 1998.  
8 SIMONART, La personnalité morale en droit privé comparé, Brussels, Bruylant, 1995, 7.  
9 Cfr. infra 2.2.2. 
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qualify as legal persons as meant in those instruments: “ […] States or other public 
bodies in the exercise of State authority and […] public international organizations”. 
The project team does not wish to copy this limitation: the survey contained 
questions regarding the distinction between private and public legal persons, an 
aspect which could not be left out when conducting a study on the liability of 
legal persons. As will be seen below, a considerable amount of member states 
applies criminal liability to their public legal persons.10 Therefore, it is 
recommended that the EU would take these data into account in the future 
policy making related to liability of legal persons, at the very least in relation to 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
Even though we can try to avoid confusion in relation to the term (legal 
person as opposed to a natural person instead of the umbrella term comprising 
natural persons plus legal entities), the fact that its meaning differs according to 
the national applicable law should be stressed. The differences exist in relation to 
different aspects and on different levels, dealt with below in 2.    
 
1.2 Concept of liability of legal persons  
Discussions on the possibility to attribute liability to legal persons for 
committing offences are far from new. The Romans already had a clear position 
on this and were opposed to the idea that a persona could be anything else than a 
natural person.11 Even though this default position evolved and despite the 
consequent lenience towards accepting forms of liability (including criminal 
liability) of legal persons, the classical idea that legal persons could not be 
criminally punished prevailed. This resulted in the adagium societas non 
delinquere potest, nec puniri.  
Even though during the Middle Ages the concept remained somewhat 
controversial, the balance shifted in favour of accepting criminal liability of legal 
persons. However, this evolution was inhibited in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution, and except for the Netherlands – the first member state to introduce 
the concept of criminal liability of legal persons, in 1976 – it was not until the last 
decade of the 20th century that the concept was (re)established in some EU 
member states’ national systems.12 In 1992 the French Criminal Code officially 
                                                             
10 Or, when criminal liability is not applied to these types of legal persons, often a system of 
administrative liability is applicable. 
11 This resulted from an antique philosophy based on the principle according to which universi 
consentire non possunt: R. VALEUR, La responsabilité pénale des personnes morales dans les droits 
francais et anglo-américains, Giard, Paris, 1931. 
12 This holds true for the continental member states only. The United Kingdom introduced 
certain forms of criminal liability of legal persons already in the first half of the 20th century.  
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reinstalled the criminal liability of legal persons.13 In Belgium, it was not before 
the law of 1999 that legal persons could be held liable and punished. Before that, 
the adagium societas non delinquere potest, nec puniri prevented legal persons from 
being punished. In other member states, criminal liability for legal persons does 
not exist. In Germany for example, according to the traditional opinion, a legal 
entity is not capable of guilt. Today still, this implies that no criminal liability for 
legal persons exist in Germany, but in 1968, with the German Administrative 
Offences Act (Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz), the general possibility of imposing 
administrative fines on associations was introduced (par. 30 
Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz). In yet other cases, it is currently in the process of 
being introduced in national law.  
However, even when no criminal liability of legal persons exists, systems 
were created to fill this gap: in Malta, where an offence is “committed by” a legal 
person every person who at the time of the commission of the offence was a 
director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of such legal person or was 
purporting to act in such capacity shall be guilty of that offence (committed by 
the legal person) unless he proves that the offence was committed without his 
knowledge and that the he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission 
of the offence.14  
As to the former Soviet republics and Soviet satellite states, the State did not 
feel it necessary to install such criminal liability, considering that all 
undertakings were owned by the state and the autonomous powers of the 
managers was thus very limited. By contrast, the climate in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries provided incentives to recognize the legal persons’ criminal liability.15  
As a result, in today’s European Union, the landscape is shattered.  
Criminal liability of legal persons is not accepted in all member states (below: 
differences in competent authorities, see 2.1). Opponents of criminal liability of legal 
persons argue that the latter does not have its proper mind and is therefore 
unable to have a criminal intent (societas delinquere non potest). The idea is that 
when a person has decided to act unlawfully – where he had the option to 
decide on the opposite – the capability for such decisions presupposes the 
                                                             
13 For more details: S. ADAM, G. VERMEULEN, W. DE BONDT, “Corporate criminal liability 
and the EC/EU: bridging sovereignty paradigms for the sake of an area of justice, freedom and 
security” in ADAM, S., N. COLETTE-BASECQZ e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes 
morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (373) 374-379.  
14 Note that Maltese law recently introduced the concept of criminal liability for legal persons in 
relation to specific offences including inter alia money laundering, terrorism, abuse of public 
authority, certain crimes against the peace and honour of families and morals, traffic of persons,  
incitement to racial hatred, fraud and computer misuse. 
15 M., WAGNER., “Corporate Criminal Liability National and International Responses”, 1999, 
paper presented at the Thirteenth International conference of the International Society for the 
Reform of Criminal low on Commercial and Financial Fraud, Malta, 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/CorporateCriminal.pdf. 
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possession of moral self-determination and the consequent capability of 
deciding on what is lawful or not, which in turn necessitates a certain moral 
maturity.16 According to this theory, the notion of guilt cannot be transferred to 
legal persons.17 In the same token, the punishment, which is a consequence of 
the guilty party’s actions, cannot be imposed on legal persons.18 This rejection 
has ever since been the prevailing opinion in Germany,19 and often its protection 
was voiced using blunt terminology. STRATENWERTH considered any revision 
of the established opinion as “obviously senseless”.20 Until this day, case-law and 
legislation have indeed refused to apply any criminal liability to legal persons. 
Only acts of individual persons are punishable, not the organisation to which 
these persons belong when they act.21  
Proponents of liability of legal persons view the latter as more than mere 
legal fictions: given their existence and their predominant position in our society 
they must be liable for the offences they commit.22 According to some, the 
prevailing opinion is that the application of criminal liability to legal persons is 
“fair”23: in Denmark for example, applying ethical judgments to undertakings is 
not perceived as problematic given that also in everyday life, such entities are 
increasingly treated as suitable subjects for moral judgments.24  
The consequences of a legal system qualifying as either of the above positions 
are tremendous; after all, the choice for one or the other position determines 
whether or not a State applies criminal liability to its legal persons. When no 
                                                             
16 R. SCHMITT, Strafrechtliche Massnahmen gegen Verbände. Gleichzeitig ein Beitrag zur Lehre von 
den strafrechtlichen Unrechtsfolgen, Stuttgart, 1958, 187. 
17 G. STRATENWERTH, “Strafrechliche Unternehmenshaftung?” in K. GEPPERT, J. BOHNERT 
and R. RENGIER (eds.), Festschrift für Rudolf Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag, Tübingen, 1992. 
18 H.-H. JESCHECK, “Die strafrecthliche Verantwortlichkeit der Personenverbände”, 65 
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafwissenschaft [1953] 213. 
19 DÖLLING, D. and LAUE, C., “Corporate criminal liability in Germany: a never ending 
story?” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes 
morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 28. 
20 G. STRATENWERTH, “Strafrechliche Unternehmenshaftung?” in K. GEPPERT, J. BOHNERT 
and R. RENGIER (eds.), Festschrift für Rudolf Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag, Tübingen, 1992, 302. 
21 D. DÖLLING and C. LAUE, “Corporate criminal liability in Germany: a never ending story?” 
in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en 
Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 29. 
22 EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004), “Green Paper on the approximation, mutual recognition 
and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union”. COM (2004) 334 final of 
30.04.2004, point 3.1.6. 
23 V. GREVE, Det strafferetlige ansvar, Jurist- og Okonomforbundets Forlag, Copenhague, 2004, 
174. 
24 TOFTEGAARD NIELSEN, G., "Criminal liability of companies in Denmark. Eighty years of 
experience” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des 
personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (105) 
108. 
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criminal liability for offences exists, some member states employ an alternative 
kind of liability: administrative liability for offences, as opposed to any form of 
liability that under national law qualifies as such. There is a considerable 
difference between an administrative liability system whereby legal persons can 
be held liable for the commitments of ‘criminal offence – like offences’, situated 
in the criminal justice sphere, and administrative liability for purely 
administrative matters. 
Although there is a clear tendency in favour of corporate criminal liability, it 
is not generally accepted. In the Chapter on the member states’ diversity the 
practical reality throughout the EU will be analysed. The developed distinction 
between criminal and administrative liability for offence will be integrated in all 
following facets of the MS analysis.  
 
1.3 Methodology and time-frame 
The MS legal persons’ liability regimes differ throughout the European 
Union. The need to carefully examine the extent of these differences warranted a 
methodological focus on the acquisition of empirical data at member states level. 
In order to ensure a targeted approach the Study mainly built on two 
separate approaches which were made as inter-independent as possible: desktop 
review on the one hand, and member states data gathering on the other.  
The project team has phased the project and divided the work into a series of 
work packages, consisting of first, preparatory desktop research, second, the 
member states analysis and third, an extensive assessment of the implications of 
the acquired data in light of the conducted desktop research. 
 
WP 1 – Preparatory desktop review 
WP 2 – MS level analysis 
WP 3 – Assessment of implications 
 
Consultation with the European Commission shaped certain aspects of these 
work packages. The project team and the European Commission held several 
meetings aimed at consultation and preliminary feedback.  
First, on 16 December 2010, a kick-off meeting was held. The European 
Commission explicitly requested that the member states questionnaire would 
not contain any questions on EU policy, neither on EU approximation policy, 
nor on the EU policy in relation to international cooperation in criminal matters 
in the EU.  The questionnaire should solely aim at mapping the existing 
diversity. The project team submitted a Progress Report to the European 
Commission with a view to validating the questionnaire before sending it to the 
member states. On 17 February 2011 a progress meeting was held in order to 
discuss the Inception Report. Based on the Commission’s recommendations the 
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progress report was adjusted and reformed into the Inception Report. Upon 
approval, the questionnaire was sent to the member states. Lastly, after the 
deadline for the completion of the member states’ questionnaire had passed, the 
project team and the European Commission held an intermediary meeting on 27 
July 2011 with a view to discussing the approach for analysis and reporting. 
Based on the preliminary analysis of the empirical results, the decision was 
made to present some member states with additional clarification questions. By 
mid December 2011 the member states consultation was closed and the final 
analysis started. The final report was submitted on 17 January 2012. 
The following paragraphs aim at summarising the different steps taken in 
each of the identified work packages. 
1.3.1 WP 1 Preparatory desktop review 
 
The first work package consisted of the preparatory desktop research and 
had a twofold objective. Firstly, it aimed at updating the existing in-house 
knowledge and in doing so obtaining a more complete and updated 
understanding of the criminal liability regimes regarding legal persons. The 
theoretical background regarding liability of legal persons was thoroughly 
analysed. Secondly, it served as the basis for the development of the member 
states questionnaire which forms the basis of this Study. 
In this phase of the Study, the project team has identified the three main 
subjects around which the member states’ questionnaire should be built. First, 
from the desktop review the need had surfaced to clearly establish the 
definitions and different possible forms of the concept of a legal person in the 
different member states, focusing on both terminological and content 
differences. Secondly, detailed questions concerning criminal liability regimes 
regarding legal persons were developed. From the research followed that some 
member states only apply an administrative liability regime, whereas other legal 
systems do not comprise this type of liability and only contain an administrative 
liability regime (others combine both systems).  
1.3.2 WP 2 MS level analysis 
 
The second work package and the main part of the study consists of the MS 
level analysis, which aims at collecting information on the existence, and 
application of one or more liability regimes of legal persons in the member 
states, and at the analysis of the obtained information.  
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This phase of the Study served two main objectives: first, the identification of 
suited member states’ contacts and secondly, the actual consultation round of 
those experts.  
 
Work Package 2.1 – Building a SPOC network 
Work Package 2.2 – Building the questionnaire 
Work Package 2.3 – Data-analysis 
 
Work Package 2.1 – Building a SPOC network  
 
Within each of the member states, a single point of contact (SPOC) was 
nominated. The SPOCs were in charge of completing the member states 
questionnaires and are ideally placed to collecting and providing the relevant 
information for the analysis to the project team, as well as, when necessary, 
make contact with the relevant stakeholders in their country. The project team 
was able to draw on an extensive network of contacts and on its experience from 
several studies conducted in the past. The selection of SPOCs participating in the 
member states’ consultation rounds was a very important milestone in the 
study.  
The input of the SPOCs is crucial to ensure the quality of the outcome of the 
Study. The SPOCs are familiar with the academic and practical status of and 
challenges at hand concerning the liability of legal persons for offences in his 
country of origin. At the kick-off meeting with the European Commission it was 
agreed not to include policy makers or experts with a practitioner background in 
the expert group, but to only include academics focussing on mapping the 
diversity in the member states’ legislation.   
 
The project team highly appreciates the valuable contributions of the 
following SPOCs. 
 
Single Points of Contact 
MS Name Function 
AT Marianne Hilf  Professor 
BE Stanislas Adam PhD 
BU Rumen Vladimirov Professor 
CY Eleni Droussioti  Lawyer (attorney) 
CZ Jaroslav Fenyk Professor 
DE Gerhard Dannecker Professor 
DK Jørn Vestergaard Professor 
EE Jaan Ginter Professor 
EL Gregoris Troufakos Lawyer (attorney) 
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Single Points of Contact 
MS Name Function 
ES Javier Gómez Lanz Professor 
FI Petri Taivalkoski Lawyer (attorney) 
FR Jean-Claude Planque PhD 
HU Kőhalmi László PhD 
IE Niamh Howlin PhD/P.G.C.H.E.T 
IT Grazia Mannozzi Professor 
LT Deividas Soloveicikas Lawyer (attorney) 
LU Stefan Braum Professor 
LV Lawin Klavins & Slaidins Law Firm 
MT Andrew Muscat  Professor/lawyer (attorney) 
NL David Roef PhD 
PL Barbara Namysłowska-Gabrysiak PhD 
PT Maria Paula Ribeiro de Faria PhD  
RO Florin Streteanu PhD 
SE Christoffer Wong Professor 
SK Lydia Tobiasova JUDr., PhD 
SV Sabina Zgaga PhD 
UK Celia Wells Professor 
 
Work Package 2.2 – Building the questionnaire 
 
As said above, based on the desktop review, the questionnaire consisted of 
three main different parts. At the end of the survey, in the General Part, open 
questions of a general character in relation to their national legislation 
concerning the liability of legal persons were presented to the experts.  
 
− Part 1 – The concept of a legal person 
− Part 2 – Criminal liability of legal persons 
− Part 3 – Administrative liability of legal persons 
− Part 4 – General Part 
 
In the first three parts the project team had developed detailed questions 
which were mostly presented through the format of multiple choice questions. 
However, considering that it was important obtain as many details as possible, 
experts were encouraged to comment on the formulation of the multiple choice 
questions and the predefined answering categories, and to provide with more 
detail.  
Questionnaires have been sent to each of the member states in April 2011. A 
copy of the questionnaire is annexed to this report. 
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Work Package 2.3 – Data-analysis 
 
The aim of this data-analysis was the mapping of the differences and 
diversity of the member states’ liability regimes.  
During the analysis of the results the team has had contact with some of the 
experts for further clarification. 
As agreed prior to the start of the member state consultation, the project team 
drew both on country-specific information from the member states, and made an 
analysis on the total of information. Country-specific information only 
concerned factual information, however: when opinions or future policy options 
were concerned the anonymity of the concerned countries was guaranteed. 
Findings and recommendations were listed based on this analysis.  
When presenting the integrated results, the project team has included tables 
and diagrams as a quantitative reflection of the member state replies. It should 
be noted that the sequence of the topics as included in the member state 
questionnaire does not perfectly match the sequence of the topics in this final 
report. The project team has frequently worked with percentages referring only 
to the member states for which the question is relevant to avoid any 
misunderstanding.  
1.3.3 WP 3 Assessment of implications 
 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of this Final Report do not stem directly from the 
questionnaire, in the sense that no explicit questions with regard to the matters 
analysed in those chapters were included. It was the Commission’s explicit 
request not to do so.  
The overall finding from the consultation round was the vast variety between 
different national liability regimes. These differences were identified on several 
levels: differences in competent authorities, differences based on the 
involvement of private or public legal persons, differences in attribution 
mechanisms, differences in the offences which can be brought in relation to 
liability of legal persons, and the sanctions which can be imposed on legal 
persons.  
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The project team assessed the implications at an EU level of the established 
variety through several methods: 
 
− existing in-house knowledge; 
− fine-tuning of the preparatory desktop review; 
− complementing empirical data obtained through other recent studies carried 
out for the European Commission.25 
 
The implications of the information obtained through the survey – and what 
it means for the future EU policy making – were examined mainly at two levels: 
first, the implications for the EU’s own policy making, and secondly, 
implications for the EU cooperation practice of the member states. The first 
mainly examines the implications of the findings for the existing approximation 
acquis as well as non-EU approximating instruments; additionally, the criminal 
records policy as well as the procedural rights policy in relation to legal persons 
are examined. The second mainly deals with the existing instruments within the 
field of EU cooperation in criminal matters, as well as the experience of the 
member states in relation to cooperation.  In both chapters, policy 
recommendations are developed.  
                                                             
25 VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT W. and RYCKMAN, C. (eds.) Rethinking international 
cooperation  in criminal matters in the EU. Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality, 
Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2012, forthcoming. 
 
  
31 
 
2 Diversity in the member states  
 
This part contains the theoretical background and empirical data serving the 
main purpose of the Study, namely mapping the diversity in liability of legal 
persons for offences throughout the European Union.  
This is done at different levels, with the understanding that the distinction 
described at the first level, namely the distinction regarding competent authorities, 
is included in the analysis of the other identified levels of diversity. Indeed, the 
different kinds of liability (criminal, administrative, and – to a lesser extent – 
civil) are discussed separately throughout this chapter, identifying the (lack of) 
relevance of differences based on the involvement of private or public legal 
persons, differences in attribution mechanisms, differences in the offences which 
can be brought in relation to liability of legal persons, and the sanctions which 
can be imposed on legal persons 
 
2.1 Variety in competent authorities 
Findings 
• In 5 member states criminal liability of legal persons for offences is 
not foreseen in national law: Bulgaria,26 Germany, Greece, Latvia 
and Sweden. 
• The most recent introductions of criminal liability of legal persons 
took place in the Czech Republic (2012) and Spain (2010). 
• In 8 member states administrative liability of legal persons for 
offences27 is not foreseen in national law: Austria, France, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy,28 Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
26 However, for Bulgaria, it must be added that in 2005 their legislation introduced a specific 
“administrative-criminal liability” for legal persons.  
27 For the exact meaning of the wording ‘offences’, see below.  
28 Liability for legal persons is formally defined by the Italian legislator has administrative ( see 
Act 231/2001 which is titled 'Disciplina della responsabilita' amministrativa delle persone 
giuridiche, delle societa' e delle associazioni anche prive di personalita' giuridica, a norma dell' 
art. 11 della legge 29 settembre 2000 n. 300') but actually it is a criminal liability. 
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Recommendations 
• Without obliging them to use one or the other liability system, the 
European Union should encourage the member states to make sure 
that a form of liability for the legal person itself is possible. At least 
one of following options should exist: attribution of the criminal 
behaviour of the natural person to the legal person instead of solely 
vice versa; or a well-developed system of administrative liability of 
legal persons for offences. 
 
A first fundamental aspect of legal persons’ liability which varies 
considerably throughout the member states relates to the scope the competent 
authorities involved in the liability. No common approach exists with respect to 
the authorities that are competent to deal with the liability of legal persons.  
Before embarking on a discussion related to the differences following the 
involved authorities, a clarification of the exact meaning of this criterion is 
warranted. What is aimed at in this context is the difference between types of 
liability for offences, namely criminal, administrative and even civil liability. It be 
stressed that what is meant here is administrative liability for offences, as opposed 
to any form of liability that qualifies as such under national law. There is a 
considerable difference between an administrative liability system whereby legal 
persons can be held liable for the commitments of ‘criminal offence – like 
offences’, situated in the criminal justice sphere, and administrative liability for 
purely administrative matters.29  
The empirical examination of this study focuses mostly on the criminal and 
administrative liability for offences, although the civil liability was also included 
in some of the questions featuring in the survey.  
In general, courts competent in criminal matters will be dealing with liability 
for criminal offences, those competent in administrative matters with liability for 
breaches of administrative law and, finally, the courts competent in civil matters 
will decide on liability for violations of the provisions of civil law.  
However, this distinction does not always stand: an example is the situation 
where legal persons can incur civil liability for offences for which their 
employees were criminally convicted:30 although the liability is situated in civil 
law, the offence which originally was originally committed is of a criminal 
justice nature. For the purpose of this Study, the authority competent to deal 
with the liability related issue is assumed to be the same as the type of liability 
                                                             
29 Cfr. infra 2.4. 
30 C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht. In hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, 
Maklu, 2011, 136. 
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involved, even though certain aspects of the case at hand might (mostly in a 
different stage) be of a different nature. This method, however, is not ideal given 
that sometimes a certain type of authority is competent to deal with a liability of 
a different type. In Spain, for example, the civil liability is assessed in the same 
criminal proceedings (in order to spare the injured party from the inconvenience 
of having to separately initiate criminal proceedings).31 Consequently, when 
‘civil liability’ is used in the context of this Study, in principle this refers to 
liability dealt with by courts competent in civil matters, with the crucial nuance 
that in some member states courts competent in criminal matters are competent 
to deal with this type of liability, when incurred following the criminally 
punishable behaviour of an employee or member of staff.  
 
 It be remembered that a small amount of member states does not apply 
criminal liability of legal persons in their national law systems. As shown on the 
map inserted below Bulgaria,32 Germany, Greece, Latvia and Sweden have not 
introduced criminal liability for legal persons in their national law. 
                                                             
31 ASTARLOA, E., “Criminal liability of legal persons in Spain. An evolving hot topic” in 
ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en 
Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 131 (134). 
32 However, it must be added that Bulgarian law in 2005 introduced a specific “administrative-
criminal liability” for legal persons.  
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For many member states which apply criminal liability to legal persons, this 
concept is a (relatively) recent phenomenon, the very last one being the Czech 
Republic where the criminal liability of legal persons entered into force on 1 
January 2012. In Spain, the first legal provisions installing criminal liability of 
legal persons were installed in 2010; the same goes for Slovakia and 
Luxembourg; in Portugal it was installed in 2007;33 in Poland in 2002; Belgium in 
1999; in France in 1994. Even though 22 member states have included criminal 
liability for offences in their national systems, 6 of those have indicated to have 
                                                             
33 Although sector-specific legislation had already included criminal liability for legal persons in 
some instances.  
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very limited experience with this type of liability – if not none at all (Finland, 
Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, and Romania; these six are mentioned on top of 
Spain, the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, and Slovakia, where given the entry 
into force it is not surprising that the practice is limited).  
 
Similarly, it be remembered that almost one third of member states does not 
apply administrative liability of legal persons for offences in their national law 
systems. It is important to specify what is meant by administrative liability for 
offences. On the one hand, naturally, administrative sanctioning for purely 
criminal offences is meant (as is the case in Germany). On the other hand,   
administrative yet ‘pseudo criminal’ offences are still considered to be “criminal 
law” according to the European Court of Justice.34 Therefore, national systems 
where administrative sanctioning is possible for offences which are as such 
administrative but could be situated in the criminal justice sphere are also 
considered as administrative liability for offences in this context. In the 
Netherlands for example, some offences were decriminalised with the 
introduction of the system of administrative liability of legal persons, but they 
are still an application of what is called administrative liability for offences in 
this contribution.35 As shown on the map inserted below Austria, France, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia have not introduced 
administrative liability of legal persons for offences in their national law.36  
 
                                                             
34 ECtHR, 21 February 1984, Nr. 8544/79, Öztürk v. Germany. 
35 On this issue, see specifically the part on “bestuurlijke boetes” in D. ROEF, “Strafrechelijke 
verantwoordelijkheid van overheden: een stand van zaken”, Verkeersrecht 2011, 7/8, 218-221. 
36 The concept of administrative liability for legal persons remains confusing, even based on the 
questionnaire developed by the project team. The empirical data used to make this assertion 
with respect to the absence of administrative liability for offences is based on question 9.1 
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The combination of those two maps reveals that several member states that 
have introduced criminal liability have combined this with another type of 
liability.  
Arguably, including other types of liability than purely repressive liability 
regimes has particular advantages. Civil liability allows potential damages to be 
compensated swiftly (be it through a purely civil or combination of criminal and 
civil system); as to administrative liability: in member states where this has been 
the prevailing system care must be taken to avoid that the introduction of a 
criminal liability mechanism would undermine the efficiency of the well-
developed administrative liability system, or that it would  blur the demarcation 
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between administrative and criminal offences regarding legal persons.37 
Mechanisms concerning the relationship between different types of sanctions 
must be developed. In Spain for example, a legal system where the criminal 
liability of legal persons was introduced only recently, the ne bis in idem principle 
plays in this regard: pursuant to law 30/1992 and the decisions of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court the criminal penalty takes precedence over the 
administrative sanction. 
 
Summarizing, the mechanisms used in the member states are rarely confined 
to one type of liability for the legal person.  
Even in member states where the situation regarding the legal person itself is 
clear-cut in that no criminal liability of legal persons exists, criminal law can still 
play an important role in relation to criminal liability and the activities of legal 
persons. An example can clarify this:38 the German Criminal Code deals with the 
liability of representatives in the case of special statutory offences. In this regard, 
when an employer does not deduct and pass on social insurance contributions, 
the natural person concerned will be criminally punishable even though 
technically, the legal rather than the natural person is the employer. This type of 
rule was developed as a counterweight for the lack of criminal liability of legal 
persons. Thus, liability of individual persons for the actual entity to which the 
legislation applies was created; the importance of such an evolution is not to be 
underestimated in view of the modern forms of business organisation and the 
extensive division of labour within a company.  
In case of Germany, this type of liability combined with their well-developed 
system of administrative liability of legal persons leads to a relatively conclusive 
system of protection. Caution is warranted, however, with systems which only 
use the first mechanism: in other words where no liability is foreseen for the 
legal person as such (be it administrative or criminal or civil), but where the 
natural persons are susceptible to criminal liability for the acts of the legal 
person. Below in 2.3, attribution techniques will be discussed.  
                                                             
37 BRAUM, S., “Le principe de culpabilité et la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales. 
Remarques relatives au projes de loi Luxembourgeois" in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. 
e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal 
liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 238-239. 
38 DÖLLING, D. and LAUE, C., “Corporate criminal liability in Germany: a never ending 
story?” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes 
morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (25) 30.  
DIVERSITY IN THE MEMBER STATES 
 
 
38 
 
There, it concerns the attribution of the behaviour of the natural person to the 
legal person, resulting in liability of the legal person (Figure 1). Here, however, 
the attribution takes place in the opposite direction, namely from the legal 
person to the natural person (Figure 2).  
 
  
Figure 1 
Behaviour of NP attributed to LP: 
Below 2.3. 
 
Legal person 
 
 
 
 
 
Natural person 
Figure 2 
Behaviour of LP attributed to NP: 
Above paragraph 
 
Legal person 
 
 
 
 
 
Natural person 
  
In Belgium, attribution in the direction shown in Figure 2 was the only way 
in which acts of legal persons could be punished (be it indirectly) until 1999, and 
all too often led to impunity.39 Offences committed by legal persons often 
remained unpunished, either because the guilt of the concerned natural person 
could not be sufficiently established, or because the complex structures of the 
legal person made the attribution legally impossible.40 Additionally, in case of 
collegial but anonymous vote one countervote sufficed for all involved natural 
persons to hide behind that particular vote41.  
Consequently, without obliging them to use one or the other liability system, 
the European Union should encourage the member states to make sure that a 
form of liability for the legal person itself is possible. At least one of following 
                                                             
39 D. PACQUEE, “De “strafrechtspersoon”: bespiegelingen omtrent het moreel element in de 
wet strafrechtelijke verantwoordelijkheid van rechtspersonen”, Jura Falconis, vol. 44, 2007-2009, 
nr. 3, 477-504. This statement needs to be nuanced in light of the fact that administrative and 
civil liability regimes do exist for legal persons. However, far from all misconduct is covered 
through these mechanisms, which is different than a system as existing in Germany given that 
in the latter the liability system for legal persons is regulated solely through the administrative 
liability mechanism, which necessarily implies that it covers more types of behaviour than the 
Belgian counterpart; for attribution in the other direction (from natural person to legal person): 
see below 2.3. 
40 WAETERINCKX, P., “De strafrechtelijke verantwoordelijkheid van de rechtspersoon, een 
kritische analyse van  enkele capita selecta uit de eerste rechtspraak” in X, Strafrecht van nu en 
straks, Brugge, Die Keure, 2003, 183-187. 
41 DE SWAEF, M., note concerning judgment Brussels 24 April 1985, Rechtskundig weekblad, 
1985-1986, 882. 
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options should exist: attribution of the criminal behaviour of the natural person 
to the legal person instead of solely vice versa; or a well-developed system of 
administrative liability of legal persons for offences. In Sweden for example, 
there is no criminal liability of legal persons. As such, this need not to be 
problematic, if compensated by an elaborate system of administrative liability 
for offences, as is the case in Germany. In Sweden, however, the corporate fine 
as a non-criminal sanction to be imposed on a legal person for offences is limited 
to max 10,000,000 SEK (about 1 million euro), and it has been questioned 
whether this sanction has a sufficiently deterrent effect.42 
Apart from criminal and administrative liability systems, naturally a third 
type of liability exists, namely the civil liability regime, a system which was 
created several decades (if not longer) ago in some member states. In Denmark 
for example, the liability system of legal persons has its present form since 
1900.43 The reform in 1996 merely involved the enactment of general statutes in 
the Penal Code; but the very principle had thus existed for a very long time 
before that, following various specific pieces of legislation.  The system meant in 
this Danish example however, is virtually exclusively linked to a purely civil law 
context. 
As mentioned, it is difficult if not impossible to give a set description of what 
is meant by civil liability, given the different meanings in member states: 
sometimes, it refers solely to the nature of the law that was violated; sometimes 
it refers to the authorities competent to rule on liability for the violation of any 
type of law; sometimes civil liability can only exists in relation to violations of 
civil law which are ruled on by courts competent in civil matters.  
 
This Study focuses mainly on systems of criminal and administrative liability 
for offences. However, where appropriate – namely when the civil liability can 
somehow be connected to the commitment of an offence or when it can at least 
be brought in the criminal justice sphere44 – the link to measures of civil liability.  
 
                                                             
42 It should be added however, that certain other types of administrative fines exist in Sweden.  
43 TOFTEGAARD NIELSEN, G., "Criminal liability of companies in Denmark. Eighty years of 
experience” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des 
personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 105. 
44 For example, when a civil liability regime applies in implementation of framework decisions 
(or (future) directives) issued in the context of Justice and  Home Affairs, see below 3.3 
(procedural safeguards).  
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2.2 Variety in types of persons involved  
Findings 
• All member states recognize the legal concept of ‘a legal person’, 
which implies the possession of legal personality. The method and 
moment of acquiring such personality differs throughout the EU. 
• In 82% of the member states both public and private bodies can 
qualify as legal persons. 
•  27% of the respondents do not recognize any type of criminal 
liability of public legal persons. In the majority of the member 
states, restrictions of different nature exist regarding the criminal 
liability of public legal persons. The State, acting in its public 
capacity, is excluded from liability in most member states. 
• Merely 25% of the respondents indicated that restrictions (hence, not 
exclusions) apply to the administrative liability of public legal 
persons.  
Recommendations 
• It is recommended that the European Union changes the current 
state of affairs in which definitions of legal persons throughout the 
EU instrumentarium (e.g. PIF Convention) are limited to private 
legal persons.  
 
A second fundamental aspect of legal persons’ liability which varies 
considerably throughout the member states relates to the type of person on 
which liability can be imposed. Such diversities exist on three different levels, 
with several varieties within those levels. First, regardless of any potential 
applicable liability rules, differences exist concerning the distinction between 
legal and natural person, regarding whether or not public entities are considered 
to be legal persons, concerning multiple or single ownership and concerning 
whether or not parent-daughter structures exist (2.2.1). Thirdly, differences exist 
regarding whether or not public entities can be held criminally liable and within 
the sphere of criminal liability differences concerning multiple or single 
ownership need be examined (2.2.2). Fourthly, the same exercise will be made in 
the sphere of administrative liability (2.2.3).  
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2.2.1 General differences, regardless of liability 
 
Regardless of any potential applicable liability rules, differences exist 
concerning the difference between a natural and a legal person, regarding 
whether or not public entities are considered to be legal persons, concerning 
multiple or single ownership and concerning whether or not parent-daughter 
structures exist.  
This subsection examines these different questions, which can be structured 
as follows:  
 
 
 
2.2.1.1 Natural vs. legal persons 
 
As said above, even though many differences occur, throughout the Union 
most member states use varieties of the definition of a legal person which is for 
example used in Portugal: “A legal person is an association of people or a special fund, 
established for social or collective purposes, which is recognized by law as having legal 
personality.”45 Key concept is legal personality and whether or not such 
personality is conferred upon the concerned entities.46 It be noted that the way 
which and the moment that entities can acquire legal personality differ 
throughout the member states. In Luxembourg for example, the legal person 
exists from the moment that the founding act is finalised, whereas in France, it is 
only acquired either from the moment that it is enlisted in the “Régistre du 
                                                             
45 J.d.C. MENDES, Teoria Geral do Direito Civil, Vol. I., Lisboa, A.A.F.D.L., reeimpressão, 1998.  
46 For more details on this concept, see above 1.1.1. 
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commerce” (the trade register) for companies or from the moment of declaration 
of existence in the concerned prefecture for other organisations.47   
2.2.1.2 Private vs. public 
 
The differences between so-called “public legal persons” and “private legal 
persons” should be emphasized. On rare occasions member states limit the 
concept of a legal person to private law artificial persons, and in the majority of 
the cases it entails both (see figure below).  
In Latvia for example, the government, the municipalities, associations of 
persons, institutions, foundations, and such aggregations of property as have 
been granted the rights of a legal person shall be considered to be legal persons. 
Sweden on the other hand, recognizes three main types of public legal persons, 
namely ‘municipalities’ (kommuner), ‘county councils’ (landsting) and the State. 
In Slovenia, public legal persons are established by a law or other public legal 
act.  
Even though differences exist regarding applicable liability rules etc. (see 
below 2.2.2.), the results of the survey show that a large majority of the member 
states have indicated not to limit the scope definition of a legal person a specific 
type of legal person (public or private), which entails that in general, the 
majority of the member states confer legal personality to their public entities.  
 
                                                             
47 ADAM, S., BLAISE, N., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N., “Conclusions” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-
BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate 
criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 448.  
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4%
7%
82%
7%
1.2 What is the scope of the definition used to determine a 
legal person under your Member  State’s national law or 
legal regime?
Scope of the definition is limited to private 
legal persons only (HU)
Scope of the definition includes both public 
and private legal persons, but excludes 
international organisations (CZ, EE) 
Scope of the definition is not limited to any 
specific type of legal person (AT, BE, BU, 
CY, DE, DK, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, 
MT, NL, PT, RO, SE, SK, SL, UK)
Other (FI, PL)
 
Having established that public entities are granted public personality in 
virtually all member states (with the important note that that does not 
necessarily concern all public entities in the said member states), the following 
two main types of distinctions amongst public legal persons can be perceived.48 
First, there is the distinction between centralised and decentralised legal 
persons, in other words between the State – in federal states: the federal state 
and the federal public entities – and the decentral level, whether the latter is 
regional or local. As mentioned, the State has immunity from criminal liability in 
several member states, amongst others in Belgium, Estonia, France, Italy, Poland 
and Romania. In Denmark and Finland on the other hand, the State can be held 
criminally liable, but only in relation to those acts which they have not carried 
out in the exercise of their public authority.  
Second, the distinction between the acts carried out de jure gestionis and de 
jure imperii, respectively the acts carried out as a private actor versus in the 
exercise of public authority: the previous example of Denmark and Sweden 
shows that the rules can cover a combination of the first and second distinction. 
Austria is another example where the criminal liability is limited to acts jure 
gestionis. Within the latter reasoning, more variations are possible: in France for 
example, the assessment of the act being carried out de juri gestionis is an in 
                                                             
48 ADAM, S., BLAISE, N., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N., “Conclusions” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-
BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate 
criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (433) 450-451. 
DIVERSITY IN THE MEMBER STATES 
 
 
44 
 
concreto assessment, whereas in Romania the establishment of an in abstracto 
ability to act de juri gestionis suffices.  
The mere existence of the concept of a public legal person should not be 
confused with the criminal liability of public legal persons. Indeed, a 
qualification as a public legal person does not imply the criminal liability of 
those persons (see below 2.2.2) and vice versa. After all, in certain countries 
certain groupings which do not qualify as a legal person because they do not 
have legal personality, can still be held criminally liable.49 
2.2.1.3 Distinctions within private legal persons 
 
Regarding single and multiple ownership of legal persons, both forms exist 
relatively consistently throughout the Union: all member states have indicated 
that their legal system indeed comprises both forms of ownership of legal 
persons.  
Regarding the existence of parent-subsidiary structures, a very small 
minority of the member states does not recognise parent-subsidiary structures in 
their national law.  
                                                             
49 An example is Belgium: see C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht. In 
hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2011, 127. 
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One member state did not wish to plainly reply yes, and added some 
additional explanations: France clarified that the parent company (in the 
meaning of the overall corporation structure comprising different legal persons) 
as such is not entitled to hold legal personality of its own – and consequently, it 
cannot be held criminally liable. However, certain specific areas of law do take 
the existence of the ‘parent-company’ into account and, accordingly, have 
developed specific rules to alleviate the lack of legal personality.  
   
96%
4%
1.4 Does your Member State’s law or legal regime recognize 
parent-subsidiary legal person relations?
Yes (AT, BE, BU, CY, CZ,
DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI,
HU, IE, IT, LT,LU, LV,
MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE,
SK, SL, UK)
Comment needed (FR)
 
 
2.2.2 Differences in relation to criminal liability 
2.2.2.1 Natural versus legal  
 
The first element which surfaces in this context is the distinction between a 
national and a legal person. As said above, a legal person, generally, can be 
described as an entity with legal personality. Consequently, groups or 
‘associations’ of people to whom no legal personality was attributed do not 
qualify as a legal person. This does not necessarily mean that these groupings 
cannot be held criminally liable, however; an example being Art. 5 of the Belgian 
Criminal Code.50 Indeed, this member state made a choice not to set the 
possession of legal personality as an absolute condition for incurring criminal 
liability. Other examples are Italy, Poland, Germany and Sweden.51 On the other 
                                                             
50 C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht. In hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, 
Maklu, 2011, 127. 
51 For the latter two it does not concern criminal liability, see above 2.1 and below 2.4. 
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hand, there are several member states where entities without legal personality 
can never be held criminally liable: Austria, Estonia, France, Denmark, 
Luxembourg and Romania. Important differences concerning whether or not 
liability (be it criminal or administrative) is possible exist with regard to unions 
and political parties. 
Linking back to the data above relating to the existence of parent-subsidiary 
legal persons’ relations it should be pointed out that in this regard too, 
considerable differences exist: even though most countries recognize the 
existence of such relations, far from all member states have the legal possibility 
to hold the parent companies criminally liable for the activities of the subsidiary. 
Examples of countries that do not are Portugal and France.  
The broader discussion in relation to the liability of natural versus legal 
persons cannot be analysed separately from attribution techniques, however, 
and will consequently be dealt with below in 2.3.  
2.2.2.2 Private versus public 
 
Several member states indicated that some restrictions applied based on the 
type of legal person involved, but only three answered that they do not foresee 
the criminal liability of public entities all together.  
 
27%
73%
2.3. Is restriction based on the type of legal person concerned?
Criminal liability is restricted to 
strictly private legal persons (EE, 
ES, HU)
Other, additional comment 
required (BE, FR, LT, PL, PT, 
NL, RO, SK, SL) 
 
 
Yielding to inconsistencies following the type of person involved means that 
in cooperation relations, executing member states accept the delineation of the 
legal person subject to criminal liability, even if that type of legal person would 
not be criminally liable in their own domestic regulations. Whether or not this is 
the case and whether it should be the case will be discussed elsewhere52, but the 
above results show that some member states do not include criminal liability of 
                                                             
52 Chapter 4. 
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legal persons in their national law. Granted, the number is small (four member 
states), however the differences do go beyond that: amongst those member 
states who apply criminal liability to legal persons, the majority still imposes 
restrictions to such liability and the content of these restrictions differ 
considerably.  
In Belgium for example, following bodies are excluded from criminal 
liability: the Federal State, regions, communities, provinces, the agglomeration 
of Brussels, municipalities, territorial intra-municipal organs, the French 
Community Commission, the Flemish Community Commission, the Common 
Community Commission and public centres of social assistance. This diversity 
reflects the complexity of the Belgian federal State. The rationale behind this 
exclusion relates to the fear that criminal liability for legal persons would be 
used as a vehicle to launch political disputes.  However, several other public 
bodies such as certain state-owned corporations, certain associations of 
professions (e.g. the association of lawyers), public institutions such as the 
Banking, Financing and Insurance Association, can be held liable.  
In Spain, the situation is slightly different in that amongst the public legal 
persons only state-owned corporations that do not pursue public policy 
objectives can be held criminally liable. There is an important exception to that 
principle however: the concept of fraus legis. This occurs when the public legal 
person is set up with the purpose of avoiding the attribution of criminal liability. 
In those cases and in those cases only political parties can be held criminally 
liable.  
France applies another nuance: the Criminal Code excludes the criminal 
liability of the State and limits the liability of the public authorities (at local, 
departmental and regional levels) to activities that could have been sub-
contracted to a private person or to another public person.  
Under Polish law, companies in which the State Treasury, a unit or units of 
local government participate can be held criminally liable; only the State 
Treasury, local government units and their associations and local government 
agencies are excluded from the definition.  
Under Portuguese law, in principle, the State, public legal persons with 
public authority and international public organizations are excluded from 
criminal liability (art. 11º, nº 3, of the Penal Code). However, it is not obvious 
whether this restriction applies to the existent special schemes, for instance, to 
the crimes committed within the scope of the Law nº 24/84, of 20th January 2011, 
which does not exclude public legal persons from the definition of art. 3º 
(criminal responsibility of the legal persons), or within the scope of the Law 
52/2003, of 22th August (law against terrorism), which also makes no distinction 
between legal persons in order to ascertain their criminal responsibility. 
In Slovakia on the other hand, in terms of criminal liability there are hardly 
any differences between private and public legal persons: the Criminal Code 
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does not set down any restrictions to criminal liability of legal persons in the 
General Part but in relation to legal persons, provisions regulating the 
imposition of confiscation of a sum of money (sec. 83a of Criminal Code) and 
confiscation of property (sec. 83b of Criminal Code) exclude certain types of 
legal person on which those protective measures may not be implied in certain 
cases.  
In some member states, the criminal liability of public legal persons is 
foreseen in the legislation on the one hand, but is not applied in practice or 
liability is made impossible through the jurisprudence, on the other. In the 
Netherlands for example, Art. 51 of the Dutch Criminal Code foresees that a 
legal person can be held criminally liable, without differentiating based on the 
‘type’ of legal person. However, following established jurisprudence, the State as 
a public legal person enjoys immunity from prosecution, and other public legal 
persons such as municipalities and provinces are immune when the offence has 
been committed in the furtherance of an exclusive governmental task that can 
only be executed by civil servants (e.g. issuing permits).The Penal Code of 
Denmark contains a provision on criminal liability for legal persons which 
encompasses any legal person, including any type of private corporation [da: 
'aktie-, anparts og andelsselskaber'], legal partnership [da: 'interessantskab'], 
legal associations [da: 'foreninger'], foundations and trusts [da: fonde'], estates 
[da: 'bo'], municipalities and regions [da: 'kommuner'] and government 
authorities and institutions [da: 'statslige myndigheder']. 
 
2.2.3 Differences in relation to administrative liability 
 
In the context of administrative liability the differences between private and 
public legal persons are smaller. In the survey the member states were asked to 
indicate whether they applied restrictions to their administrative liability 
systems, and amongst those who indicated to indeed apply some restrictions to 
administrative liability, a very small majority indicated that the restrictions were 
linked to the distinction between private and public legal persons.  
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25%
75%
7.2 Is the restriction based on the type of legal person 
concerned? 
Yes restrictions are related to 
type of legal person (EE, FI, 
LU)
No restrictions are not 
related to type of legal 
person (BU, CY, CZ, EL, LT, 
LV, MT, PT, RO)
 
 
The figure shows that nine member states have indicated not to apply 
restrictions based on the private or public character of the legal person involved. 
It be remembered that these results should be interpreted in light of the fact that 
only nineteen member states indicated to, as such, apply administrative liability 
for offences to legal persons. Even among the states who indicated to apply this 
liability system, some did not give a reply to the question dealing with the type 
of legal person, because the situation is of such nuanced nature that it proved 
difficult to tick on or another box.  
In Spain, for example, pursuant to the applicable law,53 a public legal person 
can, in principle, be held administratively liable. However, in practice, one 
restriction applies: the prohibition of an administrative self-sanction (i.e., a 
public administration cannot impose an administrative penalty on itself).  
In relation to the Netherlands, it is noteworthy that recent jurisprudence has 
not accepted to copy the immunity from prosecution for public legal persons, 
applicable in the criminal liability sphere, to the administrative liability sphere. 
This implies that these legal persons cannot incur a criminal sanction, but they 
can be subject to considerable administrative fines. The development has 
triggered an intense debate in this member state.  
It thus appears that more states than the ones listed in the figure, do not 
apply restrictions based on the public character of the legal person. As to those 
who do apply restrictions, further research reveals that public legal persons are 
not automatically and fully excluded from liability: in Finland for example, this 
depends on which of the several heterogeneous laws dealing with 
administrative liability, applies. Similarly, in Luxembourg, there is no general 
rule regarding the administrative liability of either private or public legal 
                                                             
53 Law 30/1992 of 26th November 1992 on the Legal System applicable to Public Administrations 
and the Common Administrative Procedure, Article 130.1. 
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persons: the rules of attribution, the scope and sanctions vary from one field to 
another. 
Given that public legal persons are included in the concept of a legal person 
in the majority of the member states, that in a majority of the member states 
applying criminal liability to legal persons, public legal persons can to some 
extent be held criminally liable – albeit with important restrictions – and that in 
the majority of the member states administrative liability is applied similarly to 
public legal persons as it is to private legal persons, it is recommended that the 
European Union lets go of its limitation to private legal persons in definitions of 
legal persons throughout the EU instrumentarium (e.g. PIF Convention)54. 
 
2.3 Variety in attribution mechanisms 
 
Findings 
• The mens rea requirement is not literally prescribed by law in all 
member states. 
• 5% of the respondents indicate to as a rule use an objectified 
liability system for legal persons; 14% indicates that the national 
law does not require mens rea as a rule; in 38% identification of the 
physical perpetrator is necessary, and in 29% no division is made 
between a natural and a legal person for the establishment of mens 
rea. These results are far more divided in the administrative liability 
sphere.  
• Four attribution models occur throughout the EU: vicarious liability, 
identification model, aggregation model, and the organisational 
model. 
• The identification model is the model used in the EU’s 
approximation instruments. 
• Different elements of the several attribution models apply in many 
MS; consequently, precise percentages regarding one or the other 
model cannot be provided; in terms of criminal liability, an 
overwhelming majority applies elements of both the vicarious 
liability and the identification model.  
 
 
                                                             
54 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1997), “Act of 19 June 1997 drawing up the second 
protocol of the Convention on the protection the European Communities’ financial interests”, 
OJ C 221 of 19.7.1997, Art. 1(d).  
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• In the context of criminal liability, prosecution of the legal person 
excludes parallel prosecution of the natural person – or vice versa – 
in only 5% of the member states. In the context of administrative 
liability, prosecution of the legal person excludes parallel 
prosecution of the natural person in 11% of the respondent member 
states; vice versa, in 6% of the member states prosecution of the 
natural person will lead to an exclusion of a parallel prosecution of 
the legal person. 
• In the context of criminal liability concurring liability (between the 
natural and legal person) is possible in 60% of the member states. In 
the context of administrative liability concurring liability is possible 
in 50% of the member states.  
 
 
 
2.3.1 Attribution mechanisms and criminal liability  
A third distinction stems from the different views regarding in which 
instances culpability can be attributed to legal persons.  
2.3.1.1 Mens rea requirement 
 
As is the case with the very concept of a legal person (cfr. 1.1.1), here too the 
terminology differs. Several terms are used to indicate that a moral element 
needs to be established before a person can be held criminally liable. Some 
examples are ‘guilt’, ‘criminal intent’, ‘culpability’ or ‘mens rea’. This concept 
implies  the establishment of a certain level of ‘guilt’ as a condition for the 
existence of the criminal liability.  
The requirement of a moral element in order to be held criminally liable is 
arguably one of the most delicate matters linked to the application of a criminal 
liability regime, both for natural55 and – all the more so – for legal persons. 
The mens rea requirement is not always literally prescribed by law. In 
Belgium for example, despite not being legally prescribed, it is accepted that 
Belgian penal law is a system based on guilt rather than ‘bad luck’: purely 
material (as opposed to moral) behaviour which entails a violation of the penal 
law but where the concerned person is not ‘guilty’ of that behaviour cannot lead 
                                                             
55 ADAM, S., BLAISE, N., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N., “Conclusions” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-
BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate 
criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (433) 445. 
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to punishment.56 However, the definition of what the guilt concept precisely 
entails is subject to – increasing57 – debate. In a narrow sense, the concept refers 
to the psychological relationship between the act and the offender. 
Linguistically, only in this interpretation the guilt requirement and the moral 
element requirement are synonyms. In a broader sense, the concept of guilt 
refers to the question whether or not a behaviour can be attributed to the 
offender: when the behaviour took place with the necessary moral element of the 
crime (e.g. on purpose or due to negligence depending on the crime involved) 
this will still not necessarily lead to criminal liability: indeed, the established 
guilt will be reversed when there are circumstances which  make that the 
behaviour cannot be reproached to the offender. An example is when the 
behaviour was coerced; naturally this will only reverse the guilt when certain 
conditions are met.  
The mens rea requirement in the debate on liability of legal persons refers to 
the former, narrow interpretation, namely the psychological relationship 
between act and offender.   
Common arguments against criminal liability stem from the idea that mens 
rea requirement is cannot be fulfilled by the legal person. In some countries it is 
assumed that it can never be fulfilled by legal persons: as said above, in Germany 
the notion of guilt is required in order to be criminally punishable, and 
according to German law this concept cannot be transferred to legal persons.58 
The reasoning behind this default position is that, when a person has decided to 
act unlawfully, the capability for such a decision presupposes the possession of 
moral self-determination and the consequent capability of deciding on what is 
lawful or not, which in turn necessitates a certain moral maturity.59 In other 
countries, such as Belgium, the opposite is true: there, a full assimilation 
between natural and legal persons has taken place and a general criminal 
responsibility of legal persons applies. The same goes for Denmark: an 
undertaking, together with its owner and the employees, are seen as a unit.60  
 
                                                             
56 C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht. In hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, 
Maklu, 2011, 286.  
57 For extensive arguments In favour of criminal liability of legal persons, see A.J. SEPINWALL, 
“Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime”, 
63 Hastings Law Journal, 2011, 411-454. 
58 G. STRATENWERTH, “Strafrechliche Unternehmenshaftung?” in K. GEPPERT, J. BOHNERT 
and R. RENGIER (eds.), Festschrift für Rudolf Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag, Tübingen, 1992. 
59 R. SCHMITT, Strafrechtliche Massnahmen gegen Verbände. Gleichzeitig ein Beitrag zur Lehre von 
den strafrechtlichen Unrechtsfolgen, Stuttgart, 1958, 187. 
60 TOFTEGAARD NIELSEN, G., "Criminal liability of companies in Denmark. Eighty years of 
experience” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des 
personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (105) 
105-109. 
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The assessment of whether or not legal persons can be held criminally liable 
varies depending on the internal functioning of the legal person. In practice a 
legal person will usually function through a decision of a certain body/organ 
which forms part of that legal person. Often, this decision is the result of an 
anonymous vote. Therefore, except in cases of unanimity, it is impossible to 
determine which natural persons took the decision.61 In Finland for example, 
this difficulty is anticipated in the relevant legislation. As a basic rule, the mens 
rea is a prerequisite for criminal liability. Criminal liability for legal persons 
requires as a general rule that the perpetrator has committed a crime, thus 
implying an intentional or neglectful act. Two exceptions exist, however, the first 
one being related to the anonymous vote problem: criminal liability can be 
confined to a legal person based on so called anonymous guilt, which means that 
the perpetrator is not identified. Looking at the other member states’ results it 
seems that the mens rea requirement is essential in a majority of the member 
states. Only a small minority indicated not require its establishment. As 
explained below, caution is warranted with the interpretation of this chart, 
considering that the question was phrased such that member states were 
required to indicate whether, in their national law, the requirement exists as a 
rule.  
 
                                                             
61 C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht. In hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, 
Maklu, 2011, 122. 
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5%
14%
38%
29%
14%
3.3 Does your Member State’s law or legal regime -as a rule-
require the establishment of ‘mens rea’ for a legal person?
NO, our law has an (objectified)
liability for legal persons, not
requiring a culpable state of mind
(SK)
NO, for another reason (CY, ES, NL)
YES, identification of the individual
physical perpetrator is necessary (EE,
FR, HU, LU, PL, PT, SL, UK)
YES, our law entirely recognizes
mens rea for a legal person, no
division between natural persons and
legal persons can be made (BE, IE,
DK, LT, MT, RO)
 
A common phenomenon providing a (partial) answer to difficulties with the  
mens rea requirement the inclusion of specific offences in the legislation whereby 
no moral element is required for the establishment of legal persons’ criminal 
liability; in other words, where the mere violation of the law implies criminal 
liability.62 Only one member state (Slovakia) has indicated to only use this 
technique: only one member state ticked the box “our law has created specific type 
of (objectified) liability for legal persons, not  requiring a culpable state of mind”.   It be 
noted, however, that in countries where the criminal liability of legal persons is 
not accepted, such solutions are also put forward as a means to introduce this 
concept without having to apply the concept of ‘guilt’ to legal persons. In 
Germany for example, the suggestion of a renunciation of penalties dependent 
on guilt in favour of the establishment of rules which, irrespective of guilt of the 
person concerned, are intended to restrict the danger that person poses, are 
gaining terrain.63 
                                                             
62 More on liability for specific offences: see below 2.5. 
63 STRATENWERTH, G., “Strafrechliche Unternehmenshaftung?” in K. GEPPERT, J. BOHNERT 
and R. RENGIER (eds.), Festschrift für Rudolf Schmitt zum 70. Geburtstag, Tübingen, 1992, 303-
305. 
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The figure above also shows that the “mens rea requirement” needs to be 
nuanced: indeed, a majority of the member states have ticked replies starting 
with “yes”, but 30%  has indicated that their law applies the  mens rea 
requirement to legal persons, and that no division between natural persons and 
legal persons can be made. This means that these member states do not assume 
the mens rea to be an objection to applying criminal liability to legal persons: 
after all, in this context those member states deem the mens rea requirement 
equal for natural persons and for legal persons.  
The variety and nuances concerning the application of the mens rea 
requirement again indicate the considerable differences throughout the member 
states: where countries like Germany bluntly exclude any possibility of criminal 
liability because the mens rea can never apply to legal persons, others do apply it 
to those entities, and, even stronger, they use the same assessment of the 
requirement for natural and for legal persons. In Denmark, the jurisprudence 
regarding criminal liability for legal persons applies equivalent mens rea 
requirements as for physical persons, i.e. intent or negligence, depending on the 
specific type of offence. The prosecutor does not have to prove that culpability 
can be attributed to individual physical persons. If it can be stipulated that the 
offence occurred due to the fact that the legal person as such did not in a 
sufficiently responsible manner perform its duties to select, train and supervise 
staff members or to organize and structure work processes, such failure or 
malpractice might under an overall assessment be considered the requisite 
ground for liability.  Even though the mens rea cannot always easily be 
established, the reasoning in Belgium is grosso modo the same as in Denmark. It 
follows that, as long as the material and moral element are proven, those 
countries apply a general criminal liability of legal persons.64  Similarly, in the 
Netherlands, the differences in attribution of guilt stem from the involved 
offences, rather than the natural vs. legal character of the person involved. 
Indeed, the very principle of mens rea is equal for natural and for legal persons. 
Yet, the last box was not ticked by this member state, the reason being that mens 
rea is not required as a rule, unless the legal offence definition has incorporated a 
specific subjective element like intention or negligence: indeed, for some 
offences, “objectified” liability applies: consequently, in those cases, no mens rea 
element is required either for natural or for legal persons. Therefore, even 
                                                             
64 General in the sense of the mens rea requirement,that is. The criminal liability of legal persons 
cannot be called ‘general’ in all its facets, given that there is a certain limitation ratione materiae. 
The Danish Penal Code's general provisions on criminal liability for legal persons (PC Chapter 
5, i.e. §§ 25- 27) apply in all instances where provisions on specific offences provide for such liability. 
However, such liability is authorized for all Penal Code offences, cf. PC § 306, and for a vast 
number of offences covered by special legislation outside the realm of the Penal Code (business 
law, environmental law, etc.). The fact that liability is allowed for all Penal Code offences 
implies that, at the moment, the liability can, apart from being ‘general’ concerning the material 
vs. moral element, also be called ‘general’ ratione materiae.  
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though the system does not differ based on whether natural or legal persons are 
involved, it would also be incorrect to assume that the  mens rea requirement 
applies as a rule. Cyprus also uses the rule that the mens rea requirement is 
applied in the same manner to both natural and legal persons; this member state 
also ticked the “no” reply given that the requirement is not set as a rule: its 
application depends on the involved offence.  
In some member states, the approach differs depending on which natural 
person committed the offence: in Austria, the mens rea requirements can differ 
based on whether a person holds a high or low position in within the legal 
person. Such reasoning is closely intertwined with the very existence of different 
attribution models, and will therefore be elaborated on in the section below.  
In Spain, the combination of the novelty introduced in the Organic Law 
5/2010 of 22nd June (which entered into force on 23rd December, 2010) and the 
vague wording of Article 31 bis.1 of the Spanish Penal Code contributes to the 
complexity of the moral element requirement. There is a distinction based on 
which natural person committed the violation. On the one hand, a legal person 
can only be held liable for offences committed by an employee when the 
commission of said offence was made possible by the lack of due supervision or 
control over the employee’s activities. This provision does imply the necessity of 
a “culpable state of mind” of the legal person for the attribution of criminal 
liability, but it has been construed as an assertion that a certain “organizational 
guilt” of the legal person is needed. On the other hand, given that Spanish law 
criminal liability of the legal person for an offence committed by a representative 
or director does not legally depend on a lack of organization, it could be argued 
that in that case the law has established an objectified criminal liability for legal 
persons. Even so, given that in accordance with the so-called culpability 
principle objective liability is constitutionally forbidden in Spanish criminal law 
it is foreseeable that the Spanish courts will require some degree of 
blameworthiness (e.g. a lack of a satisfactory organisation) in order to attribute 
criminal liability to a legal person for an offence committed by a representative 
or a director. Therefore, it can be argued that in Spain a certain type of 
organizational guilt will be required for the attribution of criminal liability to a 
legal person. This type of guilt, however, clearly differs from the idea of mens rea 
applied to the criminal liability of natural persons, which in Spain is based on 
the evidence of criminal intent or gross negligence. This system seems to hold 
the middle between the alter ego/identification theory and the aggregation model 
(see below 2.3.1.2). 
It be noted that in some member states, like France, even though the 
requirement is set by law, the jurisprudence tends to be rather flexible when it 
comes to assessing the fulfilment of the moral element. In this regard, the 
immense variety between systems throughout the member states surfaces again: 
when comparing France to Poland, both member states have given the same 
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reply (see figure above). Yet, the mens rea requirement is entirely in both member 
states. In the former, it lies with the natural person: when the requirement is 
fulfilled and the act can be attributed to the legal person, no moral intent 
requirement is prescribed at the level of the legal person. In the latter, the mens 
rea requirement also lies with the legal person.  
Concluding, the member states’ rules regarding the mens rea requirement in 
relation to criminal liability of legal persons can be divided in two main groups. 
First, those countries whose law does not include criminal liability of legal 
persons based on the consideration that the moral element can never be fulfilled 
in relation to legal persons. Secondly, those member states whose law allows 
criminal liability of legal persons, with the crucial note that considerable 
differences exist amongst the latter. Roughly, three main approaches occur.65 
First, a regulatory model, in which the fulfilment of the mens rea requirement is 
assumed in relation to legal persons; second, the attribution of the fault of the 
natural person to the legal person; third, the identification of a separate fault of 
the legal person which could, for example, follow from a deficiency in its 
organisation.  
                                                             
65 ADAM, S., BLAISE, N., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N., “Conclusions” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-
BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate 
criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (433) 446. 
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2.3.1.2 Different attribution models 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Turning to the existing attribution models, as argued elsewhere66 a threefold 
distinction can be made, but as will be elaborated below, it is useful to also 
mention the development of a fourth model. Firstly, the vicarious 
liability/respondeat superior theory; secondly, the identification model theory; 
thirdly, the aggregation model theory; finally, the  organisational model/self-
identity model.  
Firstly, the vicarious liability/respondeat superior theory opts for an almost civil 
law like attribution by stating that ‘any’ misconduct by the legal persons’ 
employees will lead to legal person responsibility, the only condition being that 
the acts took place for the company’s benefits and/or within its activities. 
Generally speaking, the deed is attributed to the employer, in a two-stage 
process. First, it is examined whether or not the elements of the offense were 
established in the conduct of the employee. Second, these elements are copied 
and ascribed to the employer as well, based on the relationship of employment 
that exists between them. Naturally, varieties exist. In Anglo-American law, this 
model was copied to the realm of penal law in order to enable criminal liability 
on a principal or an employer for the deeds of an agent or an employee.67 Under 
federal US criminal law for example, a corporation can be found criminally liable 
for any criminal act undertaken by an employee, so long as the act was (a) 
within the scope of the employee’s agency and (b) to the benefit of the 
corporation. This was then, through a decision of the Supreme Court,68 
broadened to legal persons (in US terminology: legal entity). In some 
jurisdictions it is even possible to establish liability for offences committed by 
persons who legally speaking, are not employees. In this liability mechanism, 
                                                             
66 S. ADAM, G. VERMEULEN, W. DE BONDT, “Corporate criminal liability and the EC/EU: 
bridging sovereignty paradigms for the sake of an area of justice, freedom and security” in 
ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en 
Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (373) 387-390. 
67 LEDERMAN, E., “Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and 
Imitation toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal law review, 
2001, (640) 652. For the principles and scope of the criminal vicarious liability doctrine in 
English law and traditional American law, see L.H. LEIGH, Strict and Vicarious Liability: A Study 
in Administrative Criminal Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 1982. 121p.  
68 US Supreme Court, New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 
494 (1909).  
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the company takes entire responsibility for its employees’ misconduct. This 
system is used in Ireland,69 amongst others.  
Secondly, the alter ego/identification model states that only managers and 
employees endowed with certain responsibilities may cause criminal liability for 
the legal person. This is especially true for the offences requiring mens rea.70 The 
rationale behind the fact that, compared to the vicarious liability model, the alter 
ego model occurs especially in relation to mens rea requiring offences,71 is that in 
the former, the law does not claim that the principle or employer actually acted 
or actually knew, no assimilation between the employee and employer occurs, in 
other words, it is a mere matter of technical attribution of the former’s behaviour 
to the latter. In the alter ego model on the other hand, the highest placed 
members of the personnel act as the company itself rather than on behalf of it: a 
high degree of assimilation between the company and the natural person takes 
place, setting the right context for sentencing corporations for offences requiring 
a moral element of intent, recklessness or negligence.72 Indeed, this theory, 
designed to compensate the shortcomings of the vicarious liability doctrine 
(which in many instances was mainly applied to objectified liability), “relies on 
the notion of personification of the legal body,73 hence its name. The difference with 
the vicarious liability doctrine is that the behaviour and thoughts of certain 
individuals may be identified as the actions and thoughts of the legal body itself: 
after all, according to the supporters of this attribution model, in the absence of 
natural internal capabilities to take action, the corporation must act, directly or 
indirectly, through human representatives. The current approximation 
instruments dealing with liability on legal persons (discussed below in section 3) 
can be linked to this model.   The MPC (Model Penal Code, US) also requires a 
corporate official’s involvement in the crime before the crime can be attributed 
to the corporation. More specifically, a corporation will be held criminally liable 
for an act of its employee only if “the commission of the offense was authorized, 
requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of 
                                                             
69 However, it was indicated that the law Irish law remains unclear in several respects. It was 
reported that a lot of guesswork is involved when determining whether criminal liability can be 
attached to a legal person.  
70 “Frequent limitation to offenses of absolute or strict liability: LEDERMAN, E., “Models for 
Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation toward Aggregation 
and the Search for Self-Identity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal law review, 2001, (640) 654. 
71 Even though, not seldomly, a link exists between the attribution models and the mens rea 
requirment, both concepts should be viewed separately. Indeed, sometimes the need for mens 
rea can explain why a certain model is not – or less – applied to those offences, but within the 
different models, the attribution criteria are one specific set of rules, and the mens rea, another.  
72 WELLS, C., “Corporate criminal responsibility” in TULLY, S. (ed.), Research handbook on 
corporate legal responsibility, Cheltenham/Northampton, Elgar, 2005, fn. 72 at 151. 
73 LEDERMAN, E., “Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and 
Imitation toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal law review, 
2001, (640) 655. 
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directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within 
the scope of his office or employment.  There is no unanimity regarding the 
extent to which this last requirement, the toleration by the board of directors, 
forms an integral part of the identification doctrine. It is a criterion which refers 
to the legal person itself; consequently, it is a consideration in the last model, the 
self-identity doctrine, as well. Both in the vicarious liability doctrine, and in the 
identification doctrine, the natural person taking the action must be identified 
(in the former, this can be any employee, in the latter, this should be 
representative of the legal person). Here lies the difference with the next model, 
the aggregation model.   
Thirdly, scholars74 developed an alternative system, because it was felt that 
there was a need for identifying a collective responsibility of individuals within 
the legal person, rather than identifying an individual perpetrator, given that 
this latter technique was unable to reflect the complexity of decision-making 
within modern companies.75 According to the new theory, the aggregation model 
theory, aggregation focuses on the combined and cumulative behaviour that 
ultimately lead to the offence. In this model, the thoughts of different 
agents/employees of the legal body can be linked, thus creating the required 
mental element. It is possible that under this model, innocent activities of 
agents/employees turn into corporate acts or omissions of a criminal character. It 
be noted that the ‘mental element’ that is established through the aggregation 
model is not necessarily synonymous to the criminal intent required in mens rea 
offences. Indeed, valid considerations are thinkable according to which proving 
knowledge does not imply the presence of the mental element required for 
conviction on this offence. After all, the rational element is concerned with 
cognition, while the intent can be perceived as an emotional element, which is 
often uniquely attributed to human beings.76 Consequently, in some 
interpretations, the aggregation model,  necessitates the identification of a 
certain ‘corporate culture’ that made possible, tolerated, or encouraged the 
offence. Another important element is then whether or not the company took 
sufficient organisational measures to avoid the offence. However, such 
considerations can also be found in yet another attribution model, namely the 
self-identity doctrine, also referred to as the organisational model.77  
                                                             
74 I.a. B. FISSE and J. BRAITHWAITE, Corporations, Crime and Accountability, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
75 C. WALSH and A. PYRICH, “Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal 
Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?”, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605, 1995, 625. 
76 LEDERMAN, E., “Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and 
Imitation toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal law review, 
2001, (640) 665-669. 
77 E. COLVIN, “Corporate Personality and Criminal liability”, Criminal law forum, 1995, 1-44. 
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Fourthly, the self-identity doctrine (or organisational model) is based on the 
assumption that legal persons have a mechanism for expressing their substance 
and self-identity, and can thus be held liable for crimes, without necessarily 
having to be linked to the behaviour of individuals. After all, it is far from easy 
to reduce large and complex corporations to a sum of individuals.78   The self-
identity  theory relies on a realist approach, whereas the three previous ones are 
nominalist: indeed, in these theories, the legal person is seen as a mere collection 
of individuals, be it without having to identify them in the aggregation doctrine. 
Here, in contrast, the legal entity exists in and of itself and can thus commit 
crimes, regardless of the involvement of individuals. The self-identity doctrine is 
heavily debated: opponents dismiss it because of its apparent breadth and 
uncertainty,79 whereas its proponents consider that this model reflects the nature 
of corporate responsibility and corporate decision-making more accurately80 
than the other three models, which are in essence nominalist,  based on the 
behaviour of (an) individual(s).81 The choice for either of them is more than mere 
theory, and can have far-reaching consequences. One of the most recent and 
groundbreaking examples of the impact a choice for the organisational model 
can have is the UK Corporate and Man Slaughter Act of 2007.82 Over 25 years 
after the Herald of Free enterprise disaster, this act now allows for a more 
realistic approach (but only for corporate manslaughter) in comparison with 
their conservative identification doctrine. However, this Act is still a little bit 
attached to the latter doctrine by demanding a substantial link with a failing 
senior management (but again without the need of finding an individual). This 
nuance is symbolic for the very debate which exists about this attribution model. 
Indeed, there are two main possibilities to define the relationship between the 
organisational model and the previous three.83 According to the first view, it can 
                                                             
78 D. ROEF,  and T. DE ROOS, “De strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van de rechtspersoon in 
Nederland: rechtstheoretische beschouwingen bij enkele praktische knelpunten” in M. FAURE, 
K. SCHWARZ, De strafrechtelijke en civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van de rechtspersoon en zijn 
bestuurders, Antwerp, Intersentia, 1998, 91. 
79 STRATENWERTH, G., Schweizerisches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil I, Bern, § 5 N 21, 2005.  
80 A. PINTO and M. EVANS, Corporate Criminal Liability, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, 432; C. 
WELLS, “Corporate criminal responsibility” in TULLY, S. (ed.), Research handbook on corporate 
legal responsibility, Cheltenham/Northampton, Elgar, 2005, 147-159. 
81 The individual needs to be identified in the vicarious liability and in the identification theory; 
the identification of the particular individual or of the several individuals is not necessary 
under the aggregation theory. Nonetheless, all three models still depart from the (combined) 
behaviour of (several) individual(s), which is not the case in the organisational/self-identity 
model.  
82 SCHNEIDER, A., “Corporate Liability for Manslaughter – A comparison between English and 
German Law”, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 22-43. 
83 LEDERMAN, E., “Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and 
Imitation toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal law review, 
2001, (640) 665-669. 
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be seen as a continuation of the other models, and particularly as a far-reaching 
development of the aggregation idea. The theoretical line of the development of 
the liability models begins with the ideas of adaptation and imitation (vicarious, 
resp. identification), continues through the aggregation approach, and 
culminates in the self-identity model. The second view, in contrast, emphasises 
how the self-identity model, in contrast to the other three, focuses on the liability 
of the corporation itself, rather than liability following the attribution of offences 
committed by individuals. There is thus considerable debate about the 
organisational model. Crucial elements of the model, such as the ‘corporate 
culture’ and the extent to which this plays in determining liability, were 
examined in the questionnaire (cfr. infra in this subsection, regarding justification 
grounds). However, the questionnaire did not put the organisational model 
forward as being a separate attribution.  
 
In practice: application of the vicarious liability and identification model  
 
Questions constructed against the backdrop of these four options provide 
with valuable information regarding the employed attribution techniques. The 
self-identification model was not put forward explicitly in the member states 
questionnaire. Instead, considerations and questions related to the corporate 
culture of the concerned legal person, were included as one of the aspects of 
liability attribution, without necessarily tying them to a specific liability 
doctrine. In doing so, the project team intended to prevent that member states 
would be reluctant to indicate that the corporate culture is indeed a 
consideration when assessing liability of a legal person, if such indication would 
automatically lead to the categorization of that member state’s liability regime as 
a self-identity model. 
This approach led to some interesting results; an example being the 
Netherlands. In this member state, especially in light of a Supreme  Court 
decision from 2003, there is a very broad set of non-cumulative criteria which 
can lead to liability.84 Indeed, as long as the behaviour has a link with the 
‘sphere’ of the concerned legal person. Following criteria are said to be 
alternative criteria:  
− The offence has been committed by an employee (regardless of position); 
− The offence benefited the interests of the legal persons; 
− The offence was part of the legal person’s normal activities or tasks; 
− The offence was of such nature that the legal person had control over its 
occurrence and accepted it, or accepted a similar offence. This last 
requirement can hint towards a mens rea element (see above 2.3.1.1), but is no 
synonym: indeed, for mens rea offences, proof of the moral element is 
                                                             
84 HR 21 oktober 2003, NJ 2006, 328 (Drijfmest). 
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necessary. Fulfilment of the forth criterion (which is in essence merely a 
criterion for the attribution, not for the establishment of the offence as such) 
does not necessarily provide with sufficient proof.  Nonetheless, it will of 
course be an important indicator of mens rea.  
Leaving the discussion regarding the potential moral element aside (after all, 
many offences, especially economic offences, do not require the establishment of 
a moral element), these criteria listed in Dutch law show how an attribution 
model does not necessarily qualify as a ‘pure’ application of one of the models 
above. Indeed, several elements which are drawn from several models can (be it 
as isolated criteria or their combination) lead to liability of the legal person. The 
last criteria, referring to the corporate culture, shows how elements of the self-
identity model are combined with vicarious/identification models.85  
The following table contains an overview of which member states’ systems 
are based on a vicarious liability versus an identification model. It cannot, 
however, be interpreted as an overview of applicable attribution theories: after 
all, in some member states, such as the Netherlands, the ‘corporate culture’ plays 
an important role, implying that their attribution models are on the crossroads 
of the organisational model  on the one hand and the vicarious and/or 
identification model on the other hand. It thus appears that many member states 
apply a combination of several models, not only of the organisational model and 
others, but also of the vicarious liability and the identification doctrine. This is 
apparent from the table in which several member states indicated to apply 
elements of both these models. The left column contains the country codes of 
those countries applying liability to legal persons following the behaviour of 
their employees. This technique reflects (elements of)86 the vicarious 
liability/respondeat superior theory. The right column contains the country 
codes of those countries applying liability to legal persons following the 
behaviour of their staff. As it was put in the questionnaire, these are people who 
(as opposed to employees) possess managerial and or representative 
responsibility, thus reflecting (elements of)87 the alter ego/identification model.  
When a member state is included in italics, this means that the consulted 
member state expert had originally not ticked the concerned box in the survey, 
but that the project team adjusted that reply, considering the information 
obtained through comments or other replies in the survey and follow up 
questions after the preliminary analysis of the data gathered.  
 
                                                             
85 See in that respect also below, where the justification grounds for liability, based on the legal 
person’s organisation, are discussed.  
86 The replies do not automatically imply that the concerned countries apply this model fully, 
without a combination with elements from other attribution models; see below. 
87 The replies do not automatically imply that the concerned countries apply this model fully, 
without a combination with elements from other attribution models; see below. 
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In the analysis of the gathered data reflected in the table, these specificities 
will be explained.   
 
 Attribution of criminal liability to legal persons  
Conditions 
Acts by employees Acts by staff  
MS Nr.88 MS Nr.89 
For the benefit of 
the LP 
AT BE CY FI HU IT MT 
LT PL PT SL RO UK IE 
DK 
13 
+2 
AT EE ES FI HU IT LU PL 
PT SK UK IE DK RO LT 
11 
+4 
Within activities 
LP 
AT BE CY DK IE FI LT 
MT NL RO UK  
11 
 
AT FI FR SK IE DK RO LT 
4  
+4 
Other BE ES FR PL NL RO 6 BE CY ES FR 4 
 
First, the difference between the employees or the staff being able to give rise to 
the criminal liability of the legal person needs to be discussed.90  
Originally, only eighteen member states had ticked a box pertaining to the 
question targeted in the left column. Hence, nine member states did not indicate 
that their member state employs (elements of)91 the vicarious liability/respondeat 
superior theory. For six of those, this is undoubtedly correct: at the time of the 
completion of the questionnaire, the Czech Republic did not yet apply criminal 
liability to legal persons and the experts replied accordingly. For five others, 
notably Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia, Sweden and Greece, the absence of reply is 
easily explained, given that their national legislations do not apply criminal 
liability to legal persons. The three remaining member states, Estonia, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia, did not indicate to attach potential criminal liability 
to the acts of employees, and no comment provided in the survey contradicted 
this statement. These member states did, however, indicate to apply criminal 
liability for acts of the staff of legal persons in some instances (right column). 
Consequently, it can be concluded that amongst those member states applying 
                                                             
88 The numbers should be read considering that there is a considerable overlap between the 
replies: in each row, a very small number of MS ticked only the box of that row: “acts for the 
benefit of the legal person”: four MS, “acts within the activities of the legal person”: two, and 
“other”: two.  
89 Here too, the numbers should be read considering that there is a considerable overlap 
between the replies: in each row, a very small number of MS ticked only the box of that row: 
“acts for the benefit of the legal person”: four MS, “acts within the activities of the legal person”: 
two, and “other”: two.  
90 It be noted that they need not necessarily be seen as alternatives: the considerable overlap 
shows that in many member states acts of both groups can give rise to liability. However, even 
when not both columns are ticked, the reality in certain member states shows that it is 
sometimes not one or the other: in the Netherlands for example, the (combination of) the criteria 
listed above will be determining, rather than whether the natural person is an employee of a 
member of staff. 
91 The replies do not automatically imply that the concerned countries apply this model fully, 
without a combination with elements from other attribution models; see below. 
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criminal liability to legal persons, only three do not apply (elements of) the 
vicarious liability/respondeat superior theory, but use (elements of)92 the alter 
ego/identification model instead. 
In relation to the alter ego/identification model, originally only fourteen member 
states indicated to use this liability model (after elimination of the overlap in 
replies). Again, the six member states who do not apply criminal liability did 
most logically not tick any boxes of the replies pertaining to the question 
targeted in the right column, namely Bulgaria, Germany, Latvia, Sweden, Greece 
and the Czech Republic ( it be noted that as of January 2012 the latter does apply 
this type of liability). Yet, still seven more member states did not indicate to 
apply criminal liability for the behaviour of staff of the legal person. However, 
for four member states the comments in the questionnaire have indicated that 
staff also qualifies as those persons being able to give rise to criminal liability of 
the legal person; it concerns Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania and Romania. It thus 
appears that only three member states do not apply (elements of) the alter 
ego/identification model but use (elements of) the vicarious liability/respondeat 
superior theory instead; it concerns Malta, the Netherlands and Slovenia. It be 
remembered that several member state combine the elements of either the 
vicarious liability model  or the identification model, with elements pertaining to 
the identification model (those elements usually referring to the corporate 
culture of the involved legal person).  
Secondly, turning to the distinction between acts “for the benefit of the legal 
person” and acts “within the activities of the legal person”, it is striking that both 
for the column containing staff and employee, more member states have 
indicated the former condition.  
A close examination of the comments reveals that these results are not 
entirely precise. Regarding the questions from the left column, it appears that 
both in Ireland and in Denmark there is virtually no difference between the 
liability rules in relation to acts for the benefit of the legal person or within the 
activities of the legal person. 
 
                                                             
92 The replies do not automatically imply that the concerned countries apply this model fully, 
without a combination with elements from other attribution models; see below. 
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Another level of variety occurs regarding the meaning of ‘within the activities of 
the legal person’. Following figure summarizes the results.  
 
0 1 2 3 4 5
In accordance to the legal person's statutes 
(MT, RO, SL)
In accordance to the purpose for wich the 
legal person was founded (BE, IE, MT)
In accordance to the present corporate 
culture (MT)
Any link with the legal person can attribute 
criminal liability (CY, FI, NL)
Other (AT, BE, DK, LT, RO)
Type(s) of activities required to attribute criminal liability  
 
Following examples make the variety in liability regimes even more tangible. 
According to the Spanish Penal Code, criminal liability is attributed to a legal 
person for offences committed by its employees only when such offences are 
committed for the benefit of the legal person and also within the legal person’s 
activities. Though the Penal Code does not define the extent of the phrase 
“within the legal person’s activities”, the Spanish Supreme Court has applied a 
very broad scope of this concept when dealing with the civil consequences of a 
criminal offence.  
In Belgium on the other hand, the material element93 needed to incur liability 
establishes a physical connection between the offence and the legal person. 
Article 5, 1 Criminal Code enumerates in a limitative way three cases where 
such connection can be demonstrated: legal persons can be held liable for 
offences which are ‘intrinsically bound to the realization of their social object’, 
which are ‘intrinsically bound to the defence of their interests’, or which, on 
grounds of a concrete facts-pattern, are committed ‘for its account’. How these 
are interpreted is left to the judge on a case by case basis, and the legislator did 
                                                             
93 As opposed to the moral element, see above 2.3.1.1. 
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not specify which persons’ behaviour can give rise to liability of the legal 
person.94  
In French Criminal Law, an ‘ordinary’ employee, i.e. who has no executive 
power and/or representative authority of the legal person, can never engage the 
criminal liability of the latter. However, jurisprudence has established that an 
employee possessing a valid delegation of authority, in particular regarding the 
respect of the employment hygiene and safety regulations, is regarded as a 
representative authority.  
The Romanian Criminal Code, besides ‘within the activities’ and ‘for the 
benefit’, includes a third category – ‘offences committed on behalf of the legal 
person’. The offences perpetrated on behalf of the legal person are those offences 
perpetrated within the process of organizing the activity and operation of the 
legal person without being directly connected to its object and without 
requirement to bring a benefit to the legal person (for example, discriminations, 
harassments etc.). 
From the survey it is clear that several member states apply a relatively 
broad definition of what “hierarchy of the legal person’s staff” entails. In 
concrete terms, a relatively broad definition implies that the scope of the 
hierarchy of company staff is can cover (based on the facts) a person who has a 
leading position within the legal person based on a power of representation of 
the legal person, or based on an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal 
person or based on an authority to exercise control within the legal person.  
Justification grounds for the legal person, linked to its organisation and 
‘blameworthiness’  
Even though many member states’ legal systems indeed foresee the 
possibility for legal persons to be criminally liable for offences committed by 
their employees, several indicated that legal persons can escape such liability if 
they can prove that sufficient organization, due instructions and  reasonable care 
and control were applied, both when the condition for liability is commitment of 
the offences within the legal person’s activities and when the condition is 
commitment for the benefit of the legal person.  
This reasoning is linked to the attribution model listed above, namely the 
aggregation model, and the fourth mentioned model, being the organisational 
model/self-identity doctrine. However, even though they are clearly linked, the 
above  models of attribution and the here mentioned possibility to escape the 
liability are not the same mechanisms, given that they both apply very different 
logics:  in the aggregation model  the default position is that only a collective 
responsibility of individuals within the legal person, rather than (an)identified 
individual perpetrator(s), can lead to liability of the legal person. It focuses on 
                                                             
94 Please note that under the Belgian law system the legal person can also incur responsibility as 
an entity on its own. C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht. In hoofdlijnen, 
Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2011, 125. 
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the combined an cumulative behaviour that ultimately lead to the offence.  The 
organisational model refers to the establishment of the liability of the legal 
person as a separate entity, regardless of the individuals involved. The 
mechanism discussed here however, starts from a liability of the legal person 
following the behaviour of one individual. Only after that has been established, 
the behaviour of the legal person as a ‘self-identity’ comes into play: when 
sufficient prove is given that the organisational structure and/or the legal 
person’s instructions were not responsible (read cannot be blamed) for the 
individual’s behaviour, there is a possibility for the legal person to escape the 
liability for the behaviour of the individual natural person. In other words, the 
mechanism whereby the organisational structure of the legal person leads to the 
latter escaping its responsibility combines elements of the ‘collective 
responsibility’ of individuals with the legal entity as a ‘self-entity’, without being 
a full application of one these attribution models.  
The latter is very similar to the Slovenian situation, where lack of 
organisational care and control is only one alternative condition for criminal 
responsibility of legal persons, together with the fact that the perpetrator 
committed the criminal offence in the name of, on behalf of or in favour of the 
legal person.  In Cyprus on the other hand, the different elements of the offence 
charged need to be proven on a case by case basis. The burden of proof lies with 
the prosecution. The fact that a legal person is sufficiently organized, it has duly 
instructed its directors, managers or employees and has taken reasonable care to 
exert control on its directors, managers or employees, could be factors to be 
taken into account. It be remembered that in the Spanish situation a variation of 
the ‘pure’ aggregation model occurs, in the sense that the default position is that 
only a collective responsibility of individuals within the legal person, rather than 
identifying an individual perpetrator, can lead to liability of the legal person: in 
Spain, this is indeed a necessary (as opposed to alternative in Slovenia) 
condition, at least regarding the liability for acts of employees.95 
Concluding, considering the high number of member states which indicated 
to employ one of mechanisms listed in the question regarding the liability for 
offences committed by employees and/or in the question dealing with liability 
for offences committed by certain hierarchy of company staff, many EU member 
states use variations on (and combinations of) the vicarious liability/respondeat 
superior theory and the alter ego/identification model, be it with corrections which 
can be linked to the aggregation model theory96and the organisational model.  
 
 
                                                             
95 For more details see above 2.3.1.1. 
96 The latter is also linked to the mens rea debate, see in particular the explanation concerning the 
Spanish situation. 
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2.3.1.3 Parallel prosecution and concurring liability  
 
Other questions arising when examining attribution mechanisms are whether 
parallel prosecution of both the legal person and the concerned natural person is 
possible for the same (or, depending, related) offence and whether or not both 
the natural and the legal person can be held criminally liable for the same (or, 
depending, related) offence.  
Regarding parallel prosecution, in a clear majority of the member states the 
prosecution of the legal person does not exclude the prosecution of the 
concerned natural person. An even bigger majority applies this to the reversed 
situation: prosecution of the natural person rarely excludes the prosecution of 
the legal person. Both results are comprised, respectively, in the tables below.   
 
0%
81%
19%
5.5 Does criminal prosecution of the liable legal person 
exclude parallel prosecution for the natural 
person/perpetrator?
Yes 
No (AT, BE, CY, DK, EE, ES, 
FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, NL, PT, 
RO, SK, UK) 
Other (MT, PL, SL, UK)
 
 
 
DIVERSITY IN THE MEMBER STATES 
 
 
70 
 
0%
90%
10%
5.6 Does criminal prosecution of the liable natural 
person/perpetrator exclude parallel prosecution for the liable 
legal person?
Yes 
No (AT, BE, CY, DK, EE, ES, 
FI, FR,IT, IE, LT, LU, NL, PT, 
RO, SK, SL, UK)
Other (MT,PL)
 
In the context of the latter figure, the example of Finland shows that in that 
member state the default position is that both the legal person and the natural 
person are prosecuted at the same time. This follows from the fact that it is 
explicitly stated in which cases liability of the legal person is still possible, 
despite the natural person not being prosecuted: criminal liability can be 
confined to a legal person if the perpetrator is identified but is not prosecuted 
e.g. because the perpetrator cannot be reached, the perpetrator has died,97 or the 
crime is time barred in regard of the perpetrator but not the legal person. This is 
listed as one of the two Finnish exceptions to the mens rea requirement. In 
France, the possibility for parallel prosecution is explicitly included in the 
legislation. In several member states amongst which Slovenia, the natural and 
legal person will as a rule be subject to parallel proceedings. In others such as 
Italy, the prosecution or the trial against the natural person/perpetrator and the 
prosecution or the trial against the legal person may be carry out separately or 
jointly (Art. 38 Act 231/2001). 
Sometimes the situation is less black and white, as is the case in Poland: in 
this member state, the judgment of the natural person is a precondition for the 
criminal liability of a legal person: in other words, parallel prosecution is not 
possible, yet the criminal liability of the legal person without the criminal 
liability of the natural person is no possible. Indeed, there are two separate 
proceedings. First against the natural person (where the sanction can be imposed 
only on the natural person), and after valid judgments regulated, the second 
proceedings against legal entities. The collective entity is liable if the 
                                                             
97 Many member states contain rules concerning the death of the natural person and the 
consequence for the liability of the legal person.  
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commitment of an offence by a natural person has been confirmed with a valid 
convicting judgment, a judgment conditionally discontinuing penal proceedings, 
or proceedings in a fiscal offence case, a valid decision to leave voluntary 
submission to liability, or a court’s decision to discontinue the proceedings for 
circumstances excluding the penalisation of the perpetrator. 
Regarding concurring liability, several systems exist. In Belgian law98  for 
example, there is a cascade system. The first question is whether or not the 
natural person acted intentionally. ‘Intent’ in this context is the intent as 
apparent from the concrete circumstances of the case. This was added to avoid 
that in case of ‘objectified’ liability (cfr. supra) the intent requirement would 
automatically be met, resulting in the legal person consistently avoiding its 
liability. That would indeed have happened frequently if for the assessment of 
intent the legal qualification of an offence would have been the criterion. When 
it is concluded that in the specific circumstances of the case the natural person 
acted intentionally, a concurring system of liability applies in that both the legal 
and the natural person can (but do not necessarily have to) be held liable. If the 
natural person did not act intentionally, this possibility for concurring liability is 
lost: in this case, only one of both will be held liable: the decisive factor then 
becomes who committed the “worst” violation: the natural or the legal person. 
This is a factual matter which is assessed by the judge.  
The figure below shows that four member states have indicated not to have a 
clear-cut system, in that it is not possible to say as a rule that a sanction will be 
imposed on either the natural person, or the legal person, or on both. One of 
those member states is Belgium and three more indicate to have such a nuanced 
system.  
 
                                                             
98 For more details see C. VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht. In 
hoofdlijnen, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2011,132-134.  
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18%
64%
18%
5.4 Under your Member State’s national law or legal regime, 
on who will the sanction ultimately be imposed?
Sanction will ultimately be imposed 
on the legal person only (AT, FI,NL, 
RO)
Sanction can ultimately be imposed 
on both (CY, DK, EE, ES, FR, HU, IE, 
IT, LT, LU, MT, PL, PT, SK, SL)
Other  (BE, FI, SK, UK)
 
Another example of a nuanced system is Finland: when a natural person is 
personally liable for the company debts, the sanction is normally imposed on the 
legal person unless in case of insolvency: then, the sanction is imposed on the 
natural person.  
Despite these differences, the figure shows that amongst the member states 
which apply criminal liability to legal persons, in the majority of the cases, 
sanctions can be imposed on both.  
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2.3.2 Attribution mechanisms and administrative liability  
 
In this context, next to the attribution mechanisms and the matters of parallel 
prosecution and concurring liability are examined, the moral element is looked 
into as well, even though this aspect might at first sight be perceived as typical 
for the criminal liability context.  
2.3.2.1 Mens rea 
 
This requirement is not exclusive to the criminal liability sphere. For 
example, the Spanish Constitutional Court has explicitly stated that even 
administrative liability can only be attributed to a legal person if there is some 
degree of blameworthiness in the commission of the offence (SSTC December 19, 
1991/246, and June 30, 2003/129).  The term ‘blameworthiness’ is no synonym to 
the term ‘mens rea’, but it indicates that the complete absence of a moral element 
in the administrative sphere should not be readily assumed.  
Looking at the replies from the member states in this regard, Spain indicated 
not to require a mens rea element; as said above, given that the term 
blameworthiness’ is no synonym to the term ‘mens rea’, it can indeed be seen 
why this reply was given. However, it is a mere matter of interpretation. The 
matter of Spain being as it may, the fact remains that several member states 
indeed still require the mens rea element  in the context of administrative liability 
for offences. This is visualized in the following figure.  
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21%
10%
11%
16%
21%
21%
8.3 Does your Member State’s national law or legal regime –
as a rule – require the establishment of ‘mens rea’ for a legal 
person in the sphere of administrative liability for offences?
NO, our law has created specific type of 
(objectified) liability for legal persons, 
not  requiring a culpable state of mind 
(CY, CZ, MT, SK)
NO, our law has not created specific 
type of liability, but has restricted 
liability for legal persons to those 
offences that do not require a culpable 
state of mind (SE, UK)
NO, for another reason (BU, LU)
YES, identification of the individual 
physical perpetrator is necessary under 
your law or legal regime  (EE, EL, PT)
YES, our law entirely recognizes mens 
rea for a legal person, no division 
between natural persons and legal 
persons can be made (BE, DE, LT, RO)
 
 
Amongst the member states whose legal system comprises of a mechanism of 
administrative liability for offences,99 a small majority of the member states 
indeed replied that the mens rea requirement is a condition for the application of 
administrative liability of legal persons for offences. Again, this supports the 
statement that the complete absence of a moral element in the administrative 
sphere should not be readily assumed. However, naturally there is a 
considerable difference with the criminal liability sphere: the figure above (in 
2.3.1.1) shows how in the latter, no less than 85% of the member states require 
the fulfilment of this moral element in order to establish criminal liability.  
                                                             
99 With the exception of Slovakia: the replies to the survey contain an inconsistency in that on 
the one hand, Slovakia did not indicate to apply administrative liability for any of the listed 
offences (see 2.4.2), thus indicating that its national law does not comprise a mechanism for 
administrative liability for offences. On the other hand, it did reply to the question dealing with 
mens rea in relation to administrative liability for offences (a possible explanation is that the 
reply given was negative).   
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2.3.2.2 Different attribution models 
 
As was done in the context of criminal liability, regarding administrative 
liability for offences it is verified if, and if so, which attribution mechanism is 
used by the member states who apply the administrative liability of legal 
persons. The left column contains the country codes of those countries applying 
liability to legal persons following the behaviour of their employees. This 
technique reflects the application of (elements of)100 the vicarious 
liability/respondeat superior theory. The right column the country codes of those 
countries applying liability to legal persons following the behaviour of their 
staff. As it was put in the questionnaire, these are people who (as opposed to 
employees) possess managerial and or representative responsibility, thus 
reflecting (elements of) the alter ego/identification model. 
 
 Attribution of administrative liability for offences to legal persons  
Conditions 
Acts by employees Acts by staff  
MS 
Nr.
101 
MS Nr.102 
For the benefit of 
the LP 
BE CY MT LT LV PT SE 
SK 
8 BE DE EE EL LV SE SK 7 
Within activities 
LP 
BE BU CY LT LV MT NL 
RO SE SK  
10 
 
BE CZ DE LV PT SE SK 7 
Other ES FI NL LT LV 5 BE CY ES FI LU LV  6 
 
A total of thirteen member states (after elimination of overlap) has indicated 
to apply administrative liability for offences to legal persons following certain 
acts of their employees. Of the fourteen member states who indicated not to 
apply this vicarious liability/respondeat superior theory, this was to be expected for 
seven of them,103 given that their national law does not comprise of a mechanism 
of administrative liability of legal persons for offences.104   
                                                             
100 The replies do not automatically imply that the concerned countries apply this model fully, 
without a combination with elements from other attribution models; see below.  
101 The numbers should be read considering that there is a considerable overlap between the 
replies: in each row, a very small number of MS ticked only the box of that row: “acts for the 
benefit of the legal person”: no MS, “acts within the activities of the legal person”: two, and 
“other”: two.  
102 Here too, the numbers should be read considering that there is a considerable overlap 
between the replies: in each row, a very small number of MS ticked only the box of that row: 
“acts for the benefit of the legal person”: three MS, “acts within the activities of the legal 
person”: one, and “other”: two.  
103 AT DK FR HU IT PL IE. 
104 Regarding The Netherlands and Slovakia the replies to the survey contain an inconsistency 
in that on the one hand, The Netherlands and Slovakia did not indicate to apply administrative 
liability for any of the listed offences (see 2.4.2), thus indicating that their national law does not 
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Regarding acts of their staff, also total of thirteen member states (after 
elimination of overlap) replied to apply administrative liability for offences to 
legal persons following certain of their staff’s acts. Of the fourteen member states 
who indicated not to apply this alter ego/identification model, this was to be 
expected for eight of them,105 given that their national law does not comprise of a 
mechanism of administrative liability of legal persons for offences.106   
Comparing these results to the outcome of similar questions in the criminal 
liability sphere, less member states have indicated to apply administrative 
liability to actions of subordinates than in the sphere of criminal liability. This 
fits the given that a higher degree of mens rea is required in the latter sphere. 
After all, several member states who demand the establishment of a mens rea 
requirement in the context of criminal liability only acknowledge its potential 
existence with physical persons. Consequently, in those cases criminal liability of 
the legal person can only be established via liability for acts of employees and/or 
staff. This consideration plays to a lesser extent in the administrative liability 
context.   
2.3.2.3 Parallel prosecution and concurring liability  
 
Other questions arising when examining attribution mechanisms are whether 
parallel prosecution of both the legal person and the concerned natural person is 
possible for the same (or, depending, related) offence and whether or not both 
the natural and the legal person can be held administratively liable for the same 
(or, depending, related) offence.  
Regarding parallel prosecution, the situation is perfectly comparable to the 
situation regarding criminal liability of legal persons. In a clear majority of the 
member states the prosecution of the legal person does not exclude the 
prosecution of the concerned natural person. An even bigger majority applies 
this to the reversed situation: prosecution of the natural person rarely excludes 
the prosecution of the legal person. Both results are comprised, respectively, in 
the tables below.107   
                                                                                                                                               
comprise a mechanism for administrative liability for offences and on the other, they indicated 
to apply such liability to legal persons for the acts of the latter’s employees.   
105 AT DK FR HU IT NL PL IE. 
106 Regarding Slovakia the replies to the survey contain an inconsistency in that on the one 
hand, Slovakia did not indicate to apply administrative liability for any of the listed offences 
(see 2.4.2), thus indicating that its national law does not comprise a mechanism for 
administrative liability for offences and on the other, it indicated to apply such liability to legal 
persons for the acts of the latter’s staff.   
107 For both tables, the following consideration applies: Regarding Slovakia the replies to the 
survey contain an inconsistency in that on the one hand, Slovakia did not indicate to apply 
administrative liability for any of the listed offences (see 2.4.2), thus indicating that its national 
law does not comprise a mechanism for administrative liability for offences and on the other, it 
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11%
78%
11%
10.4 Does administrative prosecution of the liable legal 
person exclude parallel prosecution for the natural 
person/perpetrator?
Yes (LT, LV)
No (BU, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL,
FI, LU, MT, PT, RO, SE, SK,
UK)
Other (BE, ES)
 
6%
83%
11%
10.5 Does administrative prosecution of the liable natural person/ 
perpetrator exclude parallel prosecution for the liable legal 
person?
Yes (LV)
No (BU, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL,
FI, LT, LU, MT, PT, RO, SE,
SK, UK)
Other (BE, ES)
 
 
Regarding concurrent liability, the picture is divided. In merely half of the 
member states the sanctions can be imposed on both the natural and the legal 
person; a smaller percentage than the outcome of the survey in the context of 
criminal liability of legal persons. The results are comprised in the table below.108  
                                                                                                                                               
replied to the parallel prosecution questions in the context of administrative liability for 
offences. 
108 For this, the following consideration applies: Regarding Slovakia the replies to the survey 
contain an inconsistency in that on the one hand, Slovakia did not indicate to apply 
administrative liability for any of the listed offences (see 2.4.2), thus indicating that its national 
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39%
50%
11%
10.3 Under your Member State’s national law or legal regime, 
on who will the sanction ultimately be imposed?
Sanction will ultimately be
imposed on the legal person
only (BE,BU, EL, ES, FI, LT, RO)
Sanction can ultimately be
imposed on both (CY, CZ, DE,
EE, LU, MT, SE, SK, UK)
Other (LT, PT)
 
                                                                                                                                               
law does not comprise a mechanism for administrative liability for offences and on the other, it 
replied to the concurrent liability question in the context of administrative liability for offences. 
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2.4 Variety in offences leading to liability of legal persons 
 
Findings 
• 50% of the member states introduced a general criminal liability 
whereas the others limit the liability to specific offence types (41%) 
or categories (9%). 
• 39% of the member states introduced a general administrative 
liability whereas the others limit liability to specific offence types 
(33%) or categories (28%). 
Recommendations 
• Because not all member states introduced a general liability 
mechanism, it is important for the EU to consistently regulate the 
liability of legal persons for the offences that are subject to 
approximation. 
 
2.4.1 General, family or single offence approach 
 
A fourth fundamental aspect of legal persons’ liability where variations exist 
among the member states relates to the offences that are brought in relation to 
the liability of the legal persons. 
Member states accepting liability of legal persons – be it criminal or 
administrative – do not necessarily share the same view as to the offences that 
can be committed by a legal person. Some member states have opted to extend 
the liability of legal persons to their entire criminal code. By contrast, other 
member states have adopted specific clauses that limit the liability of legal 
persons to specific offences.  
From the replies to questions 4.1 it becomes clear that around 39% (with 
respect to criminal liability) of the member states have introduced a general 
liability of legal persons for offences, meaning that no distinction is made in the 
offences that can be committed by natural or legal persons. An abstract 
indication of the offence categories or families is least favoured approach when 
seeking to introduce liability only with respect to a selection of offences. 
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50%
9%
41%
4.1 For what kind of offences can a legal person be held 
criminally liable under your Members State’s national law or 
legal regime?
All kinds. Law or legal regime makes
no difference between legal and
natural persons (AT, BE, CY, CZ, FR,
HU, NL, LU, RO, SK, UK)
Law or legal regime has introduced
criminal liability for legal persons for
(a) specific categor(y)(ies) of offence
(LT, PL)
Law or legal regime has introduced
criminal liability for legal persons for
specific type of offences (DK, EE, ES,
FI, IE, IT, MT, PT, SL)
 
 
 
 
Considering the differences between the approach in relation to criminal 
liability when compared to the approach in relation to administrative liability, it 
becomes interesting to see how that diversity is spread over the member states. 
The table inserted below provides an overview of the offences connected to 
liability per member state, presenting both the approach in relation to criminal 
liability and administrative liability.  
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The columns distinguish between the introduction of liability for all  known 
offences, for a selection of offence families or for a selection of single expressly 
identified offences. In the event the member state has indicated not to have 
introduced either criminal or administrative liability, the row is filled with a 
light grey colour.  
 
 
Offences for which a legal person can be held liable  
MS 
Criminal liability Administrative liability 
All Family Single All Family Single 
AT X      
BE X   X   
BU      X 
CY X    X  
CZ ?109     X 
DE    X   
DK   X    
EE   X   X 
EL      X 
ES   X X   
FI   X X   
FR X      
HU X      
IE   X    
IT   X    
LU X    X  
LT  X   X  
LV     X  
MT   X   X 
NL X      
PL  X     
PT   X X   
RO X    X  
SE    X   
SL   X    
SK X      
UK X     X 
                                                             
109 In the Czech Republic, criminal liability for legal persons has only been introduced from 
january 2012. The replies included in the questionnaire related to the situation at the time of its 
completion. The information gathered is inconclusive on the ratione materiae with respect to 
criminal liability. 
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The table shows that only Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta have 
introduced parallel approaches for criminal and administrative liability of legal 
persons.  
For all other member states, the approach differs. Examples exist on the one 
hand of member states that have introduced a broad all inclusive criminal 
liability complemented with a category approach identifying the families for 
which administrative liability is introduced (e.g. Cyprus); and on the other hand 
of member states that have introduced a broad all inclusive criminal liability 
complemented with an approach identifying each and every single offence for 
which administrative liability is introduced (e.g. UK); Finally, the table shows 
that where a single offence approach is introduced in relation to criminal liability 
of offences, an all inclusive approach can be found with respect to administrative 
liability (e.g. Spain). 
2.4.2 Typology of the offences singled out 
 
Member states that have not introduced an all inclusive liability for legal 
persons tend to have a rather traditional view with respect to the offences that 
can be committed by legal persons. Though there are a number of offences for 
which the architecture of the constituent elements precludes the commission by 
a legal person, the examples are limited. France justly refers to infanticide which 
presupposes consanguinity between the perpetrator and the victim, which 
cannot be established for a legal person. When a legal person would be involved 
in the commission of an infanticide, the offence would be re-qualified to murder 
or manslaughter with respect to the legal person. Similarly, Cyprus has explicitly 
referred to bigamy and perjury as examples of offences that can never be 
committed by a legal person. France also refers in its comments to the fact that 
offences in the press (e.g. libel and insults)110 are excluded from the application 
of liability of legal persons.  
The table inserted below provides the overview of the empirical data 
gathered in the member states with respect to the identification of offences for 
which legal persons can be held liable.  
                                                             
110 Though at first sight press offences need to be committed by natural persons, it is not 
unimaginable that a Legal person launches a advertisement campaign with is insulting for a 
particular group and could therefore fall within the scope of insult as a press offence. 
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The data with respect to criminal liability (CL) reflects the replies of 9 
member states and is presented together with the data with respect to 
administrative liability (AL) which in its turn reflects the replies of 6 member 
states.   
 
 
Liability of legal persons for identified offences 
CL 
/9 
AL 
/6 
Offence type 
7 2 Participation in a criminal organization 
8 2 Terrorism 
9 1 Trafficking in human beings 
9 2 Sexual exploitation of children and child pornography 
8 2 Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 
7 1 Illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives 
9 3 Corruption 
9 2 Fraud 
9 4 Laundering of the proceeds of crime 
7 0 Counterfeiting currency, including of the euro 
9 1 Computer-related crime 
7 3 
Environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal 
species and endangered plant species and varieties 
5 2 Facilitation of unauthorized entry and residence 
3 0 Murder, grievous bodily injury 
3 0 Manslaughter 
5 1 Illicit trade in human organs and tissue 
4 0 Kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking 
7 3 Racism and xenophobia 
3 0 Organized or armed robbery 
4 1 Illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art 
5 1 Swindling 
4 2 Racketeering and extortion 
6 2 Counterfeiting and piracy of products 
7 1 Forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein 
8 1 Forgery of means of payment 
3 1 Illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters 
6 2 Illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials 
5 1 Trafficking in stolen vehicles 
2 0 Rape 
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Liability of legal persons for identified offences 
CL 
/9 
AL 
/6 
Offence type 
5 0 Arson 
3 1 Crimes within the jurisdiction of the international criminal court 
3 0 Unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships 
3 0 Sabotage 
3 2 
Conduct which infringes road traffic regulations, including breaches of 
regulations pertaining to driving hours and rest periods and regulation 
on hazardous goods 
4 2 Smuggling of goods 
8 3 Infringements of intellectual property rights 
2 0 
Threats and acts of violence against persons, including violence during 
sport events 
6 1 Criminal damage 
2 1 Theft 
6 2 Offences against workplaces health and safety  
 
Analysis reveals that with respect to criminal liability of legal persons for the 
offences under review, the number of member states that have introduced 
liability drops below 50% for offences that are traditionally said to be excluded 
from the scope of liability of legal persons. Examples are murder, manslaughter, 
kidnapping and rape. However, it be noted that also with respect to offences 
that can clearly be brought in relation to legal persons, the number of member 
states that have introduced criminal liability is remarkably low. Conduct which 
infringes road traffic regulations, including breaches of regulations pertaining to 
driving hours and rest periods and regulation on hazardous goods can be used 
as an example. Especially legal persons active in the transport sector can be 
brought in relation to that kind of conduct. 
With respect administrative liability of legal persons, the number of offences 
included in its scope is even more restricted. Even offences such as corruption 
and fraud are not automatically included in the scope of the liability.111 
 
                                                             
111 Though the table might suggest otherwise, the limited administrative liability of legal 
persons for offences such corruption and fraud are not covered by the introduction of criminal 
liability because the numbers in the tables are not necessarily linked to the same member states. 
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2.5 Variety in sanctions which can be imposed on legal persons  
 
Findings 
• A large majority of member states has extended their sanction 
arsenal to encompass a number of sanctions specifically designed 
for legal persons, sometimes linked to the typology of the offence 
committed 
• The sanction arsenal is more diverse than the suggestions found in 
the approximation instruments 
Recommendations 
• The EU should look into including more mandatory and suggested 
sanctions in its approximation instruments 
 
 
A fifth fundamental aspect of legal persons’ liability where variations exist 
among the member states relates to the sanctions that can be imposed on the 
legal persons. The introduction of liability for legal persons for (certain) offences 
supposes that the sanction applicable is also valid for legal persons. As a 
preliminary remark, it is important to point to the influences the differences 
regarding competent authorities (differences between criminal vs. administrative 
liability) have on the terminology used. Member states have introduced different 
regimes in their national law, including criminal, administrative and or civil 
liability for legal persons. From that perspective it can be advised not to use the 
concept of penalties in relation to the sanctions that should/can be imposed on 
legal persons. Considering the criminal connotation that is often attached to 
penalties, preference should be given to sanctions for legal persons. 
2.5.1 Need for specific sanctions 
 
It is evident that no sanctions involving deprivation of liberty can be 
imposed on a legal person. Because a legal person is essentially different from a 
natural person, the sanctions differ too. Therefore, we have asked the member 
states whether the existing sanction arsenal was sufficient or additional 
sanctions needed to be introduced specifically aimed at targeting legal persons. 
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24%
76%
5.2 What types of sanctions are used under your Member 
State’s national law or legal regime to sanction a criminally 
liable legal person?
Our law or legal regime makes no 
division in sanctions for legal 
persons as opposed to natural 
persons (CY, DK, LU, NL, UK) 
Our law or legal regime opted for a 
number or sanctions, in conciliation 
with legal person's specific status, or 
has created certain types of sanctions, 
aimed at targeting legal persons  (AT, 
BE, EE, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, IT, LT, 
MT, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL)
 
 
35%
65%
10.1 What types of (administrative) sanctions are used under your 
Member State’s national law or legal regime to sanction 
administrative offences attributed to a legal person?
Our law or legal regime makes no 
division in sanctions for legal persons 
as opposed to natural persons (BE, ES, 
FI, LU, PT, SE)
Our law or legal regime opted either 
for a number or sanctions, in 
conciliation with legal person's specific 
status or has created specific types of 
sanctions aimed at targeting legal 
persons (BU, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, LT, 
LU, LV, MT, RO) 
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Analysis reveals that between 24% (with respect to criminal liability) and 
35% (with respect to administrative liability) of the member states have not 
changed their sanction arsenal. Luxembourg has expressly indicated that the 
introduction of the criminal liability of legal persons was not associated with a 
distinction between the sanctions imposed to natural and legal persons. This is 
remarkable taking account of the difference in the way sanctions will be 
perceived and the differences in the way legal persons can be targeted. The 
commercial and financial purposes of (particularly private) legal persons, opens 
an entirely new perspective on possible sanctions. However, most of those 
member states have introduced an elaborate conversion mechanism to convert 
inoperable sanctions into sanctions that are valid for legal persons. However, 
some penalties specifically aimed at targeting the legal persons (that already 
existed) are now classified as criminal sanctions. To convert a sanction involving 
deprivation of liberty into a financial sanction, the Belgian criminal law system 
has introduced a mechanism that first converts the deprivation of liberty into 
months and subsequently multiplies the months by a coefficient to determine 
the amount of the financial sanction.112 A similar conversion mechanism was 
mentioned by Luxembourg. 
2.5.2 Typology of sanctions 
 
The fact that the replies to questions 5.2 and 10.1 revealed that most of the 
member states have extended their sanction arsenal, warrants an analysis of the 
typology to the sanctions that can be handed down against legal persons. 
The table inserted below provides a high level overview of the sanctions that 
appear in the national legislation of the member states. With respect to criminal 
liability, 16 member states have provided information on sanctions specifically 
(designed) for legal persons; with respect to administrative liability only 3 
member states have provided further information on the sanctions available for 
legal persons.  
 
CL 
/16 
AL 
/3 
Specific types of sanctions, specifically aimed at targeting legal persons 
8 2 Closing down  of -affected- branches 
3 0 Loss of legal personality 
9 0 Public pronouncement of the conviction 
9 1 Prohibition to participate in public tenders 
2 0 Prohibition to advertise goods or services 
1 0 Prohibition of any specific patrimonial operations that may entail the 
                                                             
112 C, VAN DEN WYNGAERT, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht IN HOOFDLIJNEN, 
Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2011, 125-136. 
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CL 
/16 
AL 
/3 
Specific types of sanctions, specifically aimed at targeting legal persons 
significant reduction of the patrimonial assets or the legal person's insolvency 
1 1 (Public) admonition 
13 3 Financial sanctions 
7 0 Winding-up of the legal person 
0 0 
Obligation to file various information to the authorities within certain time 
limits 
5 0 Dissolution of the legal person 
3 0 
Placement of the legal person under judicial administration in order to 
safeguard the rights of employees or creditors 
0 0 Obligation to fulfil certain organizational measures 
5 0 Liquidation 
1 1 Prohibition of entering into certain agreements 
4 1 Prohibition to the right to receive subsidies 
2 0 Prohibition to trade with financial instruments 
1 1 Prohibition of acquisition of licenses, authorizations or concessions 
0 0 
Prohibition of the legal person's merger, division or reduction of the share 
capital 
10 2 Prohibition of doing business  
 
Analysis reveals that the sanction arsenal is more extended and divers with 
respect to the criminal liability of legal persons, when compared to the sanctions 
available with respect to administrative liability of legal persons. This diversity 
cannot be completely attributed to the diversity in criminal vs. Administrative 
liability in the member states and thus the fact that some member states have 
opted to introduce criminal liability and/or administrative liability for legal 
persons. In member states that have introduced both a system of criminal as well 
as a system of administrative liability for legal persons, diversity in the sanctions 
exists. 
2.5.3 Relation between sanctions and offences 
 
Finally, the analysis looked into the relation between the typology of the 
sanction and the typology of the offences they relate to. With respect to criminal 
liability, the replies to question 5.3 reveal that 38% of the member states indicate 
that there is a relation between the sanctions and the offences in that some 
sanctions are only imposed with respect to some offences.  
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62%
38%
5.3 Is the possibility to impose certain types of sanctions 
confined to certain types of offences?
No, Member State has not
limited imposition of sanctions
to specific offence types
Yes (BE, EE, IT, FI, MT, SL, SK,
UK)
 
 
Similarly, with respect to the administrative liability of legal persons, half of 
the member states indicate that there is a relation between the sanctions and the 
offences in that some sanctions are only imposed with respect to some offences. 
 
50%50%
10.2 Is the possibility to impose certain types of sanctions 
confined to certain types of offences?
No, Member State has not
limited imposition of sanctions
to specific offence types (BE,
BU, CY DE, ES, LU, MT, PT,
RO)
Yes (CZ, EE, EL, FI, LT, LV, SE,
SK, UK)
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As summarised in the table below, further analysis of the comments of the 
member states revealed that there are two main reasons for the links between 
sanctions and offences. These comments are valid both in the context of criminal 
as well as administrative liability for offences. First, the severe nature of some 
sanctions results in being brought in relation to severe offences. Second, some 
sanctions are linked to a constituent element of the offence or a specific 
concurrence of facts. Spain, as well as Latvia113 and Belgium have highlighted 
this in their comments, stating e.g. that dissolution of the legal person is 
imposed when the legal person was established with the intend of committing 
offences; or e.g. prohibition to engage in commercial activities is imposed 
following the unlawful operation of commercial activities. 
 
 
Relation between sanctions and offences 
In the context of criminal liability In the context of administrative liability 
Some sanctions are reserved for the 
most serious offences 
BE 
Sanctions are linked to the seriousness 
of the offence 
LV 
Sanctions are linked to the scenario 
of the event, not necessarily to the 
typology / severity of the offence 
ES 
Each time the legislator has to decide 
on the sanction of a specific offence, 
this is done in an ad hoc fashion 
CZ 
Some sanctions are linked to the 
intend of the offence (e.g. 
dissolution of the legal person is 
imposed when the legal person was 
established with the intend of 
committing offences) 
BE 
Some sanctions are specific to the act 
(e.g. prohibition to engage in 
commercial activities is imposed 
following the unlawful operation of 
commercial activities) 
LV
114 
 
                                                             
113 It be noted that in the future, in Latvia, the administrative sanction of deprivation of rights in 
respect to certain or all forms of commercial activities will be excluded from the Latvian 
Administrative Violations Code because such deprivation of rights is planned to be included in 
the Latvian Criminal Code as a coercive measure. In this regard, it will be possible to apply an 
administrative sanction - deprivation of rights to hold certain positions (e.g., member of the 
board, procura holder etc.) in an enterprise, but such sanction could only be attributed to a 
natural, not legal person. 
114 Ibid. 
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3 Implications for the EU’s own policy making 
 
The diversity in the member states’ approach with respect to the liability of 
legal persons inevitably has implications for the EU’s own policy making. It is of 
utmost importance that the EU takes due account of the national differences and 
ensure that recognition of those differences would not undermine the 
effectiveness of its own policy making. Four policy domains were singled out for 
analysis: 
 
The EU’s approximation policy; 
The EU’s mutual recognition policy; 
The EU’s data exchange policy; 
The EU’s procedural rights policy. 
 
3.1 Implications for the EU’s approximation policy 
Recommendations 
• Take due account of complexity surrounding liability of legal 
persons when evaluating non-EU approximation instrument.  
• Avoid terminology with ‘criminal law’ connotation 
• Reconsider the scope of a ‘legal person’ 
• Consider the introduction of ‘strict liability’ 
• Rephrase current sanction suggestions 
• Develop a standard set of suggested sanctions 
• Complement the standard set of suggested sanctions 
• Look into need for specific ‘legal person’-offences 
• Increase follow up of implementation process 
 
Approximation consists of the adoption of minimum rules with respect to the 
constituent elements of offences and sanctions. Specifically to that end, the 
framework decision was introduced as a new instrument in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. With the Treaty of Lisbon, approximation will now be pursued via 
the adoption of directives. 
However, elsewhere we have already argued, that ‘approximation’ is also 
pursued via other instruments, even non-EU instruments. Limiting the concept 
of approximation to EU instruments only, fails to take into account that 
substantive criminal law provisions can also originate from instruments adopted 
at other cooperation levels, amongst which the Council of Europe and the 
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United Nations are the most significant.115 Therefore, the evaluation first looks 
into framework decisions and directives, and continues with other EU and even 
non-EU instruments. Finally, the evaluation looks into the implications of the 
specificities of legal person constructions for the definition of the constituent 
elements of offences. Today, it is not always clear whether behaviour or a legal 
person falls within the scope of the approximated offence. 
 
3.1.1 Framework Decision or Directive based approximation 
Ever since the possibility introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty to 
approximate the constituent elements of offences and sanctions, the Union has 
adopted several approximation instruments. The following table provides an 
overview of the adopted framework decisions and directives. 
 
Offence label as been defined in 
Euro counterfeiting 
Council Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on 
increasing protection by criminal penalties and other 
sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the 
introduction of the euro as amended by the Council 
Framework Decision of 6 December 2001 amending 
Framework Decision 2000/383/JHA on increasing 
protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions 
against counterfeiting in connection with the 
introduction of the euro 
Fraud and counterfeiting non-cash 
means of payment 
Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001 combating 
fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment 
Money laundering 
Joint Action of 3 December 1998 adopted by the Council 
on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on money laundering, the identification, tracing, 
freezing, seizing and confiscation of instrumentalities 
and the proceeds from crime repealed and replaced by the 
Council Framework Decision of 26 June 2001 on money 
laundering, the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing 
and confiscation of instrumentalities and the proceeds of 
crime 
Terrorism 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
combating terrorism as amended by Council Framework 
Decision amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA 
on combating terrorism 
                                                             
115 W. DE BONDT and G. VERMEULEN "Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence 
concepts to facilitate police and judicial cooperation in the EU", in COOLS, M., Readings On 
Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing, Antwerp-Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu, 2010, 4, p 15-
40 
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Offence label as been defined in 
Trafficking in human beings 
Joint Action of 24 February 1997 adopted by the Council 
on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union concerning action to combat trafficking in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of children repealed and 
replaced by Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 
on combating trafficking in human beings repealed and 
replaced by Directive Of The European Parliament And 
Of The Council on preventing and combating trafficking 
in human beings, and protecting victims, repealing 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA 
Illegal (im)migration 
Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on 
the strengthening of the legal framework to prevent the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, 
as complemented by the Council Directive of 28 November 
2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
transit and residence 
Environmental offences 
Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA on the 
protection of the environment through criminal law and 
Council Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA to 
strengthen the criminal-law framework for the 
enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution 
annulled and replaced by Directive 2008/99/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 
2008 on the protection of the environment through 
criminal law 
Corruption 
Joint Action of 22 December 1998 adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on corruption in the private sector 
repealed and replaced by the Council Framework Decision 
2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in 
the private sector 
Sexual exploitation of a child and 
child pornography 
Joint Action of 24 February 1997 adopted by the Council 
on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union concerning action to combat trafficking in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of children repealed and 
replaced by the Council Framework Decision of 22 
December 2003 on combating the sexual exploitation of 
children and child pornography repealed and replaced by 
Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography, and replacing Council Framework 
Decision 2004/68/JHA, 
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Offence label as been defined in 
Drug trafficking 
Joint Action of 17 December 1996 adopted by the 
Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union concerning the approximation of the 
laws and practices of the Member States of the European 
Union to combat drug addiction and to prevent and 
combat illegal drug trafficking replaced by the Council 
Framework Decision of 25 October 2004 laying down 
minimum provisions on the constituent elements of 
criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking 
Offences against information 
systems 
Council Framework Decision of 21 February 2005 on 
attacks against information systems 
Participation in a criminal 
organisation 
Joint action (98/733/JHA) of 21 December 1998 adopted 
by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty 
on European Union, on making it a criminal offence to 
participate in a criminal organisation in the Member 
States of the European Union repealed and replaced by the 
Council Framework Decision of 24 October 2008 on the 
fight against organised crime 
Racism and xenophobia 
Joint Action of 15 July 1996 adopted by the Council on 
the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, 
concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia  
repealed and replaced by the Council Framework Decision 
of 29 November 2008 on combating certain forms and 
expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of 
criminal law 
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The following table provides an overview of the legal person related 
provisions in the approximation instruments. 
 
Approach in 
approximation instruments 
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Legal persons can be held liable for ... referred to above 
Offences X  X X X  X X X X X X  
Conduct  X           X 
Infringements      X        
When committed 
For their benefit  X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
By any person who has a 
leading position 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
− a power of 
representation of the 
legal person 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
− an authority to take 
decisions on behalf 
of the legal person 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
−  an authority to 
exercise control 
within the legal 
person 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Acting either individually 
or as part of an organ of 
the legal person 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
As well as for involvement 
as accessories or instigators 
X X X           
Or the attempted 
commission 
X  X           
                                                             
116 The liability of Legal persons for money laundering is not regulated in the approximation 
instruments, but finds its legal basis in the second protocol to the PIF convention, OJ C 221 of 
19.7.1997 
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Approach in 
approximation instruments 
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Where the lack of 
supervision  or control by a 
leading person has 
rendered it possible 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Concurring with natural 
person 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
Sanctions X X X  X X   X X    
Penalties    X   X X   X X X 
Which shall include 
criminal or non-criminal 
fines & which may include: 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(a) exclusion from 
entitlement to public 
benefits or aid; 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(b) temporary or 
permanent 
disqualification from 
the practice of 
commercial 
activities; 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(c) placing under judicial 
supervision; 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(d) a judicial winding-up 
order 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(e) temporary or 
permanent closure of 
establishments which 
have been used for 
committing the 
offence 
   X X    X X    
(f) the confiscation of 
      substances which are 
the object of offences 
  X      X X    
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Approach in 
approximation instruments 
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Which shall only be 
punishable by effective, 
proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions or 
measures as far as the lack 
of control and supervision 
is concerned, without 
further suggestions or 
reference to fines. 
X X    X  X X X X X X 
 
Further evaluation of the approximation instruments is relatively positive, 
though a few remarks must be made.  
First, the integration of non-EU instruments in the EU acquis via references 
thereto in approximation instruments should be done with care and attention for 
the implications for the liability of legal persons. If the policy choice is to include 
the offence definition of a non-EU instrument into the EU acquis, it is better to 
refer to the mother document rather than to copy past the definition, not only to 
clearly point to the origin of the definition but also to ensure compatibility for 
the future. If the offence definition in the non-EU instrument is updated, a 
reference to the definition in the EU instrument will ensure simultaneous 
‘updating’ of the EU definition. The framework decision related to money 
laundering is a good example thereof. Instead of copy pasting the existing 
Council of Europe description of the money laundering offences into the EU 
instrument, or worse, coming up with an entirely different EU level money 
laundering offence concept, the framework decision refers to the definition 
included in the 1990 Council of Europe Money Laundering Convention. 
However, when doing so, due account must be paid to the position taken with 
respect to legal persons. Analysis reveals that the 1990 Council of Europe 
instrument remains silent on the liability of legal persons for those offences. No 
provision is included which stipulates that member states must ensure the 
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liability of legal persons for those offences.117 From that perspective, the EU has 
failed to guarantee that its approximation with respect to money laundering – an 
offence type that is traditionally strongly linked to legal persons – also covers the 
liability of legal persons. However, when read together with the second protocol 
to the PIF convention, in which the liability of legal persons is included 
following the critique on the absence thereof in the original PIF convention, the 
liability of legal persons is included also for money laundering offences. 
Nevertheless, it remains advised that provisions regulating the liability of legal 
persons are included in all approximation instruments. 
Second, the approximation instruments acknowledge the differences 
between criminal vs. administrative liability, in that no obligation is included to 
introduce criminal liability of legal persons. The wording of the provisions 
indicate that all different member state approaches are compatible with the EU 
policy under the sole condition that legal persons can be held liable, in whatever 
regime upheld in the national law of the member states. It is left to the discretion 
of the member states to introduce a criminal, administrative and or civil liability 
for legal persons. From that perspective it can be advised not to use the concept 
of penalties in relation to the sanctions that should/can be imposed on legal 
persons. As shown from the table included above, half the framework 
decisions/directives refer in the article titles to penalties for legal persons118 and half 
refer to sanctions for legal persons.119 Considering the criminal connotation that is 
often attached to penalties, preference should be given to sanctions for legal 
persons.  
Third, the differences related to the type of persons who can incur liability 
are not subject to any regulation in the approximation instruments. The 
European policy maker has not intervened on the basis of differences between 
public and private legal persons, differences in the liability consequences of a 
parent-subsidiary construction or the recognition of single or only multiple 
owner legal persons. The discussions surrounding the inclusion of certain types 
of public legal persons are avoided and the only reference that can be found in 
the instruments is a description of a ‘legal person’ as entailing any entity having 
                                                             
117 The only reference to Legal persons included in the 1990 Council of Europe Money 
Laundering Convention can be found in its Art. 18.8 related to cooperation in criminal matters. 
It is foreseen that member states cannot refuse cooperation in criminal matters solely because 
the order relates to a legal person. This cooperation obligation entails a form of mutual respect 
for the choices made by the other member states, but cannot be read as to mean that liability of 
Legal persons is to be ensured. 
118 i.e. approximation instruments related to terrorism, environmental offences, corruption, 
offences against information systems, participation in a criminal organisation and finally racism 
and xenophobia. 
119 i.e. approximation instruments related to euro counterfeiting, fraud and counterfeiting of 
non-cash means of payment, trafficking in human beings, illegal (im)migration, child sexual 
exploitation and child pornography and finally drug trafficking. 
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such status under the applicable national law, except for States or other public 
bodies in the exercise of state authority and for public international 
organizations. 
Fourth, considering the differences in attribution mechanisms and the 
implications this third concept has for the effectiveness of the introduction of a 
liability of legal persons, it is commendable that member states are obliged to 
make those offences punishable, when committed by any person, either 
individually or as a member of an organ of the legal person in question, who has 
a leading position within the legal person. The meaning of a leading position is 
consistently defined120, referring to (i) a power of representation of the legal 
person, (ii) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person or (iii) an 
authority to exercise control within the legal person. Furthermore, member 
states are to ensure that legal persons can also be held liable where lack of 
supervision or control by a leading person has rendered the offence possible. It 
should be noted though that a lot of member states have introduced a so-called 
‘strict liability’-regime, which no longer requires that the commission of the 
offences was rendered possible due to a lack of supervision or control. This strict 
liability approach significantly facilitates the burden of proof when prosecuting 
these crimes. Unfortunately, the provisions with respect to attempted 
commission of offences121 as well as liability for involvement as accessories or 
instigators122, are not copied into all approximation instruments.  
Fifth, considering that the main objective of the approximation instruments 
consists of ensuring that certain types of behaviour are considered criminal in 
the national jurisdictions of the member states and that both natural and legal 
persons can be held liable for them, it is important to take due account of the 
differences relating to offences which can give rise to liability of legal persons. 
Grosso modo, three different approaches can be distinguished, being (i) the 
introduction of liability of legal persons, regardless of the offence type, (ii) the 
limitation of the liability of legal persons for a specifically identified categories 
or families of offences and (iii) the enumeration technique in which the offences 
for which legal persons can be held liable are individually identified. Even 
though the EU does not wish to intervene in that diversity, it is important that it 
sees to the compliance with the minimum standards in its approximation 
instruments. Analysis reveals that the instruments have not been (correctly) 
implemented (yet) and the liability of legal persons for the approximated 
offences is not guaranteed.  
                                                             
120 With the exception of the approximation instrument relating to money laundering that does 
not hold any provisions with respect to the liability of legal persons. 
121 This can only be found in the framework decision related to euro counterfeiting 
122 This can only be found in the framework decision related to euro counterfeiting and in the 
framework decision related to fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment. 
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The table inserted below shows that for 8 out of 15 instruments, liability of 
legal persons for the approximated offences is not foreseen in national 
legislation.  
 
Status questionis 
of the liability of 
legal persons for 
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Foreseen  24 24 27 27 26 26 24 27 27 26 27 26 26 
Not foreseen 3 3   1 1 3   1  1 1 
 
It is most unfortunate that no infringement procedure exists with respect to 
the approximating framework decisions. Fortunately the possibility to start an 
infringement procedure against member states that have not (correctly) 
implemented EU instruments is now – following the introduction of the Lisbon 
Treaty – extended to approximating directives. With a view to being able to 
ensure the introduction of national provisions regulating the liability of legal 
persons for the approximated offences, it is advised to include those provisions 
in a directive to allow close follow up of the member states’ implementation 
processes. 
Sixth and final, the analysis of the national approaches to ensure the liability 
of legal persons has pointed to the diversity in sanctions which can be imposed 
on legal persons. That diversity is partially linked to the diversity in criminal vs. 
administrative liability. Member states that have opted to introduce the liability 
of legal persons within the scope of an authority competent in criminal matters 
have introduced criminal sanctions, whereas member states that have opted to 
introduce the liability of legal persons within the scope of an authority 
competent in administrative or civil matters have introduced administrative or 
civil sanctions. Because the EU does not wish to intervene in that diversity, it is 
only logical to transfer that leniency also to the required and suggested 
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sanctions. For the reasons mentioned above, it is advised to use the term 
sanction as opposed to the term penalty, which holds a criminal connotation. 
Member states must take measures to ensure that a legal person found liable is 
punished by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, which shall 
include criminal or non-criminal fines. Additionally, possible other sanctions are 
listed, in general comprising four possible types of sanctions, namely (a) 
exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; (b) temporary or permanent 
disqualification from the practice of commercial activities; (c) placing under 
judicial supervision; (d) a judicial winding-up order. In relation to some offences 
an additional (e) is included related to temporary or permanent closure of 
establishments which have been used for committing the offence123 and/or (f) 
confiscation of the (substances which are the) objects of the offences124 are added 
as possible sanctions.  
Three recommendations can be made in this respect. Firstly, with respect to 
suggestion (a) it can be advised to rephrase it so that it refers to exclusion from 
entitlement to public benefits or aid and from entering in a public procurement 
proceeding,125 based on the inclusion in other instruments of mandatory 
exclusion grounds in the context of a public procurement proceeding.126 
Directive 2004/18/EC includes a provision clarifying that candidates who have 
been convicted for either participation in a criminal organization, fraud, money 
laundering or corruption are excluded from participating in a public tender 
procedure. Because this exclusion is mandatory, it would enhance internal 
consistency between the EU instruments if a reference to the mandatory 
exclusion grounds would been introduced in the corresponding approximation 
instruments. Secondly, with respect to suggestions (e) and (f) it is not clear why 
they are not generally included in all approximation instruments. Suggestion (e) 
relates to the closure of establishments used for committing the offence which 
can be brought in relation to  almost any offence. The same is true for suggestion 
(f) which relates to confiscation which can undoubtedly be brought in relation to 
counterfeiting of the euro and/or other non-cash means of payment. Similarly, 
confiscation of the computer material used to commit an offence against the 
integrity of an information system seems evident. Remarkably though, 
confiscation obligations are not included among the sanctions to be foreseen, not 
in relation to natural persons nor in relation to legal persons. Thirdly, an 
                                                             
123 This suggestion is included in the approximation instruments related to terrorism, trafficking 
in human beings, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography and drug trafficking.  
124 This suggestion is included in the approximation instruments related to money laundering, 
trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of children and child pornography and drug 
trafficking. 
125 See more in detail: DE BONDT W. Curing Procurement. Rethinking conviction related 
exclusion grounds, forthcoming. 
126 This obligation is included in the context of four offences being: participation in a criminal 
organisation, corruption, fraud and money laundering (see Directive 2004/18/EC) 
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additional suggestion (g) can be considered, including at least other types of 
disqualifications.127  
 
3.1.2 Approximation based on other EU or even non-EU 
instruments 
Approximation can also be pursued via other EU and even non-EU 
instruments. 
First, analysis has revealed the pursuit of approximation in other EU 
instruments.  
The Union can adopt Conventions that possibly contain substantive criminal 
law provisions. The 1995 Convention on the Protection of the Communities’ 
Financial Interests (PIF Convention)128 and the 1997 Convention on the fight 
against corruption involving Community Officials (Corruption Convention).129 
When attempting to develop criminalisation obligations, it is important to 
ensure that the liability of legal persons is sufficiently covered in all these 
instruments. Art. 3 PIF convention refers to the criminal liability of heads of 
businesses, stipulating that each member state shall take the necessary measures 
to allow heads of businesses or any persons having power to take decisions or 
exercise control within a business to be declared criminally liable in accordance 
with the principles defined by its national law in cases of fraud by a person 
under their authority acting on behalf of the business. Similarly Art. 6 
Corruption Convention stipulates that each member state shall take the 
necessary measures to allow heads of businesses or any persons having power to 
take decisions or exercise control within a business to be declared criminally 
liable in accordance with the principles defined by its national law for cases of 
corruption by a person under their authority acting on behalf of the business. 
Though it ensures the liability of a person for acts committed on behalf of a legal 
person, it cannot be regarded as a provision introducing the liability of legal 
persons as such. The critiques raised with respect to this provision lead to the 
adoption of the second protocol to the PIF Convention130 that includes provisions 
                                                             
127 Regarding disqualifications, see VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT,  RYCKMAN, C., PERŠAK, 
N., The disqualification triad. Approximating legislation. Executing requests. Ensuring equivalence. 
Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2012, forthcoming. 
128 Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention on the protection of the European 
Communities' financial interests, OJ C 316 of 27.11.1995. 
129 Council Act of 26 May 1997 drawing up, on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on 
European Union, the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the 
European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, OJ C 195 of 
25.6.1997. 
130 Council Act of 19 June 1997 drawing up the Second Protocol of the Convention on the 
protection of the European Communities' financial interests, OJ C 221, 19.7.1997. 
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regulating the liability of legal persons as can be found in all approximation 
instruments.  
Second, when the decision is taken that it would be better to include a non-
EU instrument into the EU acquis rather than to establish a new EU instrument, 
it is important to ensure that the requirements for the liability of legal persons 
are included. Reference can be made to both Council or Europe as well as United 
Nations instruments. Some Council of Europe instruments hold provisions that 
are very specific in imposing a system of liability for legal persons. Following 
Art. 12 Cybercrime Convention131 for example, countries are to adopt measures 
to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for a criminal offence established 
in accordance with the Convention, committed for their benefit by any natural 
person, acting either individually or as part of an organ of the legal person, who 
has a leading position within it. It goes on to specify who/what can be qualified 
as the persons or organs being in a leading position. According to the 
Explanatory Report, such obligation “is consistent with the current legal trend to 
recognise corporate liability”.132 The convention imposes relatively specific details 
regarding the instances in which liability should be made possible (par. 1 and 2), 
but is leaves it up to the member states to decide whether this liability (albeit 
concerning liability for criminal offences) takes a civil, administrative or criminal 
form (par. 3). However, not all non-EU instruments, include provisions relating 
to the liability of legal persons.133  
Concluding, it is important that the EU not only remains actively seized on 
ensuring the inclusion of provisions on the liability of legal persons, it is of equal 
importance that the EU sees to the correct implementation of those provisions. 
 
                                                             
131 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2001), 23 November 2001, “Convention on Cybercrime”, Budapest, 
CETS 185. The FD Deprivation of Liberty (2008/909/JHA; OJ L 327/27) replaces part of this 
Convention, namely the corresponding provisions (Art. 26 FD Deprivation of Liberty). The very 
nature of the FD however (dealing with measures involving deprivation of liberty and custodial 
sentences) means that the provisions concerning legal persons contained in the Convention 
apply fully.  
132 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2001), 23 November 2001, “Convention on Cybercrime, Explanatory 
report”, Budapest, CETS 185, nr. 123. 
133 E.g. UNITED NATIONS (1949) Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and 
of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others; UNITED NATIONS (1988) UN Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
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3.1.3 Study the need for specific offences 
 
A final implication for the EUs approximation policy relates to the 
recommendation to study the need for specific offences tailored to the 
specificities of the liability of legal persons.  
From the efforts put into the development of an approximation policy, it has 
become clear that it is the EUs intention to formulate common offence 
definitions for a selection of priority domains. Drug trafficking, trafficking in 
human beings, terrorism and some other offences have grown to be become true 
EU priorities. A detailed definition has been introduced in an approximation 
instrument and is now the basis for further EU criminal policy making. For each 
of those offences, the liability of legal persons is made mandatory via specific 
provisions in the approximation instruments, though it is left to the member 
states to decide what type of liability is foreseen.  
However, a such provision regulating the liability of legal persons may not 
be sufficient to be able to tackle all the behaviour of a legal person. Considering 
the specificities related to the legal construction of a legal person, it is not always 
clear whether or not behaviour is included within the scope of the definition. 
Most of the concerns can be accommodated via the introduction of provisions 
regulating the liability of accessories or instigators. However, the table inserted 
above providing an overview of the provisions in the approximation 
instruments has clarified that not all approximation instruments include those 
provisions. Furthermore, even when liability of accessories or instigators is 
regulated, situations remain for which it is unclear whether they can be brought 
within the scope of the approximated offence. The exploitation of victims of 
trafficking in human beings in relation to subcontracting structures used by legal 
persons can be used as an example. Recently, the National Society of Belgian 
Railways (SNCB) featured in news paper headlines in relation to the economic 
exploitation of the cleaning staff working the night shifts in the Belgian Railway 
Stations. The SNCB immediately communicated it could not be held liable in any 
way because the persons referred to where employed by one of its 
subcontractors. Specifically in this context, it is not clear whether liability of the 
SNCB is desirable in the first place, and if so whether the existing mechanisms of 
inciting, aiding and abetting are sufficient or a new offence should be created 
specifically incriminating the said situation under a chain approach introducing 
a due diligence obligation to ensure that subcontractors do not commit any 
economic exploitation (of victims of trafficking in human beings) offences. 
Therefore it should be recommended to look into the EUs priority offences, 
and review them using the specific structures set up by legal persons (such as 
subcontracting) as a baseline to decide whether or not it is necessary to extent 
the scope of the incrimination.  
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3.2 Implications for the EU’s mutual recognition policy 
 
Recommendations 
• Introduce a notification obligation upon conviction of a foreign 
legal person 
• Introduce a storage obligation in spite of lacking national 
recognition of criminal liability for legal persons 
• Develop a general approach to deal with the differences in 
competent authorities, differences based on the involvement of 
private or public legal persons, differences in attribution 
mechanisms, differences in the offences which can be brought in 
relation to liability of legal persons, and the sanctions which can be 
imposed on legal persons 
 
3.2.1 Background of mutual recognition 
 
The issue of mutual recognition in criminal matters was raised at the Cardiff 
European Council on 15 and 16 June 1998. 
Point 45(f) of the action plan of the Council and the Commission on how best 
to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam establishing an area of 
freedom, security and justice, adopted on 3 December 1998, provides that within 
two years of entry into force of the Treaty a process should be initiated with a 
view to facilitating mutual recognition of decisions and enforcement of 
judgments in criminal matters. 
The idea was discussed again at the Tampere European Council in October 
1999, which concluded that mutual recognition should become the cornerstone 
of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union 
Though it has been cited at countless occasions, the importance of the 
corresponding part in the Tampere Presidency conclusions cannot be 
overestimated and justify it being cited once more: 
Enhanced mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements and the 
necessary approximation of legislation would facilitate co-operation between 
authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights. The European 
Council therefore endorses the principle of mutual recognition which, in its 
view, should become the cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil and 
criminal matters within the Union. The principle should apply both to 
judgements and to other decisions of judicial authorities (European Council, 15-
16 October 1999). 
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In order to implement the principle, a programme of measures was adopted 
in January 2001. That programme was clearly drawn up from the perspective of 
ensuring the recognition of sentences imposed to natural persons. In the 
preamble, it is emphasized that mutual recognition is linked to the transfer of 
persons from one member state to another and that the main purpose of 
transferring sentenced persons as provided for in the Council of Europe 
Convention of 21 March 1983 is to help towards their rehabilitation and stems 
from humanitarian considerations. It necessarily implies recognition by the 
administering State of the decision taken by the sentencing State's court. 
As a result, the measures included in the programme are mostly linked to the 
sentences imposed to natural persons. However, when elaborating on a type of 
sanction that can also be imposed to a legal person, the debate with respect to 
the differences related to the liability of legal persons for offences is taken into 
account. When introducing measure 17 and 18, it is clearly stated that the aim 
thereof is enabling fines imposed on natural ánd legal persons in one Member 
State to be levied in another Member State. Surprisingly no specific reference is 
made to the complexity related to the liability of legal persons for offences when 
introducing measure 19 with respect to confiscation, another sanction that can 
typically also be imposed on a legal person. 
However, already in the preamble, it is clarified that the programme should 
not be seen as a definitive programme, but rather as an open way to demonstrate 
the approach to be used. The open character from the programme is also 
apparent from the formulation of measure 20. Because it is not all that self-
evident to map all the existing disqualifications, prohibitions and incapacities 
possibly handed down against either natural or legal persons, a such list should 
be drawn up. Therefore, even though written from the perspective of the 
sanctions typically imposed to natural persons, the sanctions imposed to legal 
persons are not excluded from the scope of mutual recognition, and the door is 
left open for further supplementation of the plan.  
From the narrow content of the programme of measures to implement the 
principle of mutual recognition, it should come as no surprise, that the current 
instruments governing the mutual recognition of sentences are primarily 
focussed on the sanctions handed down against natural persons. In 2005 a 
framework decision was adopted on the mutual recognition of financial 
penalties, followed in 2006 by a framework decision on confiscation. In 2008 
instruments governing the mutual recognition of custodial sentences and non-
custodial alternative sanctions followed. Whenever the instruments were 
relevant for legal persons, the discussions on the differences in the national 
approach with respect to the liability of legal persons for offences was duly 
taken into account in the sense that the diversity was not accepted as a refusal 
ground. Even a member state that does not recognise the criminal liability of a 
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legal person is obliged to execute a foreign sentence that involves such criminal 
liability. 
3.2.2 Way ahead to ensure a consistent MR policy 
 
Because mutual recognition (MR) is now enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty as a 
basic principle for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, a consistent 
interpretation and application becomes all the more important. The programme 
of measures remains an interesting guideline, but more gaps can be identified 
and should be filled to ensure a consistent European criminal policy with respect 
to the application of the principle of mutual recognition. The central concern 
expressed in this study is the gap with respect to the sanctions typically imposed 
to legal persons. 
As shown from the table inserted below, the approximation instruments hold 
a consistent suggestion with respect to the sanctions that could possibly be 
imposed to legal persons. Besides the comments related thereto made above in 
the section on approximation, it should be noted that no mutual recognition 
instruments exist to ensure the cross-border execution of those suggested 
sanctions.  
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Effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
Sanctions X X X  X X   X X    
Penalties    X   X X   X X X 
Which shall include 
criminal or non-criminal 
fines & which may include: 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
                                                             
134 The liability of Legal persons for money laundering is not regulated in the approximation 
instruments, but finds its legal basis in the second protocol to the PIF convention, OJ C 221 of 
19.7.1997 
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(a) exclusion from 
entitlement to public 
benefits or aid; 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(b) temporary or 
permanent 
disqualification from 
the practice of 
commercial 
activities; 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(c) placing under judicial 
supervision; 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(d) a judicial winding-up 
order 
X X X X X X  X X X X X X 
(e) temporary or 
permanent closure of 
establishments which 
have been used for 
committing the 
offence 
   X X    X X    
(f) the confiscation of 
      substances which are 
the object of offences 
  X      X X    
 
Only with respect to financial penalties (included as a mandatory sanction in 
the approximation instruments) and confiscation (occasionally included as an 
suggested sanction in the approximation instruments), a legal basis is provided 
to engage in the cross-border execution thereof. For any of the other suggested 
sanctions, no mutual recognition instrument exists, nor is under development. It 
should be recommended to extent the mutual recognition policy in accordance 
to the policy lines set out in the approximation instruments and ensure a legal 
basis for mutual recognition of (at least) the suggested sanctions. 
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3.3 Implications for the EU’s data exchange policy 
 
Recommendations 
• Introduce a notification obligation upon conviction of a foreign 
legal person 
• Introduce a storage obligation in spite of lacking national 
recognition of criminal liability for legal persons 
 
If the EU wants to ensure that convictions handed down against legal 
persons with respect to the offences it has identified in the approximation 
instruments have effect, it is important to ensure that such information 
effectively flows from one member state to another. Within the EU, taking 
account of prior convictions is an inherent part of the fight against crime. First, 
there is the taking account of previous convictions in the course of a new 
criminal proceeding which is regulated by a framework decision that introduces 
an obligation thereto. Second, there is the policy option to introduce the taking 
account of prior convictions in the context of disqualifications in the sense that 
convictions for certain offences must on the one hand automatically lead to 
disqualifications  and on the other hand be allowed to be used as a basis for 
disqualifications. The existing obligations and the future policy options warrant 
a critical assessment of the EU’s data exchange policy. 
Analysis reveals that there is an important gap in the EU information 
exchange policy with respect to offences committed by legal persons. With the 
introduction of the FD Crim Records135 and – in execution thereof – the ECRIS 
Decision,136 an EU criminal records exchange information system was set up. In 
the FD Crim Records, the member state of the person’s nationality is notified of 
criminal records information regarding convictions handed down elsewhere in 
the EU (Art. 4). The central authority of the member state in which a private or 
public entity wishes to obtain information may submit a request to the central 
authority of another member state for information to be extracted from the 
criminal record (Art. 6, par. 1 FD Crim Records). Art. 11, par. 3 and 4 refer to the 
standardised format which states should use for their information exchange. The 
implementation of that article came to being with ECRIS.  
                                                             
135 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009), “Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 
February 2009 on the organisation and content of the exchange of information extracted from 
the criminal record between Member states” OJ L 93/23, 7.4.2009. 
136 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009), “Framework Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 
April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) 
in application of Article 11 of Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA” OJ L 93/33, 7.4.2009. 
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Unfortunately, Art 2.a FD Crim Rec limits the scope of information exchange 
to natural persons. Whereas it might be understandable that the European 
Commission argues following its conclusion in the 2005 White Paper137 that 
states who do not accept the criminal liability of legal persons may have 
difficulties in the storing of information on foreign criminal convictions, not 
tackling the consequences of the differences between criminal and 
administrative liability has a significant impact on the effectiveness of the EU 
policy. Two comments are in order with respect to upholding that 
argumentation in the final version of the 2009 FD Crim Records. 
First, it is important that the European policy maker maintains a cross-policy 
consistency. This means that similar situations need to be dealt with similarly 
and similar problems need to receive a similar solution. From this perspective 
the choice to limit the scope of information exchange to natural persons seems to 
be outdated when compared to the position on legal persons taken in other more 
recent instruments in European cooperation in criminal matters and in the 
approximation instruments listed above. Undeniably, the recognition and 
execution of a decision imposing a financial penalty to a legal person, is more far 
intrusive for a member state that does not recognize the criminal liability of a 
legal person, than the mere storing of criminal record information on that same 
financial penalty. A credible and consistent criminal policy cannot have the one 
without the other; it cannot have the obligation to recognise ánd execute a decision 
and at the same time hesitate to introduce the obligation to merely store 
information on that decision. Additionally, the framework decision on taking 
account of prior convictions138 has not introduced a limitation on the types of 
persons eligible to incurring liability. Art. 3.1 FD Prior Convictions stipulates that 
the EU track record of a person shall be taken into account in the course of a new 
criminal proceeding. This means that any prior EU conviction on any person is 
included in the scope of the FDs obligation, both natural and legal persons, both 
nationals and foreigners. 
Second, the existing acquis should not be torn down. The commitment the 47 
Council of Europe states made in Art. 22 ECMA139 was not explicitly limited to 
natural persons. Even though based on the era in with it was adopted, it is only 
fair to say that the initial intention cannot but have been to introduce the 
obligation to exchange criminal records information for natural persons only, an 
acceptable evolutionary interpretation of the scope of the article suggests that 
                                                             
137 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, White Paper on exchanges of information on convictions and 
the effect of such convictions in the European Union. COM (2005) 10 final of 25.1.2005, §6. 
138 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2008), "Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 
July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member states of the European Union in the 
course of new criminal proceedings." OJ L 220, 15.08.2008. 
139 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1959), 20 April 1959, “European Convention on Mutual Assistance 
in Criminal Matters”, Strasbourg, CETS 030.  
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due to the changes in the notion of criminal liability, Art. 22 now also holds the 
obligation to inform one and other of convictions handed down against a legal 
person who has its seat in another state. That would be the evolved equivalent of 
a conviction against a persons with the nationality of another state. 
Unfortunately, because the 27 EU member states decided that the FD Crim 
Records replaces Art. 22 ECMA between the member states, it is now no longer 
possible to use that article as a legal basis to require the exchange of information 
on legal persons. This is most regrettable because the introduction of EU 
framework decisions always has the intention to facilitate and further elaborate 
on cooperation between the member states and not to negatively impact on the 
acquis that already exists in other instruments.   
It should be recommended that the obligation to exchange information 
extends also to convictions handed down against legal persons. The 
counterargument that the member states will not be able to use that information 
in a criminal proceeding in accordance to national law anyway is not valid, 
because Art. 7 FD Crim Rec explains that the storing of information is motivated 
by the possibility to share that information with any other member state that 
does conduct a criminal proceeding with respect to that legal person.140 
It should come as no surprise that in absence of an exchange obligation, 
conviction related information on legal persons is rarely exchanged.  
Both member states that have introduced a criminal liability for legal persons 
as well as the member states that have introduced an administrative liability for 
legal persons rarely exchange the convictions nor store foreign convictions. Non 
of the member states indicated to fully notify their counterparts when convicting 
a legal person established in other member state. Based on the comments 
summarized in the table inserted below, it becomes that there are not only legal 
technical problems with respect to notification, but the most important issue 
remains the lack of a all inclusive legal basis for information exchange. 
 
Current notification practice 
 MS with criminal liability MS with administrative liability 
 Comment MS Comment MS 
N
o 
 n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
Due to a legal technicality, no 
criminal records are held with 
respect to legal persons; hence no 
communication thereof takes place 
BE 
There is no automatic notification 
practice 
SE 
There is no obligation but a 
possibility for the authorities 
MT 
This also creates problems with 
respect to the execution of the 
sanctions imposed by Belgian 
authorities 
BE 
                                                             
140 See also recital 9 and 16 FD Crim Rec.  
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Current notification practice 
 MS with criminal liability MS with administrative liability 
(p
ar
ti
al
) n
ot
if
ic
at
io
n 
Only with respect to some MS RO There is a legal obligation to do so LV 
For financial penalties notification is 
brought in relation to the mutual 
recognition obligations that have 
been introduced 
FI 
For financial penalties notification 
is brought in relation to the mutual 
recognition obligations that have 
been introduced 
FI 
It is not clear whether the current 
treaties can be used as a legal basis 
for information exchange 
SK 
Following the internal market 
directive, there is an obligation to 
provide information on service 
providers 
SV 
There is no obligation but a 
possibility for the authorities 
MT 
Even if there is no tangible legal 
basis, information can be exchanged 
on the basis of reciprocity 
PL 
It is possible that there are 
agreements between the authorities 
but it is difficult to present a 
complete picture 
FI 
 
Based on the current poor notification practice, it can only be expected that 
storing foreign conviction information is not widespread. The replies to question 
6.5. with respect to the member states that have introduced criminal liability for 
legal persons in their legal system, 57% of the member states do not store 
information on foreign convictions because they have either never received such 
information, have technical difficulties to do so or only store information with 
respect to some member states or some sanctions. When asking that same set of 
member states whether they notify other member states when having handed 
down a conviction against a legal person established in that other member state, 
only 1 member state indicates to do so. 
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36%
7%
7%7%
43%
6.5 Do you store information on convictions handed 
down by other member states upon a legal person 
established/incorporated in your member state?
We have never received such
information (CY, LT, PL, RO, SL)
No, we cannot store information
on foreign convictions (due to
legal or technical limitations) (IT)
Only with respect to some
member states( FR)
Only with respect to some
sanctions (BE)
Other (EE, FI, HU, MT, SK, UK)
 
With respect to the member states that have introduced an administrative 
liability for legal persons, the situation is slightly better though far from good. 
Still 39% of the member states do not store information on foreign convictions 
because they have either never received such information, have technical 
difficulties to do so or do not store because they fail to see the added value 
thereof. 
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23%
8%
8%
61%
11.5 Do you store information on convictions handed 
down by other member states upon a legal person 
established/incorporated in your member state?
We have never received such
information (CY, EE, LT)
No, we cannot store information on
foreign convictions (due to legal or
technical limitations) (CZ)
No, we do not store information on
foreign convictions, even though we
could do so (SE)
Other (BE, BU, DE, EL, FI, LV, MT,
SE)
 
 
If the Union wishes to include the exchange of conviction related information 
of legal persons within the scope of the mandatory exchange mechanism, it is 
vital for the member states to not only foresee the technical ability to include 
foreign information in their national records system, it is important that they 
include information on national convictions handed down against legal persons 
in their records system in the first place. The analysis of the current situation in 
the member states revealed that a lot of progress can still be made. Even member 
states that have introduced a criminal liability for legal persons indicate that 
information is only partially included in the criminal records system.  
The replies to question 6.1. reveal that for 33% of the member states, the 
information included in the criminal record is incomplete, either because 
information on legal persons is not included altogether, or because information 
on convictions handed down against a legal person established outside their 
territory is not included. Two member states, i.e. Belgium and Spain have 
explicitly stated that the lack of criminal records for legal persons is due to an 
inconsistency in the national law. Though criminal liability is foreseen, the 
consequences thereof for the architecture of the criminal records databases are 
not or insufficiently taken into account. Combined with the replies to question 
6.5. which have pointed to a limited exchange of criminal records information 
with respect to legal persons, there is a huge risk that conviction information 
gets lost along the way. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU 
 
 
115 
 
 
20%
15%
65%
6.1 Does your country keep criminal records for legal 
persons?
No (AT, BE, ES, LU)
Yes, but only with respect to legal
persons that are established within our
territory (FR, LT, PT)
Yes, with respect to legal persons that
we have convicted, regardless of their
establishment within or outside our
territory (CY, DK, EE, FI, HU, IE, IT,
MT, PL, RO, SK, SL, UK)
 
 
With respect to member states that have introduced a system of 
administrative liability for legal persons, the storage of conviction related 
information is even far less guaranteed. The replies to question 11.1 reveal that 
for no less than 71% of the member states, the information included in the 
criminal record is incomplete, either because information on legal persons is not 
included altogether, or because information on convictions handed down 
against a legal person established outside their territory is not included. Only in 
17% of the member states, complete information is guaranteed. 
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61%
11%
17%
11%
11.1 Does your country keep administrative records for legal 
persons?
No (BE, BU, CY, CZ, EL, ES, LT, LU, PT,
RO, SK)
Yes, but only with respect to legal
persons that are established within our
territory
Yes, with respect to legal persons that we
have convicted, regardless of their
establishment within or outside our
territory
Other (DE, UK)
 
 
Finally, it is important to look into the kind of information that is stored on 
legal persons to assess whether that information is sufficiently detailed to 
comply with exchange obligations that are introduced with a view to ensuring 
that the information can actually be used outside the convicting member state.  
The table introduced below provides an overview of the information that is 
stored on legal persons. The numbers in column # MS CL represent the number 
of member states that have introduced criminal liability and store this kind of 
information. The numbers in column # MS AL represent the number of member 
states that have introduced administrative liability and store this kind of 
information. 
 
Kind of information stored on legal persons 
Type of information 15 MS CL  5 MS AL 
th
e 
le
ga
l p
er
so
n 
Legal name 14 3 
Shortened name 5 0 
Country of incorporation/establishment 10 1 
Register and number of incorporation 14 3 
Address of registered office 12 3 
Name of legal representative 6 1 
Other 4 4 
th
e 
of
fe
nc
e 
Legal definition  11 0 
Legal provision  8 3 
Date (or period) of facts 9 2 
Place(s) of facts 4 2 
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Number of acts committed 4 1 
Other 6141 4142 
Completed 10 2 
Attempt  6 1 
Other form of completion 1143 3 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n Perpetrator 6 2 
Accomplice 6 1 
Accessory (aiding and abetting) 6 1 
Instigator 5 1 
Other 1 4 
sa
nc
ti
on
 Type of sanction 10 3 
Duration / height 12 3 
Enforcement status 5 2 
Erasure / deletion date 7 1 
Other 3144 4 
 
                                                             
141 E.g. whether or not it is a repeat offence (indicated by France), the identity of the court that 
has established the liability for the offence (indicated by France, Lithuania and Poland) 
142 E.g. government authority (official) that has drawn up the administrative violation report, 
and the report number (indicated by Latvia) 
143 E.g. a further differentiation between preparation and attempt as indicated by Slovakia 
144 E.g. information on the modality of the sanction (suspended sentences) (indicated by France) 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU 
 
 
118 
 
3.4 Procedural safeguards 
Recommendations 
• Ensure equivalent protection between natural and legal persons145 
• Ensure equivalent protection outside the criminal justice sphere 
 
The third EU policy reviewed relates to procedural safeguards which have 
gained a position on top of the political agenda and are subject to intense debate 
and rapid evolution.  
Two types of procedural rights related problems can be identified. First, 
within criminal liability systems, there is the concern that procedural rights 
should be guaranteed to legal persons as they are to natural persons. Secondly, 
considering the existence of other kinds of liability than criminal liability, in that 
context too, a sufficient level of protection through procedural safeguards 
should exist.  
3.4.1 Within criminal liability context 
 
Art. 6 ECHR reads:146 
  
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing […] 
 
2.Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 
 
3.Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
 
[…] 
 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if 
he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the 
interests of justice so require; 
                                                             
145 In some member states, concerns are raised regarding the procedural safeguards of the legal 
persons. In Spain for example, the implementation of the new system of criminal liability of 
legal persons for offences was not accompanied by an amendment of Spanish procedural law, 
despite clear warnings of the Chief Prosecutor of Spain in this regard; In Latvia, uncertainty 
regarding the rights of the representative to appeal the judgment was reported.  
146 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1950), 4 November 1950, “European Convention on Human 
Rights”. 
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(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him;  […]”. 
 
The second and third paragraph are confined to situations where one is 
charged with a criminal offence. Therefore, the following only deals with the 
criminal liability context; other forms of liability are dealt with below.  
A specific type of procedural safeguards which might cause problems in 
relation to criminal liability of legal persons is the right to remain silent, which is 
a part of the rights of defence and a corollary of the presumption of innocence 
(Art. 6, par. 2 ECHR).147 The latter is violated when – even in the absence of a 
formal finding148 – the decision of a judicial authority reflects the assumption 
that he is guilty.149  
Certain practices could be decried for being at odds with the right against 
self-incrimination, for example the fact that sometimes the legal person is 
obliged to produce certain documents based on which the prosecution could 
found its accusation, as happens for example in Spain.150 
Other problems than problems with the right against self-incrimination arise 
in the context of the rights of defence. One of those is the right of a defendants to 
be tried in their presence (Art. 6, par. 3, (c) ECHR): in principle, the accused has 
the right to be present at hearings and to participate actively in the process.151 
An example of tensions between a criminal liability regime for legal persons 
and this particular right can be found in a case which was decided upon by the 
Polish constitutional court.152 The initial legislation concerning liability of legal 
persons installed a two phase procedure: in the first, the liability of the natural 
person was examined to then, in the second phase, analyse the repercussions 
such liability had for the legal person. The legal person did not have any means 
                                                             
147 ECtHR, Application No. 19187/91, Saunders v. the United Kingdom, par. 68 ; COISNE, S. and 
WAETERINCKX, P., “La sauvegarde des droits de la défense d’une personne morale, son droit 
au silence et le mandataire ad hoc comme garant de ces droits” in NIHOUL, M. (dir.), La 
responsabilité pénale des personnes morales en Belgique, Bruges, La Charte, 2005, 313. 
148  E., CAPE, Z., NAMORADZE, R., SMITH and T. SPRONKEN, Effective Criminal Defense in 
Europe, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010, 27. 
149 ECtHR, Appliction nos. 10588/83, 10589/83, 10590/83, 6 December 1988, Barbera, Messugue and 
Jarbardo v. Spain, par. 77. 
150 ADAM, S., BLAISE, N., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N., “Conclusions” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-
BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate 
criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (433)  
151 ECtHR, Application no. 18114/02, 18 October 2006, Hermi v. Italy, par. 58-67. 
152 Polish Constitutional Court, 3 November 2004, K. 18/3, available at www.trybunal.gov.pl; see 
B. NAMYSLOWSKA-GABRYSIAK, “Criminal liability of legal persons in Poland. Present in 
law, absent in practice”, ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale 
des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 
(241) 246-254. 
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to participate in the legal proceedings against the natural person even though 
the judgment resulting of such proceedings constituted the basis for its own 
liability. Consequently, the Constitutional court declared this double mechanism 
invalid. The Polish law was adjusted and since, the legal person has the right to 
be represented in the first phase proceedings through the presence of a natural 
person with a mandate to act on its behalf.  
Linked to the issue that arose in the Polish case is the  fact that a legal person 
is necessarily represented through natural persons, a given which becomes 
problematic especially when the natural person is himself subject of proceedings 
related to the questioned behaviour. “The problem of the legal person is that it is not 
command its own words given that it can only express itself through the bias of physical 
persons. Thus the question arises whether the right to silence can efficiently be 
guaranteed for the legal person who, per definition, fully depends on physical persons for 
its defence”.153 In Belgium, this problem is addressed through the appointment of 
an ad hoc agent charged only with the representation of the legal person – not 
with its defence.  
Concluding, the above problems show the necessity to take legal persons into 
consideration when developing a fundamental rights policy. It is important that 
legal person are not a priori excluded from relevant instruments. In the 
Procedural Rights Roadmap for example154, the used terminology is consistently 
‘a person’: the project team highlights the importance of interpreting such 
wordings in a way that they also cover legal persons. The same goes for 
provisions such as Art. 47 EU Charter fundamental rights.  
3.4.2 Administrative and civil liability context 
 
In addition to Art. 6(1) ECHR (cited above), which contains guarantees in 
relation to civil rights and criminal proceedings, the latter have to comply with 
additional guarantees spelled out in the second and third paragraphs of article 6 
ECHR. 155 This distinction between civil and criminal proceedings has several 
implications in terms of procedural rights.156 Concerning the provisions which 
                                                             
153 COISNE, S. and WAETERINCKX, P., “La sauvegarde des droits de la défense d’une 
personne morale, son droit au silence et le mandataire ad hoc comme garant de ces droits” in 
NIHOUL, M. (dir.), La responsabilité pénale des personnes morales en Belgique, Bruges, La Charte, 
2005, 325. 
154 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009), “Resolution of 30 November 2009 on a 
Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal 
proceedings”, OJ C 295/1, 4.12.2009. 
155 MAHONEY, P., “Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Matters under article 6 ECHR”, 4 Judicial 
Studies Institute Journal, nr. 2, 2004, 107. 
156 For an analysis of such implications in the context of Competition procedures, see A. 
ANDREANGELI, “Toward an EU Competition Court: “Article-6-Proofing” 
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explicitly apply to criminal offences, considering the “prominent place held in a 
democratic society by the right to a fair trial”, the ECtHR, “compelled to look behind the 
appearances and investigate the realities of the procedure in question” has been 
prompted to give an autonomous meaning to the concept of criminal charge and 
to prefer a substantive rather than a formal conception of the charge 
contemplated by Article 6 ECHR.157  
3.4.2.1 Administrative liability 
 
In its approximation acquis (discussed above in chapter 3) the EU accepted 
the national diversity in the liability of legal persons for offences: it is left to the 
member states to decide whether a criminal, administrative or civil mechanism 
(or a combination) applies. In doing so, the EU takes account of and accepts the 
differences in the recognition and application of criminal liability of legal 
persons in the member states.  The reality is indeed that variations occur 
throughout the EU (above chapter 2); this reality must be taken into account 
when designing the EU’s procedural rights policy. 
The ECtHR’s case-law giving the concept of “criminal offence” from Art. 6 
ECHR an autonomous meaning was developed to avoid that the application of 
this provision could be circumvented by parties to the Convention, simply by 
their domestic classification of penalties.158 Considering the explicit recognition 
that legal persons can be holders of the fair trial rights contained in Art. 6 ECHR 
and the variety of criminal, administrative (and civil159) liability regimes, this 
case-law is of undeniable importance. 
In the case Air Canada v. the UK160 the Strasbourg Court considered that even 
though the applicable national rules were to be situated primarily in 
administrative law, “the result is that the [concerned authorities] are given the 
power to prosecute and punish [the concerned legal persons].”161 The Court refers 
to its case-law162 where it is held that such practices are compatible with Art. 6 
“provided that the [legal person] can bring any such decision affecting him before a 
court that affords the safeguards of that provision”.163 
Both the acceptance of the diversity in national approaches and the 
requirement that administrative procedures which are in practice very close if 
                                                                                                                                               
Antitrust Proceedings before the Commission ?”, World Competition 30 (4), 595-622. 
157 ECtHR, Application no. 6903/75, 27 February 1980, Deweer v. Belgium, par. 44. 
158 ECtHR, Application no. 11598/85, 27 February 1992, Société Stenuit v. France. 
159 This will be discussed further in this subsection.  
160 ECtHR, Application no. 18465/91, 5 May 1995, Air Canada v. UK. 
161 ECtHR, Application no. 18465/91, 5 May 1995, Air Canada v. UK, par. 33. 
162 ECtHR, Application no. 12547/86, 24 February 1994, Bendenoun v. France, par. 46. 
163 ECtHR, Application no. 12547/86, 24 February 1994, Bendenoun v. France, par. 46. 
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not similar to the prosecution and punishment offences, provide with 
procedural safeguards that apply to criminal proceedings, are reflected in the 
majority of the cooperation in criminal matters acquis.  It fits the argumentation 
upheld elsewhere which essentially entails that not the name tags of the 
authorities taking the decisions are relevant, but the finality with which those 
authorities act.164 In the same vein, it should not matter whether the sanction 
was imposed by an authority competent in criminal or administrative. Actions 
taken with a criminal justice finality were defined as actions taken “in the course 
of criminal investigations which present the characteristics of being an investigation 
following the commission of a specific criminal offence […] in order to identify and 
arrest, charge, prosecute or deliver judgment on those responsible.”(Art. 20 EU 
MLA165). In the context of cooperation in criminal matters, this criminal justice 
finality definition was broadened to infringements of the national rules of law, 
provided that “the decision may give rise to proceedings before a court having 
jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters” (e.g. Art. 3, par. 1 EU MLA, Art. 1,a,i 
and ii FD Fin Pen).166 The link with investigations into offences (or infringements 
of the rules of law) is decisive, over the link with the acting authority. However, 
when brought within the criminal justice sphere care was taken not to allow a 
loss of procedural safeguards which usually come with the application of 
criminal procedures: therefore, the condition of the availability of a court having 
jurisdiction in criminal matters was attached. 
The Strasbourg case-law combined with the broadening of the scope of EU 
cooperation instruments in criminal matters warrants a similar reasoning in the 
EU’s approximation acquis related to legal persons. In 3.1.2. the content of the 
relevant Justice and Home affairs instruments was examined. No reference to 
procedural safeguards was included in any of those.  
It is advised to change this by introducing an obligation for the member 
states to guarantee that the necessary procedural safeguards are upheld in the 
liability regimes for legal persons, even when the liability regime is 
administrative in nature. Such a provision is necessary considering the fact that, 
as was stated in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the result of the involved rules is 
decisive: when the result is that authorities are given the power to prosecute and 
punish legal persons, sufficiently conclusive safeguards must apply. It be noted 
that this result applies per definition in relation to the administrative liability of 
                                                             
164 On the criminal justice finality, extensively: VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT W. and 
RYCKMAN, C. (eds.) Rethinking international cooperation  in criminal matters in the EU. Moving 
beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in reality, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2012, 
forthcoming.   
165 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000), "Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual 
Legal Assistance between member states of the European Union", OJ C 197/1, 12.7.2000. 
166 Framework Decision of 24 February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to financial penalties”, OJ L 76/16, 22.3.2005. 
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legal persons for offences, as targeted in this Study, particularly the 
administrative liability in execution of the JHA approximation acquis. The 
proposal for inclusion of procedural safeguard considerations in the 
approximation acquis is the necessary counterweight to balance the flexible 
approach regarding the type of liability member states are allowed to use in the 
context of the applicable approximation instruments. In concrete terms, this 
would entail that the mechanism imposed in the Strasbourg Court’s, whereby 
Art. 6 ECHR, including its par. 2 and 3 are made applicable to national 
administrative liability regimes such as targeted in the approximation acquis.     
3.4.2.2 Civil liability 
 
In relation to civil liability, Art. 6(1) ECHR applies. Hence, when applying 
civil liability regimes to legal persons, this article needs to be respected. It is 
advised to make this explicit in the relevant approximation acquis. Granted, the 
obligation to respect Art. 6(1) ECHR clearly stems from the wordings of the 
provision and the utility of an explicit reference in the concerned approximation 
instruments might therefore be debated. However, this is different with regards 
to Art. 6, par. 2 and 3. For these provisions, no case-law or related practice in the 
Union exists the way it does concerning administrative liability (above 3.3.2.1). 
Here too, however, the same reasoning applies: the flexibility of the EU in its 
acceptance of the diversity in the national liability approaches should not be a 
justification for a loss of procedural safeguards.  
Granted, an analogy with the rules regarding administrative authorities in 
the context of cooperation in criminal matters, being the possibility of recourse 
to an authority also competent in criminal matters, is undesirable. However, an 
alternative must be introduced. After all, as shown through the survey in this 
Study, several member states apply a combined criminal/civil liability regime.  
It is strongly recommended that the EU would explicitly include the 
obligation for member states to, when dealing with liability of legal persons, 
apply safeguards equivalent to those applicable in criminal procedures. The 
same argument as was used in the context of administrative liability applies: 
given that the approximation instruments examined in this Study are per 
definition of a criminal justice nature (they are JHA instruments), the 
implementing national measures will in practice have as a result that legal 
persons can be ‘prosecuted’ and ‘punished’, regardless of whether this result is 
obtained through a criminal, administrative of civil liability system. Coherence 
in the EU’s (criminal) policy requires that the leniency showed with respect to 
the national choices in relation to the attribution of liability to legal persons has a 
counterpart in the EU’s procedural safeguards policy. 
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4 Implications for the MS’s cooperation practice 
 
For several decades, the common desire of European states to undertake a 
joint effort to fight crime at the international level was expressed in the EU’s and 
– more commonly – in Council of Europe’s legal texts. That joint effort also 
includes the fight against crimes committed by legal persons inevitably the 
diversity in the member states’ approaches with respect to the liability of legal 
persons for offences impacts on the design of the joint effort to fight crime. This 
final chapter looks into the position of legal persons in the instruments 
regulating international cooperation in criminal matters. However, before 
looking into the technicality of the cooperation instruments, empirical data with 
respect to the experiences of the member states in relation to cooperation is 
presented. This empirical data was gathered in the context of the recent Study on 
the international cooperation in criminal matters.167 Because the picture is 
expected to be different according to the type of cooperation involved, a 
distinction is made between providing mutual legal assistance and executing a 
foreign decision. 
 
4.1 Providing mutual legal assistance 
 
Findings 
• When asked from their experience as issuing member state, 32% of 
the member states experience problems with mutual legal assistance 
requests due to the (un)acceptability of criminal liability of legal 
persons.  
• When asked from their experience as executing  member state, 21% 
of the member states experience problems with mutual legal 
assistance requests due to the (un)acceptability of criminal liability 
of legal persons.  
• Prohibitions to call on refusal grounds based on the lack of liability 
of the legal person for the underlying offence are not consistently 
copied throughout the instruments regarding EU cooperation in 
criminal matters; such prohibition is part of the framework decision 
regarding confiscation, but not regarding freezing.  
  
 
                                                             
167 VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT W. and RYCKMAN, C. (eds.) Rethinking international 
cooperation  in criminal matters in the EU. Moving beyond actors, bringing logic back, footed in 
reality, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2012, forthcom
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Recommendations 
• The lack of consistency between the framework decision on 
confiscations (mutual recognition) and the framework decision on 
freezing orders (mutual legal assistance) should be remedied. 
• Considering that within the context of mutual legal assistance, the 
intrusion in the national legal systems is relatively low, it is advised 
not to allow the member states to refuse cooperation based on the 
lack of liability of the legal person for the underlying offence; it is 
thus recommended to include this prohibition in the framework 
decision on freezing orders.  
 
Even though only a small minority of the member states indicates not to have 
the concept of criminal liability of legal persons in their legislation it can be 
expected that the existing diversity in the national approaches with respect to 
the liability of legal persons for offences may have significant implications for 
the member states’ cooperation practice. The analysis first looks into the 
experiences of the member states with respect to cooperation before evaluating 
the legal instruments that form the basis for cooperation. 
4.1.1 Experiences  
 
The empirical results gathered in the context of a previous study regarding 
cooperation in criminal matters come to testify that opinions on the current 
practice are diverse. It may be expected that few problems are experienced 
regarding mutual legal assistance. After all, in this secondary form of 
cooperation, the ‘ownership’ of the procedure stays entirely with the requesting 
member state given that mere assistance (rather than cross-border execution) is 
requested. The intervention requested from the cooperating member state is thus 
less intrusive on its own legal system in the context of mutual legal assistance 
than in the context of cross-border execution.  
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Member states were asked to share their experiences, both acting as the 
issuing as well as acting as the executing member state. The replies to question 
4.1.20 reveal that 32% of the member states experience problems with respect to 
the mutual legal assistance requests it sends as an issuing member state.  
 
12%
16%
8%
4%
60%
4.1.20 Do you experience problems with your mutual legal 
assistance requests due to (un)acceptability of criminal liability 
of legal persons when you are the issuing member state?
Not applicable, we do not accept criminal
liability of legal persons in our domestic
legislation (BU, CZ, EL)
Yes, with respect to some member states
(FR, LV, NL, RO)
Yes, with respect to some forms of
cooperation (ES, MT)
Yes, with respect to both certain member
states and certain forms of cooperation
(UK)
No (AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, EE, FI, IT, LT,
LU, PL, PT, SE, SL, SK)
 
 
When asked to elaborate on the nature of the problems experienced, 42% of 
the member states refer to the type of cooperation and no less than 71% of the 
member states to the requested member state. 
 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
related to some member states
related to some forms of cooperation
What is the nature/type of the problems  you experience with 
your mutual legal assistance requests due to (in)acceptability of 
criminal liability of legal persons when you are the issuing 
member state?
yes
no
 
 
 
COOPERATION IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MS 
 
 
128 
 
When asked the same question when being at the receiving end and being 
approached as the executing member state, 30% of the member states indicate to 
experience problems. This number is relatively high.  
 
13%
8%
0%
79%
4.1.22 Do you experience problems with mutual legal assistance 
requests due to (un)acceptability of criminal liability of legal 
persons when you are the executing member state?
Yes, when it concerns a type of
liability we do not foresee in our
domestic legislation (BU, EL, SE)
Yes, with respect to some forms of
cooperation (CZ, MT)
Yes, we have constitutional problems
with accepting the criminal liability
of legal persons
No (AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR,
HU, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO,
SL, UK)
 
 
One would have expected at least 18% of the member states to indicate that 
they experience problems, considering that 18% of the member states have not 
introduced criminal liability of legal persons in their national law. However, an 
additional 12% of the member state also indicate to experience problems with 
the execution of mutual legal assistance requests relating to the criminal liability 
of legal persons. This means that the difficulties in cooperation find their origin 
not solely in the fact that liability is criminal, but have an origin in one or more 
of the other differences identified in the second chapter of this report. In other 
words, not only the difficulties relating to criminal vs. administrative liability 
can be a cause of cross-border difficulties; this is also the case for differences 
based on the involvement of private or public legal persons (supra 2.2), 
differences in attribution mechanisms (supra 2.3), differences in the offences 
which can be brought in relation to liability of legal persons (supra 2.4), and the 
sanctions which can be imposed on legal persons (supra 2.5).
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What is interesting though, is the nature of the problems. None of the member 
states indicate that they have constitutional issues rendering cooperation 
impossible, which is important to assess to feasibility of mutual recognition in 
this sphere. 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
constitutional problems
related to some forms of cooperation
What is the nature/type of the problems  you experience with 
your mutual legal assistance requests due to (in)acceptability of 
criminal liability of legal persons when you are the executing 
member state?
yes
no
 
4.1.2 Position of legal persons in cooperation instruments 
 
Because difficulties still hinder smooth cooperation with respect to legal 
persons, the question arises to what extent the diversity in the national 
approaches can be used as a refusal ground in the context of mutual legal 
assistance. Therefore, the current legal framework is analysed with a view to 
identifying the position of legal persons therein. 
Relevant provisions can be found in the 2000 Convention on mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters168 [hereafter EU MLA]. It explicitly stipulates that 
mutual assistance shall be afforded even when it concerns criminal proceedings 
in connection to offences/infringements for which a legal person may be liable in 
the requesting state (Art. 3, par. 2 EU MLA). The provision inflicts on the many 
different fields that are covered by the EU MLA, for example the placing of 
articles obtained by criminal means at the disposal of the requesting state with a 
view to their return to the rightful owners, making the impact of these rules 
quite far reaching.169 Art. 3, par. 2 EU MLA fits the evolution that the EU MLA 
makes from locus to forum regit actum, meaning that instead of applying the law 
of the requested member state, the law of the requesting member state applies: 
in principle, the assumption is made that the request for mutual assistance is 
                                                             
168 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000), "Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual 
Legal Assistance between member states of the European Union", OJ C 197/1, 12.7.2000. 
169 S. ADAM, G. VERMEULEN, W. DE BONDT, “Corporate criminal liability and the EC/EU: 
bridging sovereignty paradigms for the sake of an area of justice, freedom and security” in 
ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en 
Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, (373) 
COOPERATION IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MS 
 
 
130 
 
compatible with the legal system of the requested state.170 Only with a selected 
number of investigative measures for which cooperation is still governed by the 
locus regit actum principle, questions related to differences in the liability of 
legal persons can arise. As a baseline however, forum regit actum precludes the 
use of diversity in the liability of legal persons as a refusal ground. 
Unfortunately, this trend is not explicitly included in more recent 
instruments on mutual recognition. No reference to legal persons is made 
whatsoever in the Framework decision on the freezing of evidence [hereafter FD 
Freezing]171. Following the policy line that can be identified within the existing 
legal framework and considering that confiscation cannot be refused based on 
unacceptability of the liability of legal persons for the underlying conviction, this 
caveat is remarkable considering that a freezing order can precede a confiscation 
order. It is only logical that no refusal ground should be allowed in a freezing 
context. This caveat comes to testify that provisions including an obligation to 
cooperate even if a legal person cannot be held liable in the requested/executing 
member state, are not consistently copied into all cooperation instruments. 
Especially for legal assistances which involves only minor intrusion in the legal 
order of the cooperating member state, differences related to the liability of legal 
persons should not be used as a ground to refuse cooperation. 
 
                                                             
170 VERMEULEN, G., “EU Conventions enhancing and updating traditional mechanisms for 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters”, Revue International de Droit Pénal 2006, 77 (1-2), (59) 
82-83. 
171 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2003), “Framework Decision of 22 July 2003 on the 
execution in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence” OJ L 196/45, 2.8.2003. 
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4.2 Execution of foreign sentences 
 
Findings 
• When asked from their experience as issuing member state, 28% of 
the member states experience problems with the international 
validity of their decisions due to the (un)acceptability of criminal 
liability of legal persons.  
• When asked from their experience as executing member state, 24% 
of the member states experience problems with the international 
validity of their decisions due to the (un)acceptability of criminal 
liability of legal persons.  
• As opposed to the relevant Council of Europe instruments, EU 
mutual recognition instruments (esp. regarding financial penalties 
and confiscations) explicitly state that considerations regarding 
liability of legal persons cannot serve as a refusal ground.  
Recommendations 
• The lack of consistency between the framework decision on 
confiscations (mutual recognition) and the framework decision on 
freezing orders (mutual legal assistance) should be remedied. 
• Considering that within the context of mutual recognition, the 
intrusion in the national legal systems is higher than in the sphere 
of mutual legal assistance, it is advised to include the prohibition 
for refusal based on lack of liability of the legal person in the 
framework decision on freezing orders. 
4.2.1 Experiences 
 
Because execution of a foreign sentence entails the taking over of an essential 
part of the criminal procedure, it can be expected that member states are more 
reluctant to cooperate with respect to the legal persons. Here too, the empirical 
data gathered in the context of a previous study on international cooperation in 
criminal matters is used as a basis to provide insight into the experiences of the 
member states. The replies to question 4.1.21 show a slight increase of the 
member states that indicate to have experience problems, when compared to the 
problems identified with respect to mutual legal assistance. 41% of the member 
states have indicated to have experienced problems with respect to the 
international validity of their decisions due to the unacceptability of criminal 
liability of legal persons when they were the issuing member state. 
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13%
14%
14%
59%
4.1.21 Do you experience problems with the international validity 
of your decisions due to (un)acceptability of criminal liability of 
legal persons when you are the issuing member state?
Not applicable, we do not accept
criminal liability of legal persons in
our domestic legislation (BU, CZ, EL)
Yes, with respect to some member
states (CY, RO, SL)
Yes, with respect to some forms of
cooperation (LV, MT, NL)
No (AT, BE, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, IT,
LT, LU, PL, PT, SE)
 
 
When encouraging the member states that have indicated to experience 
problems to further elaborate on the nature of those problems, reference is made 
to the forms of cooperation and the member state of which cooperation is 
requested, though neither can be very significant and no specific form of 
cooperation or member state is identified as the main problem. 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
related to some member states
related to some forms of cooperation
What is the nature of the problems you experience  with the 
international validity of your decisions due to (in)acceptability 
of criminal liability of legal persons when you are the issuing 
member state?
yes
no
 
 
When acting as an executing member state, a similar trend can be found. A 
slight increase can be identified in the member states that indicate to experience 
problems with respect to the criminal liability of legal persons when they are at 
the receiving/executing end of the cooperation. 41% of the member states 
indicate to experience problems with the execution of a foreign conviction 
related to the criminal liability of legal persons.  
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18%
5%
0%
77%
4.1.23 Do you experience problems with the international validity 
of foreign decisions due to (in)acceptability of criminal liability 
of legal persons when you are the executing member state?
Yes, when it concerns a type of 
liability we do not foresee in our 
domestic legislation (BU, CZ, EL, SE)
Yes, with respect to some forms of 
cooperation (MT)
Yes, we have constitutional problems 
with accepting the criminal liability 
of legal persons
No (AT, BE, CY, DE, EE, FI, FR, IT, 
LT, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SL, LU, DK)
 
 
Again, this number is relatively high. One would have expected at least 18% 
of the member states to indicate that they experience problems, considering that 
18% of the member states have not introduced criminal liability of legal persons 
in their national law. However, 23% of the member state also indicate to 
experience problems, which means that the difficulties find their origin not 
solely in the fact that liability is criminal, but have an origin in any of the other 
differences identified in the second chapter of this report. In other words, not 
only the difficulties following from and administrative vs. criminal justice 
system can be a cause of cross-border difficulties; this is also the case for 
differences based on the involvement of private or public legal persons (supra 
2.2), differences in attribution mechanisms (supra 2.3), differences in the offences 
which can be brought in relation to liability of legal persons (supra 2.4), and the 
sanctions which can be imposed on legal persons (supra 2.5). 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
constitutional problems
related to some forms of cooperation
What is the nature of the problems you experience  with the 
international validity of your decisions due to (in)acceptability 
of criminal liability of legal persons when you are the executing 
member state?
yes
no
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When compared to the experiences drawn up with respect to mutual legal 
assistance requests, even less member states indicate that the difficulties relate to 
the form of cooperation, which supports the presumption that cooperation is 
difficult due to one or more of the other differences identified in the second 
chapter of this report. 
4.2.2 Position of legal persons in cooperation instruments 
 
Because the differences in the liability of legal persons hinder smooth 
cooperation with respect to offences committed by / attributed to legal persons, 
the question arises to what extent those differences can be used as a ground for 
refusal. Therefore, the current legal framework is analysed with a view to 
identifying the current position if legal persons therein. 
First, at Council of Europe level, it is the Convention on the International 
Validity of Criminal Judgments172 which deals with the cross-border 
enforcement of sentences and contains the early steps towards executing foreign 
decisions. An important provision in the context of this contribution is Art. 4, 
which reads:  
“The sanction shall not be enforced by another Contracting State unless 
under its law the act for which the sanction was imposed would be an offence if 
committed on its territory and the person on whom the sanction was imposed 
liable to punishment if he had committed the act there". Even though legal 
persons are not mentioned explicitly, from this provision it follows that 
requested states shall be exempt from the obligation to execute a foreign 
sentence when the latter was imposed on a legal person and the requested state 
does not recognize the principle of criminal liability of legal persons. Because of 
its very low ratification until the nineties however, the cited provision did not 
resort much practical relevance.  
Significant progress is made at EU level. The framework decisions dealing 
with the execution of criminal judgments which can be imposed on legal persons 
are the framework decision regarding mutual recognition of financial 
penalties173 [hereafter FD Fin Pen] and the framework decision regarding mutual 
recognition of confiscation orders [hereafter FD Confiscation]174, which both 
                                                             
172 COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1970), 28 May 1970, “European Convention on the international 
validity of criminal judgments”, The Hague, CETS 070. 
173 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005), “Framework Decision of 24 February 2005 
on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties”, OJ L 76/16, 
22.3.2005. 
174 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2006), “Framework Decision of 6 October 2006 on 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders”, OJ L 328, 
24.11.2006. 
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stipulate that the national differences the liability of legal persons are no basis to 
refuse cooperation. 
The basis for this EU policy can be found in the 2000 Programme of Measures 
implementing mutual recognition175 which explicitly refers to the matter of 
liability of legal persons. In measure 18, which urges member states to prepare 
measures for cross-border execution of financial penalties, it is said that account 
will be taken of “the differences between EU member states on the issue of liability of 
legal persons”. 176  
The proposal for the FD Fin Pen made the enforcement subject to the law of 
the executing state, but required enforcement against legal persons “even when 
the executing state does not recognize the principle of criminal liability of legal 
persons”.177 An optional transition period is included: Art. 20, par. 2, b provides 
that member states may (until maximum 22 March 2010)178 limit the enforcement 
of a foreign decision sentencing a legal person to those offences for which a 
European instrument provides for the application of the principle of corporate 
liability. The FD Confiscation also applies the default position of the FD Fin Pen. 
However, it does not foresee in a transitional period.  
Especially because execution of a sentence is far more intrusive than mere 
cooperation it is important that also with respect to mutual legal assistance the 
diversity with respect to the liability of legal persons is recognised and no longer 
regarded as a legitimate obstacle to cooperation. 
 
                                                             
175 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000), “Programme of measures of 30 November 
2000 to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters”, OJ C 
12, 15.1.2001. 
176After all, because of the low ratification level of the abovementioned Council of Europe 
Convention on the Validity of Judgments, fines imposed by criminal courts (or administrative 
authorities) could not be enforced in other member states unless there was a bilateral agreement 
concluded to that aim: K. LIGETI, "Mutual recognition of financial penalties in the European 
Union" Revue International de Droit Pénal 2006, 77, (145) 146. 
177 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001), Explanatory note on the Initiative from the 
French republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom for the adoption by the 
Council on a draft framework decision on the application of the principle of mutual recognition 
to financial penalties (10710/01), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st10/st10710-
ad01.en01.pdf.  
178 Art. 20 j.° 21 FD Fin Pen: transition period of five years after entry into force; entered into 
force on the date of publication in the Official Journal, which was 22.03.2005. 
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4.3 Need for the EU to safeguard its own approximation policy 
Findings 
• In certain legislation, the EU temporarily allowed refusal grounds 
based on considerations related to liability of legal persons; an 
exception was included, however, in that such refusals were not 
allowed in relation to offences which had been subject to 
approximation and introduction of the obligation to foresee liability 
for legal persons; such transitional period was not foreseen in the 
framework decision on confiscations.  
Recommendations 
• If and when the EU would (temporarily) allow refusal grounds 
based on considerations related to liability of legal persons, it 
should see to it that allow such refusal grounds does not undermine 
its approximation acquis (as it did in the framework decision on 
financial penalties).  
• When assuring the compatibility with the approximation acquis, 
which can be accomplished by not allowing the refusal in relation to 
offences which had been subject to approximation and introduction 
of the obligation to foresee liability for legal persons, it is advised to 
develop an instrument comprising the concerned approximated 
offences.  
 
In the margin of the discussion on whether or not the differences in the 
liability of legal persons ought to be accepted/recognised, it is important for the 
EU to ensure that the compromise reached by the member states does not 
undermine the progress made in and consistency of its own policy making.  
In situations where member states introduce a transition period of 5 years to 
adjust to having to execute sanctions handed down against legal persons, it is 
important for the EU to see to it that such – be it temporary –refusal grounds are 
no threat for its approximation policy and should do what is possible to facilitate 
the identification of obligations that spring from its approximation policy. 
With respect to the transitional period found in Art. 20, 2, b FD Fin Pen, 
respect for the EUs approximation efforts is safeguarded in that the possibility to 
wait with the recognition and execution of sanctions handed down against legal 
persons may not be introduced with respect to just any offences. The scope is 
limited to offences that have not been subject to approximation and introduction 
of the obligation to foresee liability for legal persons. Differently put, the 
provision stipulates that at least for the offences that have been subject to 
approximation, recognition and execution is mandatory from the initial entry 
into force of the instrument. 
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Obviously, the formulation of the provision could have been more concrete 
on the specific offences it relates to. A practitioner is now expected to either 
know by heart which offences have been subject to approximation or check the 
legislation. It would have been more user-friendly if the EU would make a 
consolidated list of those offences available for practical use. Significant first 
steps towards the introduction of such a consolidated list that can be used for 
these kinds of purposes have been made via the development of EULOCS, short 
for the EU level offence classification system that has amongst others the 
ambition to visualise the existing acquis.179 
  
                                                             
179 VERMEULEN, G. and DE BONDT, W. EULOCS. The EU level offence classification system : 
a bench-mark for enhanced internal coherence of the EU's criminal policy. Antwerp - 
Apeldoorn - Portland, Maklu, 2009, 212p 
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5 Conclusion  
 
The conclusion to this study comprises two main parts. First, the main 
conclusions will be drawn from the diversity in the member states deduced from 
the comparative analysis conducted on the information gathered. The 
questionnaire only encompassed questions aiming to describe the current 
approach found in the member states with respect to the liability of legal persons 
for offences. Second, though no questions related thereto could be included in 
the questionnaire, the team has formulated a set of operational 
recommendations based on the EU level analysis it conducted, in addition to the 
comparative analysis conducted on the information gathered. In doing so, the 
team provides insight into its opinion on the way forward and the policy lines 
the European Commission should set out – in its opinion – to ensure a 
comprehensive and consistent policy with respect to the liability of legal 
persons. 
 
5.1 Diversity in the member states 
Differences in competent authorities were identified, differences based on the 
involvement of private or public legal persons, differences in attribution 
mechanisms, differences in the offences which can be brought in relation to 
liability of legal persons, and the sanctions which can be imposed on legal 
persons. Firstly, with respect to the differences related to the competent 
authorities involved, the analysis presented an overview of the choice for either 
criminal, administrative and/or civil liability of legal persons. The mapping 
exercise lead to the conclusion that 5 member states have not introduced a form 
of criminal liability in their national law and 8 member states have not 
introduced a form of administrative liability in their national law. This diversity 
is also relevant in relation to the other diversities regarding liability of legal  
persons in that the varieties based on the involvement of private or public legal 
persons, differences in attribution mechanisms, differences in the offences which 
can be brought in relation to liability of legal persons, and the sanctions which 
can be imposed on legal persons. 
Secondly, with respect to the differences related to the type of persons 
involved, it must be noted that the concept of a legal person is sometimes used 
as an umbrella concept to include both natural and fictitious persons. For a 
proper analysis and comparison, it is important to clearly define a legal person 
as an entity (as opposed to a human being) recognised by the law as having legal 
personality, without excluding States and other public bodies and organisations 
from its scope. The latter nuance was added because the legal person concept is 
rarely limited to private legal persons. Nonetheless, awareness of the (rare) 
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limitation is necessary, especially when examined in light of differences 
regarding criminal vs. administrative liability: in relation to criminal liability of 
legal persons there tends to be more limits on liability of public legal persons 
than is the case for administrative liability of legal persons.  
Thirdly, with respect to the differences in attribution mechanisms, three 
theoretical schools were used as a basis to map the attribution techniques 
introduced in the member states. A distinction can be made between  
− the vicarious liability/respondeat superior theory which opts for an almost civil 
law like attribution by stating that ‘any’ misconduct by the legal persons’ 
employees will lead to legal person responsibility; 
− the alter ego/identification model. stating that only managers and employees 
endowed with certain responsibilities may cause criminal liability for the 
legal person; 
− the aggregation model theory, aimed at identifying a collective responsibility of 
individuals within the legal person, rather than identifying an individual 
perpetrator, aggregation could therefore involve matching the conduct of one 
individual with the state of mind or culpability of another individual to 
achieve liability. 
A fourth model, the organisational model/self-identity doctrine, was also 
included. It is based on the assumption that legal persons have a mechanism for 
expressing their substance and self-identity, and can thus be held liable for 
crimes, without necessarily having to be linked to the behaviour of individuals.   
The identification model is the model used in the EU’s approximation 
instruments. Different elements of the several attribution models apply in many 
MS, but in relation to criminal liability, an overwhelming majority applies 
elements of both the vicarious liability and the identification model. Parallel 
prosecution of natural and legal persons is possible in a wide majority of the 
member states; whereas concurrent liability occurs in – on average – 55% of the 
member states. 
Fourthly, with respect to the differences in offences which can give rise to 
liability of legal persons, analysis revealed that only few member states have 
introduced an all inclusive liability for legal persons. Most member states have 
opted for an enumeration strategy selecting either families of offences or single 
offences for which a legal person can be held liable. 
Fifthly and finally, with respect to the differences in sanctions which can be 
imposed on legal persons, analysis revealed that the sanction arsenal is very 
divers, though some member states have not included separate sanctions in their 
legal system and/or included a conversion mechanism to convert inoperable 
sanction types to a financial sanction. 
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5.2 Recommendations for a coherent and consistent policy with 
respect to the liability of legal persons for offences 
5.2.1 With respect to approximation 
 
Recommendation 1 – Continue general approach 
It is important to continue the general approach with respect to the 
introduction of provisions related to the liability of legal persons for offences 
included in approximation instruments. Considering the existence of structures 
such as accessories or instigators it should be kept as a baseline that legal 
persons can be involved in any type of offence. 
 
Recommendation 2 – Complement non-EU instruments where necessary 
Though it is a good practice to take account of existing approximation efforts 
in non-EU instruments and refer to those instruments for the definition of the 
constituent elements of offences, it is important to thoroughly assess to what 
extent it is necessary to complement the provisions with respect to the liability of 
legal persons included in the concerned non-EU instrument. 
 
Recommendation 3 – Avoid terminology with ‘criminal law’ connotation 
Especially because the EU has continuously accepted the diversity in the 
member states and has decided not to introduce the obligation to introduce a 
criminal liability for legal persons, the use of the term sanctions should have 
preferences over penalty which has a criminal law connotation. 
 
Recommendation 4 – Reconsider the scope of a ‘legal person’ 
In the current EU policy with respect to the liability of legal persons for 
offences, public legal persons are not included in the scope. Considering that a 
lot of member states include one or more types of public legal persons within the 
scope of their national liability approach, the EU can consider extending its 
scope accordingly. 
 
Recommendation 5 – Consider the introduction of ‘strict liability’ 
The introduction of a system of strict liability as is done in some member 
states can significantly reduce the burden of proof when prosecuting those 
offences. 
 
Recommendation 6 – Rephrase the currently suggested sanctions 
Some of the sanctions currently included in the list of suggestions can be 
better phrased. The recommendation can be made to rephrase the suggested 
‘exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid’ in a way to clearly 
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encompass the exclusion from participation in a public tender procedure in its 
scope, especially since that suggestion is included in some other EU instruments. 
 
Recommendation 7 – Develop a standard set of suggested sanctions  
Though the suggested sanctions are to a large extent consistently included in 
all approximation instruments, there seems to be no tangible explanation why 
some are not included in a small number of approximation instruments. It is 
therefore recommended to develop a clear and transparent standard set of 
suggested sanctions for legal persons. 
 
Recommendation 8 – Complement standard set with additional sanctions 
Besides the standard set of suggested sanctions, additional (suggested) 
sanctions can be included reflecting the specificity of the offence. 
 
Recommendation 9 – Look into need for specific ‘legal person’-offences  
Based on the current formulation of the constituent elements of the offences, 
it is not always clear whether specific situations fall within its scope. Especially 
subcontracting constructions raise a lot of questions. It should therefore be 
looked into whether or not it is desirable to criminalise the situations linked to 
e.g. subcontracting and subsequently look into the necessity to either rephrase 
the constituent elements of the current offences or to develop a new set of  
specific ‘legal person’-offences. 
 
Recommendation 10 –  Increase follow-up of the implementation process 
Analysis has revealed that the implementation of the current set of 
approximation instruments is far from flawless. The implementation process in 
the member states should be followed more closely. In the event the current 
instruments need to be amended, the opportunity should be seized to introduce 
directives who’s poor implementation can give rise to the start of an 
infringement procedure. 
5.2.2 With respect to mutual recognition 
 
Recommendation 11 –  Extend mutual recognition instrumentarium 
The current instrumentarium regulating the mutual recognition of sentences 
and governing their cross-border execution is largely focused on the sanctions 
typically imposed against natural persons. A comprehensive and consistent 
policy with respect to the liability of legal persons would need to contain 
instruments regulating the mutual recognition of the sanctions typically 
imposed against legal persons.  
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Recommendation 12 –  Develop general approach with respect to refusal 
grounds related to the differences 
In the current instrumentarium, nor the differences in administrative vs. 
criminal liability, nor the differences based on the type of involved legal persons, 
nor the variety in attribution mechanisms, nor the differences in offences leading 
to liability of legal persons, nor the sanctions which can be imposed  are 
considered as eligible grounds to refuse execution of judicial decisions imposing 
a financial penalty or confiscation measure upon a legal person. The question 
arises whether that will become a general approach when extending the mutual 
recognition instrumentarium to encompass also cross-border execution of other 
sanctions. 
5.2.3 With respect to the information exchange policy 
 
Recommendation 13 – Introduce the obligation to keep records  
Analysis has revealed that not all member states keep (complete and 
comprehensive) records in relation to the liability of legal persons for offence. 
With a view to extending the information exchange with respect to the liability 
of legal persons for offences in the EU, the first step would be to introduce an 
obligation to keep records in order to be able to provide information upon 
request. 
 
Recommendation 14 – Introduce exchange and storage obligations 
Analogous to the exchange and storage obligations that have been 
introduced with respect to the criminal records of natural persons, similar 
exchange and storage obligations should be introduced with respect to the 
liability (criminal or other) of legal persons for offences. It would significantly 
facilitate the taking account of prior convictions in the course of criminal or non-
criminal procedures. 
5.2.4 With respect to the procedural safeguards policy 
 
Recommendation 15 –  Ensure equivalent protection outside criminal 
liability context 
Especially because the EU has continuously accepted the EU-wide diversity 
regarding the criminal vs. administrative liability of legal persons in the member 
states and has decided not to introduce the obligation to introduce a criminal 
liability for legal persons, it is important to complement that policy choice with a 
policy that ensures a procedural protection in relation to offences administrative 
and civil liability for offences that is equivalent to the procedural protection 
foreseen in the context of a criminal liability mechanism. 
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Recommendation 16 –  Ensure equivalent protection for natural and legal 
persons 
The development of the policy line to enhance the level of protection 
provided by procedural safeguards in the EU, is mainly focused on the 
procedural safeguards natural persons need. It is important to look into the 
specificity of the situation in which a legal person finds itself and ensure 
equivalent protection for natural and legal persons. 
 
  
145 
 
6 Bibliography 
 
6.1 Legislation and policy documents  
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1950), 4 November 1950, “European Convention on 
Human Rights”. 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1959), 20 April 1959, “European Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters”, Strasbourg, CETS 030. 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1970), 28 May 1970, “European Convention on the 
international validity of criminal judgments”, The Hague, CETS 070. 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1999), 27 January 1999, “Criminal law Convention on 
Corruption”, Strasbourg,  CETS 173. 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2001), 23 November 2001, “Convention on 
Cybercrime”, Budapest, CETS 185. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1997), “Act of 19 June 1997 drawing 
up the second protocol of the Convention on the protection the European 
Communities’ financial interests”, OJ C 221 of 19.7.1997, Art. 1(c). 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000), "Convention of 29 May 2000 on 
Mutual Legal Assistance between member states of the European Union", OJ 
C 197/1, 12.7.2000. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2000), “Programme of measures of 30 
November 2000 to implement the principle of mutual recognition of 
decisions in criminal matters”, OJ C 12, 15.1.2001. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001), Explanatory note on the 
Initiative from the French republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the United 
Kingdom for the adoption by the Council on a draft framework decision on 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties 
(10710/01),  
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/01/st10/st10710-ad01.en01.pdf. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002), “Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on combating terrorism (as amended by Council Framework 
Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008)”, OJ L 330/21, 9.12.2008. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002), “Framework Decision 
2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the legal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence”, OJ L 328 of 5.12.2002. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2003), “Framework Decision 
2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector”, 
OJ L 192 of 31.7.2003. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004), “Framework Decision 
2004/757/JHA of 25 October 2004 laying down minimum provisions on the 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
146 
 
constituent elements of criminal acts and penalties in the field of illicit drug 
trafficking”, OJ L 335 of 11.11.2004. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005), “Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA on attacks against information system, adopted on 21 February 
2005”, OJ L 69 of 16.3.2005.  
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005), “Framework Decision of 24 
February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
financial penalties”, OJ L 76/16, 22.3.2005. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2006), “Framework Decision of 6 
October 2006 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
confiscation orders”, OJ L 328, 24.11.2006. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2008), "Framework Decision 
2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member 
states of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings." OJ 
L 220, 15.08.2008. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2008), “Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial 
sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of 
their enforcement in the European Union” OJ L 327/27, 5.12.2008. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009), “Framework Decision 
2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and content of the 
exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member 
states” OJ L 93/23, 7.4.2009. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009), “Framework Decision 
2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal 
Records Information System (ECRIS) in application of Article 11 of 
Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA” OJ L 93/33, 7.4.2009. 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2009), “Resolution of 30 November 
2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected or 
accused persons in criminal proceedings”, OJ C 295/1, 4.12.2009. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004), “Green Paper on the approximation, mutual 
recognition and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union”. 
COM (2004) 334 final of 30.04.2004. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2005), “White Paper on exchanges of information 
on convictions and the effect of such convictions in the European Union”. 
COM (2005) 10 final of 25.1.2005. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007), “Acquis of the European Union - Title IV of 
the TEC, 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010), DG Justice, Invitation to tender, 
JLS/2010/JPEN/PR/0009/E4, “Study on the liability of legal persons for 
offences in the national legal systems of the Member States”.  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
147 
 
6.2 Case-law 
ECtHR, Application no. 6903/75, 27 February 1980, Deweer v. Belgium. 
ECtHR, Appliction nos. 10588/83, 10589/83, 10590/83, 6 December 1988, Barbera, 
Messugue and Jarbardo v. Spain.  
ECtHR, Application no. 11598/85, 27 February 1992, Societe Stenuit v. France. 
ECtHR, Application no. 12547/86, 24 February 1994, Bendenoun v. France. 
ECtHR, Application no. 18465/91, 5 May 1995, Air Canada v. UK. 
ECtHR, Application no. 18114/02, 18 October 2006, Hermi v. Italy, par. 58-67. 
Polish Constitutional Court, 3 November 2004, K. 18/3, available at 
www.trybunal.gov.pl.  
US Supreme Court, New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 
212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909).  
 
6.3 Doctrine 
ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des 
personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La 
Charte, 2008, 500p. 
ADAM, S., VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT, W., “Corporate criminal liability and 
the EC/EU: bridging sovereignty paradigms for the sake of an area of justice, 
freedom and security” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La 
responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in 
Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 373-432. 
ADAM, S., BLAISE, N., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N., “Conclusions” in ADAM, S., 
COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes 
morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 
2008, 433-463. 
AIOLFI, G. and PIETH, M. “International aspects of corporate liability and 
corruption” in S. TULLY (ed.), Research Handbook on Corporate legal 
Responsibility, Northampton, Elgar, 2005, 689. 
ANDERSSON, T. "Harmonisation and Mutual Recognition: How to Handle 
Mutual Distrust?" European Business Law Review 2006, 17, p 747-752. 
ANDREANGELI, A., “Toward an EU Competition Court: “Article-6-
Proofing”Antitrust Proceedings before the Commission ?”, World Competition 
30 (4), 595-622. 
ASTARLOA, E., “Criminal liability of legal persons in Spain. An evolving hot 
topic” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité 
pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, 
Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 131-146. 
AUSTIN, J., CAMPBELL, R., AUSTIN, S. (eds.), Lectures on jurisprudence, or, The 
philosophy of positive law, London, J. Murray, 1911. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
148 
 
BRAUM, S., “Le principe de culpabilité et la responsabilité pénale des personnes 
morales. Remarques relatives au projes de loi Luxembourgeois" in ADAM, S., 
COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes 
morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 
2008, 227-239. 
CAPE, E., NAMORADZE, Z., SMITH, R. and SPRONKEN, T., Effective Criminal 
Defense in Europe, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010, 687p. 
COISNE, S. and WAETERINCKX, P., “La sauvegarde des droits de la défense 
d’une personne morale, son droit au silence et le mandataire ad hoc comme 
garant de ces droits” in NIHOUL, M. (dir.), La responsabilité pénale des 
personnes morales en Belgique, Bruges, La Charte, 2005, 501p. 
COLVIN, E., “Corporate Personality and Criminal liability”, Criminal law forum, 
1995, 1-44. 
DE BONDT, W.  and G. VERMEULEN, “EULOCS:  contextualising the need for, 
added value and requirements of an EU level offence classification system” 
in VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT W. and RYCKMAN, C. (eds.) Rethinking 
international cooperation  in criminal matters in the EU. Moving beyond actors, 
bringing logic back, footed in reality, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2012, 
forthcoming. 
DE SWAEF, M., note concerning judgment Brussels 24 April 1985, Rechtskundig 
weekblad, 1985-1986, 882. 
DEWEY, J., “The historic background of corporate legal personality”, Yale law 
Journal, April 1926, 655-673. 
DÖLLING, D. and LAUE, C., “Corporate criminal liability in Germany: a never 
ending story?” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. (eds.), La 
responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal liability in 
Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 25-46. 
FISSE, B. and BRAITHWAITE, J., Corporations, Crime and Accountability, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, 279p. 
GREVE, V., Det strafferetlige ansvar, Jurist- og Okonomforbundets Forlag, 
Copenhague, 2004. 
JANSSENS, C., The principle of Mutual Recognition in the EU Internal Market and 
the EU Criminal Justice Area: A Study into the Viability of a Cross-policy Approach, 
non-published version of PhD, Antwerp University, 2011. 
JESCHECK, H.-H., “Die strafrecthliche Verantwortlichkeit der 
Personenverbände”, 65 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafwissenschaft [1953] 213. 
LEDERMAN, E., “Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From 
Adaptation and Imitation toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-
Identity”, 4 Buffalo Criminal law review, 2001, 640-708. 
L.H. LEIGH, Strict and Vicarious Liability: A Study in Administrative Criminal Law, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1982. 121p.  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
149 
 
LIGETI, K., "Mutual recognition of financial penalties in the European Union" 
Revue International de Droit Pénal 2006, 77, 145-154. 
MAHONEY, P., “Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal Matters under article 6 
ECHR”, 4 Judicial Studies Institute Journal 2, 107-129. 
MENDES, J.d.C., Teoria Geral do Direito Civil, Vol. I., Lisboa, A.A.F.D.L., 
reeimpressão, 1998.  
NAMYSLOWSKA-GABRYSIAK, B., “Criminal liability of legal persons in 
Poland. Present in law, absent in practice”, ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, 
N. e.a. (eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate 
criminal liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 241-256.  
NILSSON, "From classical judicial cooperation to mutual recognition." Revue 
International de Droit Pénal 2006, 77 (1-2), p 53-59. 
PACQUEE, D., “De “strafrechtspersoon”: bespiegelingen omtrent het moreel 
element in de wet strafrechtelijke verantwoordelijkheid van rechtspersonen”, 
Jura Falconis, vol. 44, 2007-2009, nr. 3, 477-504. 
PIETH, M. “The responsibility of Legal Persons” in PIETH, M., LOW, L. and 
CULLLEN, PJ. (eds.), The OECD Convention on Bribery. A Commentary. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
PIETH, M. and IVORY, R., Corporate Criminal Liability: Emergence, Convergence, 
and Risk,  
PINTO, A. and EVANS, M., Corporate Criminal Liability, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, 
432. 
ROEF, D. and DE ROOS, T. “De strafrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van de 
rechtspersoon in Nederland: rechtstheoretische beschouwingen bij enkele 
praktische knelpunten” in M. FAURE, K. SCHWARZ, De strafrechtelijke en 
civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid van de rechtspersoon en zijn bestuurders, 
Antwerp, Intersentia, 1998, 91 
ROEF, D., “Strafrechelijke verantwoordelijkheid van overheden: een stand van 
zaken”, Verkeersrecht 2011, 7/8, 218-221 
SCHMITT, R. Strafrechtliche Massnahmen gegen Verbände. Gleichzeitig ein Beitrag 
zur Lehre von den strafrechtlichen Unrechtsfolgen, Stuttgart, 1958, 238p. 
SCHNEIDER, A., “Corporate Liability for Manslaughter – A comparison 
between English and German Law”, Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik, 22-43. 
SEPINWALL, A.J., “Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the Boundaries of 
Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime”, 63 Hastings Law Journal, 2011, 
411-454. 
SIMONART, La personnalité morale en droit privé comparé, Brussels, Bruylant, 1995, 
670p.  
STRATENWERTH, G., “Strafrechliche Unternehmenshaftung?” in K. GEPPERT, 
J. BOHNERT and R. RENGIER (eds.), Festschrift für Rudolf Schmitt zum 70. 
Geburtstag, Tübingen, 1992. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
150 
 
STRATENWERTH, G., Schweizerisches Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil I, Bern, § 5 N 
21, 2005.  
TOFTEGAARD NIELSEN, G., "Criminal liability of companies in Denmark. 
Eighty years of experience” in ADAM, S., COLETTE-BASECQZ, N. e.a. 
(eds.), La responsibilité pénale des personnes morales en Europe/Corporate criminal 
liability in Europe, Brussels, La Charte, 2008, 105-129. 
TULLY, S. (ed.), Research handbook on corporate legal responsibility, 
Cheltenham/Northampton, Elgar, 2005, 430p.  
VAN DEN WYNGAERT, C., Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht. In hoofdlijnen, 
Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2011, 568p.  
VALEUR, R., La responsabilité pénale des personnes morales dans les droits francais et 
anglo-américains, Giard, Paris, 1931. 
VERMEULEN, G., VANDER BEKEN, T., DE BUSSER, E. and DORMAELS, A. 
Blueprint for an EU Criminal Records Database. Legal, politico-institutional and 
practical feasibility. Antwerp - Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2002, 91p. 
VERMEULEN, G., “EU Conventions enhancing and updating traditional 
mechanisms for judicial cooperation in criminal matters”, Revue 
International de Droit Pénal 2006, 77 (1-2), 59-95. 
VERMEULEN, G. and DE BONDT, W. EULOCS. The EU level offence classification 
system : a bench-mark for enhanced internal coherence of the EU's criminal policy. 
Antwerp - Apeldoorn - Portland, Maklu, 2009, 212p. 
VERMEULEN, G. and VAN PUYENBROECK, L., “Approximation and mutual 
recognition of procedural safeguards of suspects and defendants in criminal 
proceedings throughout the European Union” in COOLS, M., DE RUYVER, 
B. et al. (eds.), EU and International Crime Control – Gofs Research papers, 
Maklu, Antwerpen, Apeldoorn, Portland, 2010, 41-62. 
VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT W. and RYCKMAN, C. (eds.) Rethinking 
international cooperation  in criminal matters in the EU. Moving beyond actors, 
bringing logic back, footed in reality, Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2012, 
forthcoming. 
VERMEULEN, G., DE BONDT,  RYCKMAN, C., PERŠAK, N., The disqualification 
triad. Approximating legislation. Executing requests. Ensuring equivalence. 
Antwerpen-Apeldoorn, Maklu, 2012, forthcoming. 
WAGNER, M., “Corporate Criminal Liability National and International 
Responses”, 1999, paper presented at the Thirteenth International conference 
of the International Society for the Reform of Criminal low on Commercial 
and Financial Fraud, Malta, 
 http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/CorporateCriminal.pdf 
C. WALSH and A. PYRICH, “Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to 
Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its Soul?”, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605, 
1995, 625. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
151 
 
WAETERINCKX, P., “De strafrechtelijke verantwoordelijkheid van de 
rechtspersoon, een kritische analyse van  enkele capita selecta uit de eerste 
rechtspraak” in X, Strafrecht van nu en straks, Brugge, Die Keure, 2003, 183-
187. 
WELLS, C., “Corporate criminal responsibility” in TULLY, S. (ed.), Research 
handbook on corporate legal responsibility, Cheltenham/Northampton, Elgar, 
2005, 147-159. 
 
  
153 
 
7 Annex: questionnaire 
 
PART 1 – An introduction to the concept of a legal person 
 
1  Definition of a legal person 
 
1.1 Does your national law or legal regime acknowledge the existence of a 
 legal person? 
 No, the concept of legal person is not acknowledged under our national 
law or legal regime 
 Yes, our national law or legal regime acknowledges the concept of a 
legal person 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
1.2  If yes, what is the scope of the definition used to determine a legal 
 person under your Member State’s national law or legal regime? 
 
The project team has anticipated to differences between the national justice systems 
and allows you to make a distinction between private and public legal persons, and 
the position of international organizations. 
 
 Scope of the definition is limited to private legal persons only 
 Scope of the definition is limited to public legal persons only 
 
We would like to know what is meant by a ‘public legal person’ 
according to your national law. Please define the scope of the definition 
used to determine public legal persons. Is it limited according to the 
specific type of legal person? 
 
 Scope is not limited to any specific type of public legal person 
 Scope is limited to specific type of public legal person 
 
If so, please further define the specific scope for public legal 
persons: 
 Public legal person scope is limited to state authorities 
 Public legal person scope is limited to state controlled bodies 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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 Scope of the definition includes both public and private legal persons, 
but excludes international organisations 
Is the scope of the definition used to determine public legal persons 
confined to a specific type of public legal person? 
 
 No, scope is not limited to any specific type of public legal person 
 Yes, scope is limited to specific type of public legal person 
 
Please further define the specific scope: 
 Public legal person scope is limited to state authorities 
 Public legal person scope is limited to state controlled 
 bodies 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 Scope of the definition is not limited to any specific type of legal person 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
1.3  Does your Member State’s law or legal regime acknowledge the existence of 
both multiple person and single owner legal persons? 
 
 No, there is a selection. Our law or legal regime is limited to : 
 
 Only acknowledging the existence of multiple person legal persons 
 Only acknowledging the existence of single person legal persons 
 
 Yes, our law or legal regime acknowledges the existence of both 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
ANNEX: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
155 
 
1.4 Does your Member State’s law or legal regime recognize parent-subsidiary 
 legal person relations? 
 
A parent company is a company that has control over the management and 
operations of another company by influencing or electing its board of directors; the 
second company being deemed as a subsidiary of the parent company. 
 
 No, our law or legal regime does not comprehend 
 Yes, our law or legal regime does comprehend 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
PART 2 – Criminal liability of legal persons 
 
2 Type and scope of criminal liability for legal persons 
 
2.1 Does your Member State’s national law or legal regime acknowledge  
 criminal liability for legal persons? 
 
Please indicate which of the following liability regimes is applicable in your Member 
State. If your Member State applies a combination of liability regimes (E.g. 
criminal/administrative or criminal/civil etc.) please indicate below, you will be 
redirected to the appropriate chapters of the questionnaire. 
 
 No, our law does not acknowledge criminal liability for legal persons 
 
Please specify legal persons liability regime: 
 Our legal system applies administrative liability regime 
 Our legal system applies civil liability regime 
 Our legal system applies a combination of administrative and civil 
liability for legal persons 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 Yes, our law acknowledges criminal liability for legal persons 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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2.2 What is the scope of the criminal liability regime for legal persons utilized 
under your Member State’s law or legal regime? 
 
 A legal person can be held criminally liable under our national 
legislation or legal regime, without any restrictions 
 Criminal liability for legal persons is restricted under our national 
legislation or legal regime 
 
2.3 If you have ticked the second button, what the basis for such restriction? 
 
We have anticipated restrictions based on the type of legal person, the offences 
involved and whether an individual perpetrator has to be identified to confine 
criminal liability of legal persons. Additionally, we have included a free text field for 
you to elaborate on any other bases for restrictions. 
 
 Restriction is based on the type of legal person concerned: 
 
Please further specify: 
 Criminal liability is restricted to strictly private legal persons 
 Criminal liability is restricted to strictly public legal persons 
 
Please further specify: 
 Criminal liability is restricted to State authority 
 Criminal liability is restricted to State controlled bodies 
 Other (please explain) : 
 
Besides restrictions based on the legal persons being either a private or 
public legal person, other restrictions are possible. 
 
 Criminal liability is restricted to multiple person legal persons 
 Criminal liability is restricted to single person legal persons 
 Criminal liability is restricted to parent-corporation-type legal 
persons 
 Criminal liability is restricted to subsidiary-corporation-type 
legal persons 
 
 Restriction is based on specific type of offence 
The legal person’s criminal liability depends on whether specific type of offence 
was committed and can be attributed to the legal person concerned 
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Please further specify: 
 Our legislator has created specific offences to which criminal 
liability is confined 
 Our legislator has opted to confine criminal liability to specific 
offence types under its National Penal Code 
 Restriction is based on whether an individual perpetrator has to 
be identified to confine criminal liability of legal persons 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
2.4 Does your Member State combine criminal liability with another type of 
 liability for legal persons? 
 
 Our law applies a combination of criminal and civil liability for legal 
persons 
When combination option is indicated, please continue to fill out the chapter on 
criminal liability as stated below. 
 
 Our law applies a combination of administrative and criminal liability 
for legal persons 
When this combination option is indicated, please fill out firstly the part on 
criminal liability as stated below, at the end you will reach the administrative 
liability chapter where you can fill out the appropriate administrative liability 
regime utilized by your Member State. 
 
 Our law applies a combination of administrative, civil and criminal 
liability for legal 
When this combination option is indicated, please fill out firstly the part on 
criminal liability as stated below, at the end you will reach the administrative 
liability chapter where you can fill out the appropriate administrative liability 
regime utilized by your Member State. 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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3 Attribution techniques and scope 
 
In the context of this questionnaire, four main attribution theories are distinguished: 
Firstly, the vicarious liability/respondeat superior theory, opting for an almost civil law 
like attribution by stating that ‘any’ misconduct by the legal persons’ employees will lead 
to legal person responsibility. 
Secondly, the identification model theory, stating that only managers and employees 
endowed with certain responsibilities may cause criminal liability for the legal person. 
Thirdly, the aggregation model theory, aimed at identifying a collective responsibility of 
individuals within the legal person, rather than identifying an individual perpetrator, 
aggregation could therefore involve matching the conduct of one individual with the 
state of mind or culpability of another individual to achieve liability. 
Fourthly and finally, we will try to review specifically about organizational 
responsibility of the legal person concerned, both when the offences were committed for 
its benefit and otherwise. 
In the following questions, the project team will try to identify in which of these theories 
your national law or legal regime fits best. 
To anticipate to any differences in your legal order based on the status of the offender, 
this section makes a distinction between first offences committed by the legal person’s 
employees and second offences committed by the legal person’s hierarchy. 
 
3.1 Offences by its employees 
 
3.1.1 How will criminal liability be attributed to a legal person under your 
Member State’s national law or legal regime for offences committed by its 
employees? 
 
We have anticipated a potential difference in your reply for offences committed 
- either for the benefit of the legal person 
- or within the legal person’s activities. 
For each of these two techniques we will ask you a set of additional questions. 
Additionally, we have foreseen a free text field should the attribution be regulated 
in a third manner in your member state. 
 
 The legal person can incur liability for offences committed by its 
employees, even when they are deprived of any managerial or 
representative responsibility, when the offences are committed for the 
benefit of the legal person 
 
If this explains the attribution in your country: 
3.1.1.1 Please further specify: Can the legal person avoid its liability as 
stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
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instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid the 
commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational exception for liability is not recognised 
 Yes, legal person can avoid liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
3.1.1.2 Please further specify: Can the legal person restrict its liability as 
stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid the 
commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational motive for restriction of liability is not 
recognised 
 Yes, legal person can restrict liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 The legal person can incur liability for offences committed by its 
employees, even when they are deprived of any managerial or 
representative responsibility, when the offences are committed within 
the legal person's activities. 
 
This means without the need to prove any advantage or benefit achieved by the 
legal person. 
 
If this explains the attribution in your country: 
 
3.1.1.3 Please further specify: Can the legal person avoid its liability as 
stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid the 
commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational exception for liability is not recognised 
 Yes, legal person can avoid liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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3.1.1.4 Please further specify: Can the legal person restrict its liability as 
stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid the 
commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational motive for restriction of liability is not 
recognised 
 Yes, legal person can restrict liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
3.1.1.5 How does your National Member State’s law or legal regime 
define the concept of ‘within the legal person’s activities’? 
 
 Our law applies the broadest scope of this concept: any link with 
the legal person can attribute criminal liability 
 Our law applies a restricted scope of this concept: specific type(s) 
of activities are required to attribute criminal liability 
 
Please further specify: 
 Legal person's activities are defined in accordance to the legal 
person's statutes 
 Legal person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
purpose for which the legal person was founded 
This implies the de facto purpose of the legal person rather than the 
construed purpose in the statutes 
 Legal Person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
present corporate culture 
This implies the current purpose/mentality/structure/.. of the legal 
person 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 Other besides 'for the benefit' and/or 'within the activities' (please 
explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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3.2 Offences by hierarchy of the legal person’s staff 
 
3.2.1 How will criminal liability be attributed to a legal person under your 
Member State’s national law or legal regime for offences committed by 
hierarchy of the legal person’s staff? 
 
We have anticipated a potential difference in your reply for offences committed 
- either for the benefit of the legal person 
- or within the legal person’s activities. 
For each of these two techniques we will ask you a set of additional questions. 
Additionally, we have foreseen a free text field should the attribution be regulated 
in a third manner in your member state. 
 
 The legal person's liability is confined to offences committed by 
certain hierarchy of company staff and for the benefit of the legal 
person 
 
If this explains the attribution in your country: 
 
3.2.1.1 Please further specify the scope of the definition of hierarchy 
of company staff: 
Please indicate how large the ‘inner circle’ of hierarchy company staff that 
will lead to attribution exactly is: 
 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a person 
who has a leading position within the legal person based on a 
power of representation of the legal person 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a person 
who has a leading position within the legal person based on an 
authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a person 
who has a leading position within the legal person based on an 
authority to exercise control within the legal person 
 All of the above are considered within the scope of the hierarchy 
of company staff 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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3.2.1.2 Please further specify: Can the legal person avoid its liability 
as stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid 
the commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational exception for liability is not recognised 
 Yes, legal person can avoid liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
3.2.1.3 Please further specify: Can the legal person restrict its liability 
as stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid 
the commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational motive for restriction of liability is not 
recognised 
 Yes, legal person can restrict liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 The legal person's liability is confined to offences committed by 
certain hierarchy of company staff when they are committed within 
the legal person's activities 
 
Without the need to prove any advantage or benefit achieved by the 
legal person 
If this explains the attribution in your country: 
 
3.2.1.4 Please further specify the scope of the definition of hierarchy 
of company staff: 
 
 Please indicate how large the ‘inner circle’ of hierarchy 
company staff that will lead to attribution exactly is, by 
indicating the following: 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a 
person who has a leading position within the legal person 
based on a power of representation of the legal person 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a 
person who has a leading position within the legal person 
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based on an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal 
person 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a 
person who has a leading position within the legal person 
based on an authority to exercise control within the legal 
person 
 All of the above are considered within the scope of the 
hierarchy of company staff 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
3.2.1.5 Please further specify: Can the legal person avoid its liability 
as stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid 
the commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational exception for liability is not recognised 
 Yes, legal person can avoid liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
3.2.1.6 Please further specify: Can the legal person restrict its liability 
as stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid 
the commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational motive for restriction of liability is not 
recognised 
 Yes, legal person can restrict liability attribution when the 
above stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
3.2.1.7 Please indicate further: How does your National Member 
State’s law or legal regime defines the concept of ‘within the legal 
person’s activities’? 
 
 Our law applies the broadest scope of this concept: any link 
with the legal person can attribute criminal liability 
 Our law applies a restricted scope of this concept: specific 
type(s) of activities are required to attribute criminal liability 
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Please further specify: 
 Legal person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
legal person's statutes 
 Legal person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
purpose for which the legal person was founded 
This implies the de facto purpose of the legal person, rather than 
the construed purpose in the statutes 
 Legal Person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
present corporate culture 
This implies the current purpose/mentality/structure/.. of the 
legal person 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 Other besides 'for the benefit' and/or 'within the activities' (please 
explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
3.3 Does your Member State’s law or legal regime -as a rule- require the 
establishment of ‘mens rea’ for a legal person? 
 
This question is specifically aimed at retrieving whether and how the ‘mens rea’ idea 
(where a culpable state of mind – or less implicitly: ‘guilt’- is required for a certain 
offence to attribute criminal liability) is incorporated in your law or legal regime legal 
persons 
 
 NO, our law has created specific type of (objectified) liability for legal 
persons, not requiring a culpable state of mind 
 NO, our law has not created specific type of liability, but has restricted 
liability for legal persons to those offences that do not require a culpable 
state of mind 
Here, mens rea is to be considered in the broad sense; not so much as guilt 
directly linked to the perpetration of an offense, but as a general requirement for 
liability for offences. 
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 NO, for another reason (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 YES, identification of the individual physical perpetrator is necessary 
under your law or legal regime 
This means a direct link has to be made between the individual connected with 
the legal person who has committed the offence to attribute a culpable state 
of mind to the legal person 
 YES, our law entirely recognizes mens rea for a legal person, no division 
between natural persons and legal persons can be made 
 YES, for another reason (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
4  Criminal offences 
 
4.1 For what kind of offences can a legal person be held criminally liable under  
 your Members State’s national law or legal regime? 
 
 All kinds. Law or legal regime makes no difference between legal and 
natural persons 
 Law or legal regime has introduced criminal liability for legal persons for 
(a) specific categor(y)(ies) of offences: 
 
If you have ticked this second button, please indicate for what specific category or 
categories criminal liability is applied: 
 Liability is restricted to economic offences 
 Liability is restricted to tax offences 
 Liability is restricted to environmental offences 
 Liability is restricted to illicit trafficking related offences 
 Liability is restricted to fraud offence types 
 Liability is restricted to theft and dishonesty offence types 
 Liability is restricted to offences not requiring commission by a 
natural person 
With this box a type of offences is targeted where corpus reus (an actual 
physical body to commit a certain crime with) is inevitable for criminal 
liability. E.g. rape, sexual aggression, manslaughter, etc. 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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 Law or legal regime has introduced criminal liability for legal persons for 
specific type of offences 
 
This means your national law or legal regime has not opted for a specific category 
of offences, but chose to introduce liability for specific types of offences. Please use 
the table on the following page to provide an overview of the scope of the criminal 
liability of legal persons. 
 
If you have ticked the third 
button, please indicate for 
what specific type of 
offence criminal liability is 
applied: 
 
Please indicate 
when criminal 
liability for a legal 
person was 
introduced in 
national law or 
legal regime for 
the offence type 
Please wait to fill 
in this tick box on 
sanctions until you 
have reached 
sanction chapter, 
you will be 
redirected 
Participation in a criminal 
organization 
  
Terrorism   
Trafficking in human 
beings 
  
Sexual exploitation of 
children and child 
pornography 
  
Illicit trafficking in narcotic 
drugs and 
psychotropic substances 
  
Illicit trafficking in 
weapons, munitions 
and explosives 
  
Corruption   
Fraud   
Laundering of the proceeds 
of crime 
  
Counterfeiting currency, 
including of the euro 
  
Computer-related crime   
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Environmental crime, 
including illicit 
trafficking in endangered 
animal species 
and endangered plant 
species and 
varieties 
  
Facilitation of 
unauthorized entry and 
residence 
  
Murder, grievous bodily 
injury 
  
Manslaughter   
Illicit trade in human 
organs and tissue 
  
Kidnapping, illegal 
restraint and hostage 
taking 
  
Racism and xenophobia   
Organized or armed 
robbery 
  
Illicit trafficking in cultural 
goods, including antiques 
and works of art 
  
Swindling   
Racketeering and extortion   
Counterfeiting and piracy 
of products 
  
Forgery of administrative 
documents and 
trafficking therein 
  
Forgery of means of 
payment 
  
Illicit trafficking in 
hormonal substances and 
other growth promotors 
  
Illicit trafficking in nuclear 
or radioactive 
materials 
  
Trafficking in stolen 
vehicles 
  
Rape   
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Arson   
Crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the 
international criminal court 
  
Unlawful seizure of 
aircaft/ships 
  
Sabotage   
Conduct which infringes 
road traffic 
regulations, including 
breaches of 
regulations pertaining to 
driving hours and 
rest periods and regulation 
on hazardous 
goods 
  
Smuggling of goods 
Infringements of 
intellectual property 
  
Threats and acts of violence 
against persons, 
including violence during 
sport events 
  
Criminal damage   
Theft   
Offences against 
workplaces health and 
safety 
  
Other (please explain)   
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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5  Applicable sanctions 
 
5.1 Does your national law hold preventive measures that can be imposed on 
legal persons? 
 
Firstly, the project team would like to gain some insight into the preventive measures 
that can be imposed on legal persons during the trial. If specific types of preventive 
measures exist under national law or legal regime, please elaborate: 
Insert your reply 
 
5.2 What types of sanctions are used under your Member State’s national 
 law or legal regime to sanction a criminally liable legal person? 
 
 Member State's law or legal regime makes no division in sanctions for 
legal persons as opposed to physical persons: when a certain sanction is 
not manageable, conversion is applied  
 Member State's law or legal regime makes a division in sanctions for legal 
persons as opposed to natural persons 
 
Please further specify, using the tick boxes and tables on the following pages 
 
 Our law or legal regime opted for a number or existing sanctions to be 
applied, in conciliation with legal person's specific status 
 
This means that your law or legal regime has not created any specific type of 
sanction, but has simply indicated which available sanctions can be applied to a 
convicted legal person. 
 
If you have ticked this first 
box, please further specify 
the type of sanction: 
 
Please indicate when 
specific sanction was 
introduced in 
national law or legal 
regime 
Please elaborate 
(if applicable) on 
the minima 
and/or maxima 
that apply 
Loss of legal personality   
Public pronouncement of 
the conviction 
  
Prohibition to participate in 
public tenders 
  
Prohibition to advertise 
goods or services 
  
Public) admonition   
Financial penalties   
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Obligation to file various 
information to the 
authorities within certain 
time limits 
  
Placement of the legal 
person under judicial 
administration in order to 
safeguard the rights of 
employees or creditors 
  
Obligation to fulfil certain 
organizational measures 
  
Liquidation   
Prohibition of entering into 
certain Agreements 
  
Prohibition of doing 
business 
  
Other (please explain)   
 
 Our law or legal regime has created specific types of sanctions, 
specifically aimed at targeting legal persons 
This means that your law or legal regime has created specific sanctions for legal 
persons 
 
Please further specify the 
type of sanction: 
 
Please indicate when 
specific sanction was 
introduced in 
national law or legal 
regime 
Please elaborate 
(if applicable) on 
the minima 
and/or maxima 
that apply 
Closing down of -affected- 
branches 
  
Loss of legal personality   
Public pronouncement of 
the conviction 
  
Prohibition to participate in 
public tenders 
  
Prohibition to advertise 
goods or services 
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Prohibition of any specific 
patrimonial operations that 
may entail the significant 
reduction of the 
patrimonial assets or the 
legal person's insolvency 
  
(Public) admonition   
Financial penalties   
Winding-up of the legal 
person 
  
Obligation to file various 
information to the 
authorities within certain 
time limits 
  
Dissolution of the legal 
person 
  
Placement of the legal 
person under judicial 
administration in order to 
safeguard the rights of 
employees or creditors 
  
Obligation to fulfill certain 
organizational measures 
  
Liquidation 
 
  
Prohibition of entering into 
certain agreements 
  
Prohibition to the right to 
receive subsidies 
  
Prohibition to trade with 
financial instruments 
  
Prohibition of acquisition of 
licenses, authorizations or 
concessions 
  
Prohibition of the legal 
person's merger, division or 
reduction of the share 
capital 
  
Prohibition of doing 
business 
  
Other (please explain   
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 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
5.3 Is the possibility to impose certain types of sanctions confined to certain 
 types of offences? 
 
 No, Member State has not limited imposition of sanctions to specific 
offence types 
 Yes 
Please specify which sanction is related to which offence type. 
To specify the relation, please write the applicable sanction’s name in the tick 
box which conforms with the offence the sanction is related with. Use 
Ctrl+Click here. 
 
5.4 Under your Member State’s national law or legal regime, on who will the 
sanction ultimately be imposed? 
 Sanction will ultimately be imposed on the legal person only 
 Sanction will ultimately be imposed on the natural person only 
 Sanction can ultimately be imposed on both 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
5.5 Does criminal prosecution of the liable legal person exclude parallel 
prosecution for the natural person/perpetrator? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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5.6 Does criminal prosecution of the liable natural person/perpetrator exclude 
parallel prosecution for the liable legal person? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
6 Criminal records policy 
 
6.1 Does your country keep criminal records for legal persons? 
 No 
 Yes, but only with respect to legal persons that are established within 
our territory 
 Yes, with respect to legal persons that we have convicted, regardless of 
their establishment within or outside our territory 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
6.2 What kind of information do you store in your criminal records with respect 
to convictions of legal persons? 
 
6.2.1 With respect to the legal person 
 Legal name 
 Shortened name, commonly used name or trading name, if applicable 
 Country of incorporation/establishment 
 Register and number of incorporation 
 Address of registered office 
 Name of legal representative 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation 
6.2.2 With respect to the offence 
 Legal definition 
 Legal provision 
 Date (or period) of facts 
 Place(s) of facts 
 Number of acts committed 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation 
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6.2.3 With respect to the level of completion 
 Completed 
 Attempted 
 Other (please explain) 
 Insert your explanation 
6.2.4 With respect to the level of participation 
 Perpetrator 
 Accomplice  
 Accessory (aiding and abetting) 
 Instigator  
 Other (please explain) 
 Insert your explanation 
 
6.2.5 With respect to the sanction 
 Type of Sanction 
 Duration / height 
 Enforcement Status 
 Erasure / deletion date 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
6.3 Do you have separate erase and deletion rules for convictions handed down 
against legal persons? 
 
From a theoretical perspective, a legal person can live forever. Therefore the question 
arises to what extent a legal person should be confronted with the consequences of 
offences committed in the past, knowing that the staff of the legal person may have 
been completely replaced.  
With erasing rules, we intend to refer to the situation where a conviction is no longer 
mentioned on the criminal record extract issued in the convicting state, but remains 
included in the criminal record. This means that the conviction information can still 
be used for specific purposes.  
With deletion rules, we intend to refer to the situation where a person’s criminal 
record itself is expunged and any data on the conviction is deleted from all records so 
that it cannot be used any longer in the future. 
 
 Erasure or deletion does not exist in our national law 
 One single system applies to all convictions, regardless of whether the 
conviction was handed down against a natural or legal person 
ANNEX: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
175 
 
Please briefly elaborate on the basic principles 
 Additional rules - on top of the system developed for natural persons - 
that applies to convictions handed down against legal persons 
 A completely separate system applies to convictions handed down to a 
legal person 
Please briefly elaborate on the basic principles and summarize the differences with 
respect to the rules that apply to convictions handed down against natural 
persons. 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
6.4 Do you notify other member states if you have imposed a criminal sanction 
upon a legal person established/incorporated in another member state? 
 
At EU level, obligations to exchange criminal records information are currently 
limited to convictions handed down against natural persons. Convictions against 
legal persons are not included. Nevertheless, it remains interesting to gain insight 
into the flow of criminal records information with respect to legal persons, beyond 
EU obligations. 
 
 Only with respect to some member states 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some types of legal persons 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some offences 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some sanctions 
Insert your explanation here 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation here 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
6.5 Do you store information on convictions handed down by other member 
states upon a legal person established/incorporated in your member 
state? 
 
 We have never received information on a foreign conviction handed 
down against a legal person established/incorporated in our member 
state 
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 No, we cannot store information on foreign convictions (due to legal or 
technical limitations) 
 No, we cannot store information on foreign convictions (due to legal or 
technical limitations) 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some member states 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some types of legal persons 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some offences 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some sanctions 
Insert your explanation here 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation here 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
At the end of the questionnaire, an open-opinion chapter is foreseen for the respondents. 
If the administrative liability chapter is not applicable in your Member State, please click 
here and you will be immediately directed to this final chapter. 
 
PART 3 – Administrative liability of legal persons 
 
7  Type and scope of administrative liability for legal persons 
 
7.1 What is the scope of the administrative liability regime for legal persons 
 utilized under your Member State’s law or legal regime? 
 
 A legal person can be held administratively liable under our national 
law or legal regime, without any restrictions 
 Administrative liability for legal persons is restricted under our national 
law or legal regime 
 
7.2 If you have ticked this second button, what is the basis for such restriction? 
 
 Restriction is based on the type of legal person concerned 
 
Please further specify: 
 Administrative liability is restricted to strictly private legal 
persons 
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 Administrative liability is restricted to strictly public legal 
persons 
Please further specify: 
 Administrative liability is restricted to State authority 
 Administrative liability is restricted to State controlled 
bodies 
 Other (please explain) : 
 Insert your explanation 
 
 
Other possible restrictions: 
 Administrative liability is restricted to multiple person legal 
persons 
 Administrative liability is restricted to single person legal 
persons 
 Administrative liability is restricted to parent-corporation type 
legal persons 
 Administrative liability is restricted to subsidiary-corporation 
type legal persons 
 
 Restriction is based on specific type of offence  
 
A legal person’s administrative liability depends on whether specific type of offence was 
committed and can be attributed to the legal person concerned 
Please further specify: 
 Our legislator has created specific offences to which administrative 
liability is confined 
 Our legislator has opted to confine criminal liability to specific offence 
types under its National Penal Code 
 Restriction is based on whether an individual perpetrator has to be 
identified to confine criminal liability of legal persons 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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8 Attribution techniques and scope 
 
In the context of this questionnaire, four main attribution theories are distinguished: 
Firstly, the vicarious liability/respondeat superior theory, opting for an almost civil 
law like attribution by stating that ‘any’ misconduct by the legal persons’ employees 
will lead to legal person responsibility. 
Secondly, the identification model theory, stating that only managers and employees 
endowed with certain responsibilities may cause criminal liability for the legal 
person. 
Thirdly, the aggregation model theory, aimed at identifying a collective responsibility 
of individuals within the legal person, rather than identifying an individual 
perpetrator, aggregation could therefore involve matching the conduct of one 
individual with the state of mind or culpability of another individual to achieve 
liability. 
Fourthly and finally, we will try to review specifically about organizational 
responsibility of the legal person concerned, both when the offences were committed 
for its benefit and otherwise. 
In the following questions, the project team will try to identify in which of these 
theories your national law or legal regime fits best. 
To anticipate to any differences in your legal order based on the status of the offender, 
this section makes a distinction between first offences committed by the legal person’s 
employees and second offences committed by the legal person’s hierarchy. 
 
8.1 Offences by its employees 
 
8.1.1 How will administrative liability be attributed to a legal person under your 
Member State’s national law or legal regime for offences committed by its 
employees? 
 
 The legal person can incur liability for offences committed by its 
employees, even when they are deprived of any managerial or 
representative responsibility, when the offences are committed for the 
benefit of the legal person 
 
If this explains the attribution in your country: 
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8.1.1.1 Please further specify: Can the legal person avoid its liability as 
stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid the 
commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational exception for liability is not recognised 
 Yes, legal person can avoid liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
8.1.1.2 Please further specify: Can the legal person restrict its liability as 
stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid the 
commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational motive for restriction of liability is not 
recognised 
 Yes, legal person can restrict liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 The legal person can incur liability for offences committed by its 
employees, even when they are deprived of any managerial or 
representative responsibility, when the offences are committed within 
the legal person's activities. 
 
This means without the need to prove any advantage or benefit achieved by the 
legal person. 
 
If this explains the attribution in your country: 
8.1.1.3 Please further specify: Can the legal person avoid its liability as 
stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid the 
commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational exception for liability is not recognised 
 Yes, legal person can avoid liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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8.1.1.4 Please further specify: Can the legal person restrict its liability as 
stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid the 
commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational motive for restriction of liability is not 
recognised 
 Yes, legal person can restrict liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
8.1.1.5 How does your National Member State’s law or legal regime 
define the concept of ‘within the legal person’s activities’? 
 
 Our law applies the broadest scope of this concept: any link with 
the legal person can attribute criminal liability 
 Our law applies a restricted scope of this concept: specific type(s) 
of activities are required to attribute criminal liability 
 
Please further specify: 
 Legal person's activities are defined in accordance to the legal 
person's statutes 
 Legal person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
purpose for which the legal person was founded 
This implies the de facto purpose of the legal person rather than the 
construed purpose in the statutes 
 Legal Person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
present corporate culture 
This implies the current purpose/mentality/structure/.. of the legal 
person 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 Other besides 'for the benefit' and/or 'within the activities' (please 
explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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8.2 Offences by hierarchy of the legal person’s staff 
 
8.2.1 How will administrative liability be attributed to a legal person under your 
Member State’s national law or legal regime for offences committed by hierarchy 
of the legal person’s staff? 
 
 The legal person's liability is confined to offences committed by 
certain hierarchy of company staff and for the benefit of the legal 
person 
 
If this explains the attribution in your country: 
 
8.2.1.1 Please further specify the scope of the definition of hierarchy 
of company staff: 
 
Please indicate how large the ‘inner circle’ of hierarchy company staff that 
will lead to attribution exactly is: 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a person 
who has a leading position within the legal person based on a 
power of representation of the legal person 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a person 
who has a leading position within the legal person based on an 
authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a person 
who has a leading position within the legal person based on an 
authority to exercise control within the legal person 
 All of the above are considered within the scope of the hierarchy 
of company staff 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
8.2.1.2 Please further specify: Can the legal person avoid its liability 
as stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid 
the commitment of the offence? 
 No, organisational exception for liability is not recognised 
 Yes, legal person can avoid liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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8.2.1.3 Please further specify: Can the legal person restrict its liability 
as stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid 
the commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational motive for restriction of liability is not 
recognised 
 Yes, legal person can restrict liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 The legal person's liability is confined to offences committed by 
certain hierarchy of company staff when they are committed within 
the legal person's activities 
 
Without the need to prove any advantage or benefit achieved by the 
legal person 
If this explains the attribution in your country: 
 
8.2.1.4 Please further specify the scope of the definition of hierarchy 
of company staff: 
 
 Please indicate how large the ‘inner circle’ of hierarchy 
company staff that will lead to attribution exactly is, by 
indicating the following: 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a 
person who has a leading position within the legal person 
based on a power of representation of the legal person 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a 
person who has a leading position within the legal person 
based on an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal 
person 
 The scope of the hierarchy of company staff is limited to a 
person who has a leading position within the legal person 
based on an authority to exercise control within the legal 
person 
 All of the above are considered within the scope of the 
hierarchy of company staff 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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8.2.1.5 Please further specify: Can the legal person avoid its liability 
as stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid 
the commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational exception for liability is not recognised 
 Yes, legal person can avoid liability attribution when the above 
stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 
8.2.1.6 Please further specify: Can the legal person restrict its liability 
as stated above, when it can prove that sufficient organization, duly 
instructions and reasonable care and control were applied to avoid 
the commitment of the offence? 
 
 No, organisational motive for restriction of liability is not 
recognised 
 Yes, legal person can restrict liability attribution when the 
above stated care can be proven 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
8.2.1.7 Please indicate further: How does your National Member 
State’s law or legal regime defines the concept of ‘within the legal 
person’s activities’? 
 
 Our law applies the broadest scope of this concept: any link 
with the legal person can attribute criminal liability 
 Our law applies a restricted scope of this concept: specific 
type(s) of activities are required to attribute criminal liability 
 
Please further specify: 
 Legal person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
legal person's statutes 
 Legal person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
purpose for which the legal person was founded 
This implies the de facto purpose of the legal person, rather than 
the construed purpose in the statutes 
 Legal Person's activities are defined in accordance to the 
present corporate culture 
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This implies the current purpose/mentality/structure/.. of the 
legal person 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 Other besides 'for the benefit' and/or 'within the activities' (please 
explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
8.3. Does your Member State’s national law or legal regime – as a rule – 
require the establishment of ‘mens rea’ for a legal person? 
 
The project team aims at retrieving whether and how the ‘mens rea’ idea (where a 
culpable state of mind – or less implicitly: ‘guilt’- is required for a certain offence to 
attribute administrative liability) is incorporated in your national law or legal regime 
concerning legal persons 
 
 NO, our law has created specific type of (objectified) liability for legal 
persons, not requiring a culpable state of mind 
 NO, our law has not created specific type of liability, but has restricted 
liability for legal persons to those offences that do not require a culpable 
state of mind 
Here, mens rea is to be considered in the broad sense; not so much as guilt 
directly linked to the perpetration of an offense, but as a general requirement for 
liability for offences. 
 NO, for another reason (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 YES, identification of the individual physical perpetrator is necessary 
under your law or legal regime 
This means a direct link has to be made between the individual connected with 
the legal person who has committed the offence to attribute a culpable state 
of mind to the legal person 
 YES, our law entirely recognizes mens rea for a legal person, no division 
between natural persons and legal persons can be made 
 YES, for another reason (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
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Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
9 Administrative offences 
 
9.1 For what kind of offences can a legal person be held administratively liable 
under your Member State’s national law or legal regime? 
 
Offences are meant here as an administrative offence, meaning a breach of a binding 
administrative regulation. When we review the specific categories of offences 
(economical, environmental etc.) it is still under this administrative definition, only 
further specified. 
 
 All kinds. Law or legal regime makes no difference between legal and 
natural persons 
 Law or legal regime has introduced administratiev liability for legal 
persons for (a) specific categor(y)(ies) of offences: 
 
If you have ticked this second button, please indicate for what specific category or 
categories administrative liability is applied: 
 
 Liability is restricted to economic offences 
 Liability is restricted to tax offences 
 Liability is restricted to environmental offences 
 Liability is restricted to illicit trafficking related offences 
 Liability is restricted to fraud offence types 
 Liability is restricted to theft and dishonesty offence types 
 Liability is restricted to offences not requiring commission by a 
natural person 
With this box a type of offences is targeted where corpus reus (an actual 
physical body to commit a certain crime with) is inevitable for 
administrative liability. E.g. rape, sexual aggression, manslaughter, etc. 
 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
 Law or legal regime has introduced administrative liability for legal 
persons for specific type of offences 
 
This means your national law or legal regime has not opted for a specific category 
of offences, but chose to introduce liability for specific types of offences. Please use 
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the table on the following page to provide an overview of the scope of the 
administrative liability of legal persons. 
 
If you have ticked the third 
button, please indicate for 
what specific type of 
offence administrative 
liability is applied: 
 
Please indicate 
when 
administrative 
liability for a legal 
person was 
introduced in 
national law or 
legal regime for 
the offence type 
Please wait to fill 
in this tick box on 
sanctions until you 
have reached 
sanction chapter, 
you will be 
redirected 
Participation in a criminal 
organization 
  
Terrorism   
Trafficking in human 
beings 
  
Sexual exploitation of 
children and child 
pornography 
  
Illicit trafficking in narcotic 
drugs and 
psychotropic substances 
  
Illicit trafficking in 
weapons, munitions 
and explosives 
  
Corruption   
Fraud   
Laundering of the proceeds 
of crime 
  
Counterfeiting currency, 
including of the euro 
  
Computer-related crime   
Environmental crime, 
including illicit 
trafficking in endangered 
animal species 
and endangered plant 
species and 
varieties 
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Facilitation of 
unauthorized entry and 
residence 
  
Murder, grievous bodily 
injury 
  
Manslaughter   
Illicit trade in human 
organs and tissue 
  
Kidnapping, illegal 
restraint and hostage 
taking 
  
Racism and xenophobia   
Organized or armed 
robbery 
  
Illicit trafficking in cultural 
goods, including antiques 
and works of art 
  
Swindling   
Racketeering and extortion   
Counterfeiting and piracy 
of products 
  
Forgery of administrative 
documents and 
trafficking therein 
  
Forgery of means of 
payment 
  
Illicit trafficking in 
hormonal substances and 
other growth promotors 
  
Illicit trafficking in nuclear 
or radioactive 
materials 
  
Trafficking in stolen 
vehicles 
  
Rape   
Arson   
Crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the 
international criminal court 
  
Unlawful seizure of 
aircaft/ships 
  
Sabotage   
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Conduct which infringes 
road traffic 
regulations, including 
breaches of 
regulations pertaining to 
driving hours and 
rest periods and regulation 
on hazardous 
goods 
  
Smuggling of goods 
Infringements of 
intellectual property 
  
Threats and acts of violence 
against persons, 
including violence during 
sport events 
  
Criminal damage   
Theft   
Offences against 
workplaces health and 
safety 
  
Other (please explain)   
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
10 Applicable sanctions 
 
10.1 What types of (administrative) sanctions are used under your Member 
State’s national law or legal regime to sanction administrative offences 
attributed to a legal person? 
 
Sanctions are addressed as administrative sanctions. However, given the possible 
divergence of ideology and/or approach of the administrative liability of legal persons in 
the Member States, further specification is required. 
 
 Our law or legal regime makes no division in sanctions for legal persons 
as opposed to physical persons: when a certain sanction is not 
manageable, conversion is applied 
 Our law or legal regime opted for a number or sanctions to be applied, in 
conciliation with legal person's specific status 
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This means that your law or legal regime has not created any specific type of 
sanction, but has simply indicated which available sanctions under 
administrative law can be applied to a convicted legal person. 
Please further specify the type of sanction: 
 
If you have ticked this first 
box, please further specify 
the type of sanction: 
 
Please indicate when 
specific sanction was 
introduced in 
national law or legal 
regime 
Please elaborate 
(if applicable) on 
the minima 
and/or maxima 
that apply 
Loss of legal personality   
Public pronouncement of 
the conviction 
  
Prohibition to participate in 
public tenders 
  
Prohibition to advertise 
goods or services 
  
Public) admonition   
Financial penalties   
Obligation to file various 
information to the 
authorities within certain 
time limits 
  
Placement of the legal 
person under judicial 
administration in order to 
safeguard the rights of 
employees or creditors 
  
Obligation to fulfil certain 
organizational measures 
  
Liquidation   
Prohibition of entering into 
certain Agreements 
  
Prohibition of doing 
business 
  
Other (please explain)   
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 Member State's law or legal regime has created specific types of sanctions, 
specifically aimed at targeting legal persons 
 
This means your law or legal regime has created specific sanctions for legal 
persons. 
 
Please further specify the 
type of sanction: 
 
Please indicate when 
specific sanction was 
introduced in 
national law or legal 
regime 
Please elaborate 
(if applicable) on 
the minima 
and/or maxima 
that apply 
Closing down of -affected- 
branches 
  
Loss of legal personality   
Public pronouncement of 
the conviction 
  
Prohibition to participate in 
public tenders 
  
Prohibition to advertise 
goods or services 
  
Prohibition of any specific 
patrimonial operations that 
may entail the significant 
reduction of the 
patrimonial assets or the 
legal person's insolvency 
  
(Public) admonition   
Financial penalties   
Winding-up of the legal 
person 
  
Obligation to file various 
information to the 
authorities within certain 
time limits 
  
Dissolution of the legal 
person 
  
Placement of the legal 
person under judicial 
administration in order to 
safeguard the rights of 
employees or creditors 
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Obligation to fulfill certain 
organizational measures 
  
Liquidation 
 
  
Prohibition of entering into 
certain agreements 
  
Prohibition to the right to 
receive subsidies 
  
Prohibition to trade with 
financial instruments 
  
Prohibition of acquisition of 
licenses, authorizations or 
concessions 
  
Prohibition of the legal 
person's merger, division or 
reduction of the share 
capital 
  
Prohibition of doing 
business 
  
Other (please explain   
 
 
10.2 Is the possibility to impose certain types of sanctions confined to certain 
types of offences? 
 
 No, Member State has not limited imposition of sanctions to specific 
offence types 
 Yes 
Please specify which sanction is related to which offence type 
To specify the relation, please write the applicable sanction’s name in the tick 
box which conforms with the offence the sanction is related with. Press 
ctrl.+click here 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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10.3 Under your Member State’s national law or legal regime, on who will the 
sanction ultimately be imposed? 
 Sanction will ultimately be imposed on the legal person only 
 Sanction will ultimately be imposed on the natural person only 
 Sanction can ultimately be imposed on both 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
10.4 Does administrative prosecution of the liable legal person exclude parallel 
prosecution for the natural person/perpetrator? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
10.5 Does administrative prosecution of the liable natural person/perpetrator 
exclude parallel prosecution for the liable legal person? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Other (please explain) : 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
11 Administrative records policy 
 
11.1 Does your country keep administrative records for legal persons? 
 No 
 Yes, but only with respect to legal persons that are established within 
our territory 
 Yes, with respect to legal persons that we have convicted, regardless of 
their establishment within or outside our territory 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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11.2 What kind of information do you store in your administrative records with 
respect to convictions of legal persons? 
 
11.2.1 With respect to the legal person 
 Legal name 
 Shortened name, commonly used name or trading name, if applicable 
 Country of incorporation/establishment 
 Register and number of incorporation 
 Address of registered office 
 Name of legal representative 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation 
11.2.2 With respect to the offence 
 Legal definition 
 Legal provision 
 Date (or period) of facts 
 Place(s) of facts 
 Number of acts committed 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation 
11.2.3 With respect to the level of completion 
 Completed 
 Attempted 
 Other (please explain) 
 Insert your explanation 
11.2.4 With respect to the level of participation 
 Perpetrator 
 Accomplice  
 Accessory (aiding and abetting) 
 Instigator  
 Other (please explain) 
 Insert your explanation 
11.2.5 With respect to the sanction 
 Type of Sanction 
 Duration / height 
 Enforcement Status 
 Erasure / deletion date 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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11.3 Do you have separate erase and deletion rules for convictions handed down 
against legal persons? 
 
From a theoretical perspective, a legal person can live forever. Therefore the question 
arises to what extent a legal person should be confronted with the consequences of 
offences committed in the past, knowing that the staff of the legal person may have 
been completely replaced.  
With erasing rules, we intend to refer to the situation where a conviction is no longer 
mentioned on the criminal record extract issued in the convicting state, but remains 
included in the criminal record. This means that the conviction information can still 
be used for specific purposes.  
With deletion rules, we intend to refer to the situation where a person’s criminal 
record itself is expunged and any data on the conviction is deleted from all records so 
that it cannot be used any longer in the future. 
 
 Erasure or deletion does not exist in our national law 
 One single system applies to all convictions, regardless of whether the 
conviction was handed down against a natural or legal person 
Please briefly elaborate on the basic principles 
 Additional rules - on top of the system developed for natural persons - 
that applies to convictions handed down against legal persons 
 A completely separate system applies to convictions handed down to a 
legal person 
Please briefly elaborate on the basic principles and summarize the differences with 
respect to the rules that apply to convictions handed down against natural 
persons. 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
11.4 Do you notify other member states if you have imposed a administrative 
sanction upon a legal person established/incorporated in another member state? 
 
 
 Only with respect to some member states 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some types of legal persons 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some offences 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some sanctions 
Insert your explanation here 
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 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation here 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
 
11.5 Do you store information on convictions handed down by other member 
states upon a legal person established/incorporated in your member 
state? 
 
 We have never received information on a foreign conviction handed 
down against a legal person established/incorporated in our member 
state 
 No, we cannot store information on foreign convictions (due to legal or 
technical limitations) 
 No, we cannot store information on foreign convictions (due to legal or 
technical limitations) 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some member states 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some types of legal persons 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some offences 
Insert your explanation here 
 Only with respect to some sanctions 
Insert your explanation here 
 Other (please explain) 
Insert your explanation here 
 
Additional comment box: 
Feel free to insert a comment with respect to this question: 
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PART 4 – General appreciation of the national approach 
 
12 Final questions 
 
12.1 How would you assess the effectiveness of the current approach of your 
National Member State on the liability of legal persons? 
 
Insert your reply 
 
12.2 Are there future legislative initiatives scheduled on this subject? Could 
you provide your critical reflections on these initiatives, if any? 
 
Insert your reply 
 
12.3 Are there any specificities with respect to your national legislation with 
respect to the liability of legal persons you would like to elaborate on? 
 
Insert your reply 
 
The project team highly appreciates the time and effort you have put into the completion 
of the questionnaire. Without the input from national experts, it would be impossible to 
gather the necessary information in a such short timeframe. We will keep you updated on 
the developments in the project and the release of the final report. 
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